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ABSTRACT
MARTIN KUHN: Conceptualizations of Constitutional Privacy and Their Implications in 
Federal Dataveillance
(Under the direction of Cathy Packer, Ph.D.)
The federal government’s use of new data technologies, specifically knowledge 
discovery in databases (KDD) applications, in counterterrorism efforts presents a serious 
challenge to existing constitutional privacy protections. The purpose of this dissertation is to 
explore whether this use of KDD technology infringes upon a constitutional right to 
information privacy.  A broad discussion of how the constitutional right to privacy in general 
and information privacy in particular has been conceptualized by the courts is presented.
Following a review of privacy scholarship, traditional legal case analysis is used to identify 
privacy conceptualizations in three types of privacy cases: U.S. Supreme Court First 
Amendment anonymous speech and association cases, Fourth Amendment privacy cases, and 
those Supreme Court and U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal cases involving information privacy 
claims.
Five conceptualizations of privacy are discussed. Three were found in the privacy 
scholarship: privacy as space, privacy as secrecy, and privacy as information control. The
analysis of U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal information privacy cases
reveals a newly emerging conceptualization of privacy, privacy as confidentiality.  Under this
conceptualization, individuals are empowered to compel government to safeguard the 
personal information it has forced them to surrender  and to hold state actors responsible for 
iv
knowing which constitutional information privacy interests are clearly established. This is a 
significant departure from the first three conceptualizations because the responsibility for
protecting personal information resides with the government rather than the individuals to 
whom the information belongs.  
The most significant finding presented in this dissertation is that none of these four 
conceptualizations are sufficient to protect privacy against KDD dataveillance.  Since these 
applications create new knowledge rather than access and manipulate  existing information, a
new conceptualization, privacy as knowledge control, is needed.  Should the courts adopt and 
vigorously apply a privacy-as-knowledge-control conceptualization of privacy, individuals 
will have the right to be informed that new information regarding them has been created, that 
the government has information safeguards in place to protect this new knowledge, and that 
they have the right to challenge the government on constitutional grounds regarding the use 
of the discovered knowledge.
vFor Rebecca Michelle
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my gratitude to the many individuals who made this 
dissertation possible. I am particularly indebted to my dissertation committee chair, Cathy 
Packer, Ph.D., who welcomed me as an advisee upon the death of my original advisor.  She
encouraged my legal exploration of new technologies, spent many hours guiding me through 
the dissertation process, and forgot that she was entitled to weekends, vacations, and 
holidays. The members of my dissertation committee also have my sincerest thanks.  
Throughout the entire process, Ruth Walden, Ph.D., Frank Fee Ph.D., Paul Jones, M.F.A., 
and Anne Klinefelter, J.D., each dedicated their time and expertise to the project and 
provided me with endless encouragement.  The knowledge and friendship they shared made 
this project both fruitful and enjoyable.
I would also like to thank my wife, Rebecca Kuhn, not only for her encouragement 
during the dissertation process, but for her belief in my abilities as a scholar and teacher
throughout my doctoral program.  Without her constant love and support through the
coursework, conferences, committees, and comprehensive examinations, this dissertation 
could never be.  I am also grateful to my parents, Martin and Evelyn Kuhn, for instilling in 
me at a young age an appreciation for books, learning, and education.  My passion for 
intellectual exploration derives directly from the example they set so long ago.  To my many
family members, friends, and colleagues who listened to my endless chatter about 
information privacy and dataveillance, thank you. Lastly, I would like to thank Dr. Margaret 
“Peggy” Blanchard for bringing me to Chapel Hill.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Chapter
I INFORMATION PRIVACY AND GOVERNMENT DATAVEILLANCE…1
Digital Dossiers and KDD……………………………………………..5
Privacy and Information….…………………………………………..13
Conceptualizations of Privacy: A Review of Scholarly Literature.…..20
Privacy as Space.……………………………………………..22
Privacy as Access to Self.…………………………….27
Privacy as Secrecy...……….…………………………………29
Privacy as Information Control………………………………34
Privacy as Property.…………………………………..39
Privacy as Contract.…………………………………..44
Conclusion...………………………………………………….48
Research Questions…………………………………………………..50
Method……………………………………………………………….51
Study Limitations…………………………………………………….53
II THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PRIVACY AND ANONYMITY…...……….54
Privacy in Anonymous Speech Cases..................................................57
Anonymity and Pamphleteering.……………………………..60
Anonymity and Canvassing.………………………………….70
viii
Privacy in Anonymous Association Cases…………………………..77
Group Control of Member Information.…………………...…79
Compelled Testimony about Group Membership…...……….86
First Amendment Privacy and Surveillance.............................91
Conclusion: Privacy under the First Amendment……………………94
III PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT………………..................96
Due Process and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments............................99
Privacy as Space.……………………………………………………103
Privacy as Secrecy.………………………………………………….114
Privacy as Information Control.……………………….…………….127
Conclusion: Privacy under the Fourth Amendment.….……………..133
IV CONFIDENTIALITY IN INFORMATION PRIVACY CASES………….135
Challenges to Statutes, Subpoenas, and Disclosure Agreements.…..147
The Standard of Review…………………………………….149
The Individual Privacy Interest.…………………………….154
Types of Information.……………………………….155
Plaintiff Categories.………………………………....161
The Government’s Duty. …………………...……….164
The Government Interest.…………………………………...167
The Sixth Circuit.……………………………………………171
§ 1983 and Qualified Immunity Cases……………………………...175
The Scope of Protected Information.………………………..178
Clearly Established Privacy Protections.……………………187
ix
Conclusion.………………………………………………………….193
V KDD AND PRIVACY………………………………………………….......196
Pre-KDD Data Processes.…………………………………………...198
KDD Analysis Applications.………………………………………..199
The State Action Obstacle.………………………………………….202
Pre-KDD Processes and Constitutional Privacy Protections .………205
KDD and Privacy as Knowledge Control.…………………………..206
Implications for Law Enforcement’s Use of KDD Dataveillance......210
Conclusion.….……………………………………………………….214
VI CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………..217
Privacy Conceptualizations.…………………………………………217
Privacy Conceptualizations in Privacy Jurisprudence.…………...…220
First Amendment Privacy.…………………………………..220
Fourth Amendment Privacy.………………………………...224
Reconciling Conceptualizations.…………………………….226
Information Privacy................................................................227
Privacy Conceptualizations and KDD………………………….......233
Directions for Further Study………………………………………..236
REFERENCES......................................................................................................................239
CHAPTER I
INFORMATION PRIVACY AND GOVERNMENT DATAVEILLANCE1
In the opening decades of the Information Age2 two developments have renewed 
a scholarly and public interest in the constitutional right to information privacy. First, 
new and cost-efficient information technologies have enabled the processing of massive 
quantities of data about millions of individuals.  This has allowed large database 
companies (data aggregators) 3  to build digital dossiers4 on individual consumers.  
1
 Roger A. Clarke, Information Technology and Dataveillance, COMM. OF  THE ACM, May 1988, at 499. 
Clarke is a consultant specializing in strategic and policy aspects of eBusiness, information infrastructure, 
and data surveillance and privacy, and he has been in the information technology industry for thirty-five 
years.  He defined dataveillance as “the systematic use of personal data systems in the investigation or 
monitoring of the actions or communications of one or more persons” and further differentiated between 
personal surveillance (surveillance of a specific individual for a particular purpose) and mass surveillance 
(surveillance of a group in order to identify specific individuals for further investigation).
2
 Glossary, A Guide for Developing Countries, http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/readinessguide/glossary.html
(last visited Sept. 26, 2005) (defining Information Age as the current stage in societal development that
began to emerge at the end of the twentieth century and is marked by the increased production, 
transmission, consumption of, and reliance on information).
3 Companies like ChoicePoint, Experian, Acxiom, and LexisNexis began purchasing databases from 
hundreds of private-sector companies, institutions, and organizations.  The data were combined into larger 
and larger databases.  Aggregators “packaged” personal information and either sold data directly or 
contracted for access to the digital dossiers in their massive data warehouses.  See ROBERT O’HARROW, JR., 
NO PLACE TO HIDE 1-6 (2005).
4 DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 2 
(2004). Solove is an associate professor at the George Washington University Law School and has authored 
a number of books and law review articles about information privacy and new database technologies.  He 
wrote, “[D]ossiers are being constructed about all of us.  Data is digitized into binary numerical form, 
which enables computers to be able to store and manipulate it with unprecedented efficiency. There are 
hundreds of companies that are constructing gigantic databases of psychological profiles, amassing data 
about an individual’s race, gender, income, hobbies, and purchases.  Shards of data from our daily 
existence are now being assembled and analyzed—to investigate backgrounds, check credit, market 
products, and make a wide variety of decisions affecting our lives.”
2Second, federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies responded to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001, by using the new information technologies to access 
privately held data in an effort to prevent additional attacks.
Once the technology needed for building digital dossiers emerged, related 
technologies capable of “mining” these records for predictive patterns were developed.5
Since 2001 the United States Intelligence Community (USIC)6 has considered data 
aggregation and analysis technology to be a primary weapon in counterterrorism. John 
Poindexter, former director of DARPA’s7 Information Awareness Office, explained, 
“The only way to detect these terrorists is to look for patterns of activities that are based 
on observations from past terrorist attacks as well as estimates about how terrorists will 
adapt to our measures to avoid detection.”8  Data mining, more accurately known as 
5 Dr. Tony Tether, Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration, Written Statement 
Submitted to the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations, and the 
Census of the House Committee on Government Reform 1 (May 6, 2003), 
http://reform.house.gov/UploadedFiles/DARPA%20testimony.pdf  (defining data mining as the use of 
clever statistical techniques to comb through large amounts of data to discover previously unknown, but 
useful patterns for building predictive models and as finding statistical correlations to discover unknown 
behavior patterns, which are then used to build a predictive model); see also DATA MINING: FEDERAL 
EFFORTS COVER A WIDE RANGE OF USES, GAO-04-548, at 1 (2004) [hereinafter FEDERAL EFFORTS] 
(defining data mining as the application of database technology and techniques—such as statistical analysis 
and modeling—to uncover hidden patterns and subtle relationships in data and to infer rules that allow for 
the prediction of future results); see also Tal Z. Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for 
the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE 
SYMP. L. & TECH. 1 (2002/2003) (Quoting Usama Fayyad, father of data mining technologies, in U.M. 
FAYYAD ET. AL., FROM DATA MINING TO KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY: AN OVERVIEW, IN ADVANCES IN 
KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING (1996) wherein Fayyad defined data mining as the “nontrivial 
process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful and ultimately understandable patterns in the data”).
6
 The term “United States Intelligence Community” or USIC refers to the group of federal agencies and 
departments charged with gathering intelligence, both foreign and domestic, in an effort to protect the 
nation from future terrorist attacks or other external threats.  Examples include the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
7
 The Defense Advanced Research Projects Administration.
8
 John M. Poindexter, Security with Privacy 3 (adapted from Finding the Face of Terror in Data, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at A25), 
http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/campbell/library%20Papers/event%20papers/ISHS/Poindexter.pdf. Poindexter 
also noted that “terrorists operate worldwide, and information about their activities is mixed in with data 
3knowledge discovery in databases (KDD),9  is the technology capable of distinguishing 
these patterns within millions of dossiers and identifying those subjects matching the 
predefined patterns of possible terrorists.  
This type of electronic surveillance of personal data (dataveillance) invokes 
substantial privacy concerns under the First and Fourth amendments and the fledgling 
constitutional right of informational privacy, and the fact that a constitutional right of 
information privacy has not yet been clearly defined complicates matters. Dataveillance 
using KDD raises First Amendment concerns that individuals may self-censor for fear 
that data regarding their expressive activities and personal associations might match a 
federal counterterrorism data pattern. These counterterrorism practices also raise Fourth 
Amendment concerns that dataveillance is a search without probable cause and violates 
an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy regarding his or her personal 
information.  Lastly, the Supreme Court has recognized but not yet defined a 
constitutional right of information privacy – a right for individuals to avoid the 
“disclosure of personal matters”10-- in the penumbras and emanations of the Bill of 
Rights. 
about innocent people;” see also Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DUQ. 
L. REV. 663, 679 (2004). “Virtually every terrorism expert in and out of government believes there is a 
significant risk of another attack.  Unlike during the Cold War, the threat of such an attack is asymmetric. . 
. . [T]he Soviets created ‘things’ that could be observed, the terrorists create only transactions that can be 
sifted from the noise of everyday activity only with great difficulty.”
9
 David Jensen, Data Mining in Networks (Dec. 11, 2002), 
http://kdl.cs.umass.edu/people/jensen/papers/nrcdbsse02/slide10.html. According to Professor Jensen, the 
term “knowledge discovery” is preferable to “data mining” because “these technologies do not ‘mine for 
data’ they ‘mine for knowledge’—they look through data to find knowledge;” see also Daniel J. Solove, 
Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 
1456 (2001). “Information is not the key to power in the Information Age—knowledge is.  Information 
consists of raw facts.  Knowledge is information that has been sifted, sorted, and analyzed.”
10
 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). 
4The purpose of this dissertation is to explore whether the U.S. government’s use 
of KDD technologies infringes upon a constitutional right to information privacy.  It 
explores what the courts have said about the right to privacy in general and information 
privacy in particular in First Amendment anonymous speech and association cases, in 
Fourth Amendment privacy cases, and information privacy cases in the U.S. Circuit 
Courts of Appeal.  Conceptualizations of privacy and information privacy that emerge in 
the case analysis are then applied to the government’s use of KDD dataveillance in order 
to evaluate its constitutionality. This research is presented in the context of a broad 
discussion of what constitutes information privacy and whether information privacy 
needs to be defined differently in order to protect both individual privacy and national 
security.
This is an important research topic primarily because, as Daniel J. Solove wrote, 
“[T]he existing law protecting information privacy has not adequately responded to the 
emergence of digital dossiers.”11 Database technologies have emerged quickly, and as 
technology policy expert Charles Weiss noted: “American values on privacy were 
defined in a previous, less technological era.  These values need to be reexamined and 
redefined for a modern era of data mining and knowledge discovery.”12
Any successful solution may need to be built upon a new conceptualization of the 
constitutional right to information privacy. As Weiss argued, “[T]he legal responses to 
advances in technology have so weakened the limits on the government’s ability to gather 
11
 Solove, supra note 4, at 9.
12
 Charles Weiss, The Coming of Knowledge Discovery: A Final Blow to Privacy Protection?, 2004 U. ILL. 
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 253, 271 (2004). Weiss holds the Chair of Science, Technology, and International 
Affairs at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and was the first 
science and technology advisor to the World Bank.
5aggregate information that a systematic review of the safeguards to privacy is now 
necessary, even if this requires a reexamination of well-settled constitutional 
precedent.”13 This dissertation provides such a reexamination.
Digital Dossiers and KDD
Today’s data technologies have roots in the realms of both consumer marketing 
and federal bureaucracy. In the 1950s and 1960s many private companies began 
collecting data in order to better identify who was purchasing their products or services.14
Initially, they used data grouping15 and matching16 to better target their products and 
advertising.  For instance, an automobile company could separate women who purchased
a particular model car in Chicago within a specific time period from other people in its 
database. 
Data matching is used to build more detailed consumer records for a specific 
market segment. For example, a woman’s name might appear in a database containing 
the group “women who purchased Buicks in Chicago last month” and also in one 
containing women who purchased a baby crib within the last year. A computer could 
13 Id. at 270.
14 Over time demographic, geographic, and eventually psychographic information was gathered and used to 
better “target” both product development and advertisements to prospective customers.
15
 The term “grouping” refers to sorting records in a database by a particular variable or set of variables 
such as age, gender, or consumer behavior.
16
 Clarke, supra note 1, at 504. He defined computer matching as “the exploration of data maintained by 
two or more personal-data systems, in order to merge previously separate data about large numbers of 
individuals; see also ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEBSITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 324 (2000) (noting that marketers began to define targeted “clusters” 
such as “Pools & Patios (affluent Caucasian empty-nest couples), Soccer & Braces (families with 
elementary school youngsters), Blue Blood Estates (very wealthy), Shot Guns & Pick-ups (rural good ole 
boys), Black Enterprise (upwardly mobile African-Americans), even Grumpies (grim, ruthless, upwardly 
mobile professionals—who use lots of credit cards and use them frequently)”).
6match her records in each database and create a new record containing the information 
from both sources.  She might then be grouped into a new data set called “New Driving 
Mothers,” a valuable list for companies producing baby car-seats. Americans have grown 
accustomed to corporations collecting their personal data, and they seem to value having 
marketing messages and products tailored specifically to their tastes.17
The government also used computers to process and store data. Privacy historian 
Robert Ellis Smith wrote, “By the 1960s . . . America had become a credentialed society, 
demanding personal qualifications to receive the coveted benefits of education, 
employment, health care, licenses, and social services.”18 The vast amount of 
“qualifying” information began to overwhelm many departments and agencies at the 
local, state, and federal levels. A national data center was proposed in the mid-1960s to 
provide “more coherent data management to support economic and sociological 
research,” 19  but public sentiment was strongly unfavorable and the proposal was 
eventually dropped.20
17 See Markle Foundation, Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland Security: Second Report 
of the Markle Foundation Task Force 30 (Dec. 2003) [hereinafter Markle Report II], available at 
http://www.markletaskforce.org/.
18 SMITH, supra note 16, at 314-15.
19
 Clarke, supra note 1, at 500; see also United States Department of Health, Education & Welfare, 
Records, Computers, and the Rights of Citizens: Report of the Secretary’s Advisory Community on 
Automated Personal Data Systems 9-10 (1973) (explaining the government’s need for storing and 
analyzing personal data as such: “[A]dministrative data are needed for everyday management of 
transactions. Statistical data are needed for making judgments about people’s character and qualification; 
e.g., in making suitability determinations for employment, commercial credit, welfare assistance, tuition-
loan aid, or disaster relief, and warning that: “The demand generated by all these uses for personal data, and 
for record-keeping systems to store and process them, challenges conventional legal and social controls on 
organizational record keeping.  Records about people are becoming both more ubiquitous and more 
important in everyday life.”).
20 See, e.g., ALAN WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 317-20 (1967) (providing an overview of the press 
reaction to the national data center, the Congressional hearings that resulted, and the eventual tabling of the 
proposal); see also K. A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security: Connecting the Dots to Make Sense 
of Data, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 2 (2004), http://www.stlr.org/cite.cgi?volume=5&article=2
7Since the development of a national data center seemed politically unpopular, the 
federal government has never openly developed a central data storage and processing 
facility.  Data technologies therefore primarily emerged from the private sector.21
Meanwhile, government agencies and departments at the local, state, and federal levels 
continued to collect, store, and utilize data independently of one another. 
Eventually mass marketers began to develop strategies for targeting individual 
consumers rather than broad market segments, and publicly held data was central to this 
purpose. Companies began purchasing public records containing identifiable information 
from federal, state, and local governments.22 This allowed data aggregators to add 
millions of names, addresses, and social security numbers to their largely anonymous 
marketing data.  The public records also infused consumer dossiers with data such as tax 
payments, auto registrations, arrest records, veteran status, political party affiliations, 
(arguing that after the elimination of funding for the Terrorist Information Awareness (TIA) project in 
2003, large database projects and new technologies should  never be cancelled because the technologies 
will be developed anyway by the private sector and without public oversight.  If projects like the proposed 
national data center and TIA were allowed to progress, public discourse would assure that privacy 
protections would be built into the technical and operational architecture.).
21 See SIMSON GARFINKLE, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 35 (2001). 
Garfinkle argued that “we blew it” by not completing the national data center.  He thought it would have 
headed off the future excesses of the credit reporting industry and could have prevented the sea of errors 
that exist in the plethora of private databanks today.  Moreover, with a public system, uses of the data for 
purposes other than those originally intended would have been debated in public, rather than proposed and 
approved behind closed doors; see also Taipale, supra note 20, at  ¶6 (arguing that “not proceeding with 
government funded research and development of these technologies (in which political oversight can 
incorporate privacy protecting features into the design of the technologies) will ultimately lead to a 
diminution in privacy protection as alternative technologies developed without oversight (either through 
classified government programs or proprietary commercial development) are employed in the future, since
those technologies may lack the technical features required to support legal and procedural mechanisms to 
protect privacy and civil liberties).
22 CHARLES J. SYKES, THE END OF PRIVACY 29 (1999) (noting, “Governments are making tens of millions 
of dollars selling public records to junk mailers and other businesses” and that efforts to limit access to 
publicly held personal information “have been halfhearted, at best”); see also ERIK LARSON, THE NAKED 
CONSUMER: HOW OUR PRIVATE LIVES BECOME PUBLIC COMMODITIES 239 (1992) (asserting that the 
government’s practice of selling compelled, personal information to marketers was eroding public trust in 
government and thus “any new [privacy] law must give individuals real, effective control over how the 
information they give to government is used”).
8vital statistics (height, weight, and eye color), property ownership data, census data, and 
marital status. 23   This resulted in a new market for highly detailed digital dossiers. One 
commentator noted that digital dossiers were becoming “commodities, bought and sold 
like bags of potato chips and six packs of beer.”24
Digital dossiers also contain data collected as people move through society doing 
small things such as purchasing products with credit cards, filling out consumer surveys, 
or voting. Most individuals do not realize that they are leaving behind a data trail that 
amounts to a psychographic self-portrait.  Julie E. Cohen, a Georgetown University law 
professor, opined that the “picture” created by an individual’s “record-generating 
behaviors” is in some respects more “detailed and intimate than that produced by visual 
observation.”25 Simson Garfinkle, research fellow at the Center for Research on 
Computation and Society at Harvard University, referred to his transactional data trail as 
his “data shadow.”26  The composite resulting from the collection of the data has also 
been referred to as one’s “digital biography,”27 one’s “information plus,”28 and one’s 
23
 Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. 
REV. 1137, 1194-95 (2002). “Public records . . . are often a principle source of information for the private 
sector in the construction of their databases.  Marketers stock their databases with public record 
information, and the uses to which these databases are put are manifold and potentially limitless.”
24 Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort Response to Consumer 
Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 142 (2003).
25
 Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1373, 1425-26 (2000); see also Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 393, 439
(2002) (explaining that “consumption patterns . . . as revealed by consumer records” allow third parties to 
“pinpoint not only the person’s socioeconomic status, but also his or her cultural and social inclinations.”).
26 GARFINKLE, supra note 21, at 70. He wrote: “[M]y data shadow is largely beyond my control.  Scattered 
across the computers of a hundred different companies, my shadow stands at attention, shoulder-to-
shoulder with an army of other data shadows inside the databanks of corporations and governments all over 
the world.”
27
 Solove, supra note 23, at 1141. “Consolidating various bits of information, each in itself relatively 
unrevealing, can, in the aggregate, begin to paint a portrait of a person’s life.  I refer to this as a ‘digital 
biography’.”
9“data self.”29  In this dissertation the term “digital dossier” is used to refer to an 
individual’s compiled, digital record.  Eventually, KDD technologies developed allowing 
analysts to predict the future behavior of consumers based on data patterns found in their 
dossiers.30
The new security challenges brought by 9-11 have encouraged traditional law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies to rely on access to data held by the private sector 
and on KDD processes. This is exemplified by the ad hoc public-private data partnerships 
that emerged immediately after 9-11. For instance, a travel Website used by the 9-11 
hijackers revealed to the FBI “the patterns the hijackers followed and identified others 
who fit a similar profile,”31 and an airline, JetBlue,® turned over the names and addresses 
of five million passengers for use in a military data mining study on risk assessment.32
The previous “outflow” of information from public databases to private-sector data 
companies has reversed direction. There are currently no restraints on government access 
to commercial data accessed through voluntary disclosure resulting from a government 
28 Karas, supra note 25, at 424 (explaining that privacy law and scholarship seek to protect not mere 
information relating to a person, but rather “information plus,” information that is expressive of one’s self).
29 McClurg, supra note 24, at 142.
30 Lee Tien, Symposium Article, Privacy, Technology and Data Mining, 30 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 389, 395 
(2004) (explaining the difference between mere data matching and KDD as the difference between looking 
up material that is “in” a database and using data mining to discover patterns and relationships in the data 
that “we humans might not think of on our own”).
31
 Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, FBI, Partnership and Prevention: The FBI’s Role in Homeland Security, 
Commonwealth Club of California ¶17 (April 19, 2002), 
http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/speeches/speech041902.htm. 
32
 Markle Report II, supra note 17, at 10-11; see also Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the 
Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1096 (2002) (describing the resulting 
information flow “when the government requests private sector records for particular investigations or 
compels their disclosure by subpoena or court order”).
10
request.33 According to James Dempsey and Laura Flint, executive director and staff 
counsel at the Center for Democracy and Technology, “Third parties that hold consumer 
information often comply with such requests because they want to be helpful to the 
government or because compliance seems to be the path of least resistance.”34
 Along with access to private databases, federal law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies have come to rely on KDD technology.35  A Markle Foundation36 task force on 
national security and information technology reported that private data and KDD 
technology “might be used not only for investigations of specific people (for example, to 
help find associates of a suspected terrorist) but also to perform large-scale data analysis 
and pattern discovery in order to discern potential terrorist activity by unknown 
individuals.”37  Agencies began designing and implementing in-house data mining 
projects and also contracting with companies like ChoicePoint and Acxiom for national 
33
 A proposed partnership between the United States Intelligence Community (USIC) and private-sector 
data companies was written into the 2005 National Intelligence Strategy: “The Program Manager, 
Information Sharing Environment, in conjunction with the Chief Information Officer, will develop a plan to 
facilitate the means for sharing terrorist information among all appropriate federal, state, local, and tribal 
entities, and the private sector (emphasis added);” see Staff of the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, The National Intelligence Strategy of the United States of America: Transformation though 
Integration and Innovation 11 (Oct. 26, 2005) [hereinafter National Intelligence Strategy], 
http://www.dni.gov/NISOctober2005.pdf.
34 James X. Dempsey & Laura M. Flint, Commercial Data and National Security, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1459, 1476 (2004).
35 FEDERAL EFFORTS, supra note 5, at 2. Between May 2003 and April 2004, the GAO audited 128 federal 
departments and agencies in an attempt to identify ongoing or planned data mining efforts and found that 
52 departments were conducting 131 data mining programs.
36 The John and Mary R. Markle Foundation, Inc. was founded to “promote the advancement and diffusion 
of knowledge” and the “general good of mankind.”  Since 1988 the foundation has focused on three main 
program areas: Policy for a Networked Society, Healthcare, and Interactive Media for Children. Recently, 
the foundation has identified the “modernization of the complex and over-burdened healthcare system and 
the strengthening of our nation's security against the threat of terrorism” as the two “most critical issues of 
our time.”  Additional information about the foundation is available at http://www.markle.org/index.php.
37
 Markle Report II, supra note 17, at 31. One key concern is mission creep wherein information collected 
for counterterrorism purposes by the government will at some point in the future be used for another, 
secondary, purpose.
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security, database solutions.38  The new security posture was described as follows in the 
first Markle task force report on information technology and national security: 
“Information and information processing is to homeland security as the brain is to the 
human body.”39
A key privacy concern is that the use of KDD technology in counterterrorism 
efforts amounts to government surveillance of individuals not suspected of any crime.  
Even before the terror attacks of 9-11 some scholars warned of a government, tempted by 
new data technologies, that was ready to plunge American citizens into an Orwellian 
existence.40 In 1999 Charles Sykes opined, “By invoking fears of drug cartels, 
kidnappings, and international terrorism, the FBI has sought the power to be a fly on the 
wall in the new information age.”41 Some commentators now have gone as far as to 
compare the Bush Administration’s response to the terror attacks of 9-11 to the repressive 
domestic surveillance policies of J. Edgar Hoover42 and the USIC’s use of KDD to the 
38 Id. at 30. Governments can readily buy data sets from data aggregators, who can deliver the data to 
government users in any format necessary for immediate analysis; see generally Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big 
Brother’s Little Helpers: How Choicepoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your 
Data for Law Enforcement, 29 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 595, 597-99 (2004) (relating how the 
Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) sought information pertaining to ChoicePoint, LexisNexis, 
Experian, Dun & Bradstreet, and Database Technologies Online and received over 1,500 government 
documents pertaining to companies that sell personal information to the government, which led to the 
revelation that “the database companies are extremely solicitous to government and actually design the 
databases for law enforcement use”).
39
 Markle Foundation Task Force, Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age 38 (Oct. 2002) 
[herinafter Markle Report I], http://www.markletaskforce.org/. 
40 See e.g. O’HARROW, JR., supra note 3; and DAVID BRIN, THE TRANSPARENT SOCIETY: WILL 
TECHNOLOGY FORCE US TO CHOOSE BETWEEN PRIVACY AND FREEDOM? (1998).
41 SYKES, supra note 22, at 156.
42
 John D. Podesta & Raj Goyle, Lost in Cyberspace? Finding American Liberties in a Dangerous Digital 
World, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 509, 510-16 (2005).
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“general warrants” issued by the English kings in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.43
The government has recognized the privacy threat posed by its domestic 
dataveillance. The 9-11 Commission Report 44 acknowledged the possibility that 
increased federal surveillance powers might lead to civil rights violations: “This shift of 
power and authority to the government calls for an enhanced system of checks and 
balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of life.”45  More 
recently, the 2005 National Intelligence Strategy referred to the maintenance of such a 
balance as an enterprise objective and noted, “[W]e must . . . perform our duties under 
law in a manner that respects the civil liberties and privacy of all Americans.”46  The 
nature of that which the government has a constitutional duty to protect remains a subject 
of some debate.
43
“In some ways, mass dataveillance looks very much like the general warrants that the framers of the 
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution were determined to prohibit. . . . Mass dataveillance, like general 
warrants, allows the government to scan a great deal of innocent information in the course of fishing for
signs of guilt.  And in the process, it threatens both privacy and equality, and diverts government resources 
away from more effective responses to terrorism.” JEFFREY ROSEN, THE NAKED CROWD: RECLAIMING 
SECURITY AND FREEDOM IN AN ANXIOUS AGE 23 (2004); see infra p. 13 and note 47.
44
 The Congressional commission of five Democrats and five Republicans (established by the 2002 
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2003, Pub. L. No.107-306, Title VI §§ 601-611, 116 Stat. 2383
(2002)) was charged with making recommendations intended to ready America for stopping future terrorist 
attacks.
45 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 394 (Authorized 1st Ed., 2004). The commission made three recommendations 
to safeguard civil liberties: [1] The President should safeguard the privacy of individuals when determining 
guidelines for information sharing among government agencies and between government agencies and the 
private sector; [2] The burden of  demonstrating that controversial provisions of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 
of 2001 (USA Patriot Act of 2001), materially enhance security and that they are subject to adequate 
oversight when they come up for renewal; and [3] An executive branch board should be established to 
oversee adherence to the guidelines the 9/11 commission recommends in the interest of protecting civil 
liberties.
46
 National Intelligence Strategy, supra note 33.
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Privacy and Information
The word privacy does not appear in the U.S. Constitution. However, today’s 
privacy protections can be traced back to the ratification of the Bill of Rights, through 
which the Founders sought to protect individual rights including private property rights 
from the fledgling central government.  The Fourth Amendment in particular protected 
citizens from the general warrants that were common under English rule.47  Prior to the 
late nineteenth century, no jurist or legal scholar made the argument that personal privacy 
warranted constitutional protection.
While the constitutional right of privacy exists separately from the common law 
privacy torts, conceptualizations of what constitutes the constitutional right of privacy 
clearly trace their roots to the common law.  Seventy-five years before the U.S. Supreme 
Court explicitly recognized a constitutional right of personal privacy, Samuel D. Warren 
and Louis D. Brandeis provided the foundation for a common law right of personal 
privacy in their seminal 1890 Harvard Law Review article, “The Right to Privacy.” 48
They argued that individuals had a right “to be let alone”49 and that common law 
remedies under the general legal rules regarding slander and libel and the “law of literary 
and artistic property” could be used to enforce this right to privacy.  During the next 
47 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1616 (8th ed. 2004). A general warrant is defined as [1] “a warrant issued by 
the English Secretary of State for the arrest of the author, printer, or publisher of a seditious libel, without 
naming the person to be arrested” and [2] “a warrant that gives a law-enforcement officer broad authority to 
search and seize unspecified places or persons; a search or arrest warrant that lacks a sufficiently 
particularized description of the person or thing to be seized or the place to be searched.”
48
 Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
49 Id. at 195. Their article argued that common law should provide remedy for invasions of privacy, and  
they cite Judge Thomas Cooley as the source of the phrase “right to be let alone;” see THOMAS MCINTYRE 
COOLEY ON TORTS, 2d ed., p. 29 (Callagan 1888). “The right to one's person may be said to be a right of 
complete immunity: to be let alone.”
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seven decades states adopted privacy statutes,50 and state courts recognized privacy 
torts51  that were based upon the Warren and Brandeis article.
Thirty-eight years after he first asserted that a right to privacy existed in the 
common law, Justice Louis Brandeis argued that there also was a constitutional basis for 
a right to privacy under the Fourth Amendment. In his dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States, Brandeis wrote: “The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions 
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. . . . They conferred, as against the government, the 
right to be let alone -- the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by 
civilized men.”52 Olmstead involved wiretapping, and the majority ruled there was no 
invasion of privacy because there was no physical incursion into the home in question.  
Brandeis refuted this purely “physical” conceptualization of privacy and wrote that the 
Fourth Amendment guaranteed protection for Americans “in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations” as well as in their property.53
50 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy Laws by State, 
http://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/states.html (providing a completed and updated list of state privacy 
statutes); see also Privacilla.org, Special Report, How U.S. State Law Quietly Leads the Way in Privacy 
Protections 18-24 (July 2002), http://www.privacilla.org/releases/Torts_Report.pdf  (providing a state-by-
state listing of key cases, statutes, and sources).
51 See generally William J. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960) (recognizing the following four 
privacy torts: [1] Intrusion upon Seclusion (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977), This tort 
allows plaintiffs to seek remedy for the invasion of their “solitude or seclusion” or “private affairs or 
concerns” if the intrusion is “highly offensive to a reasonable person.”); [2] False Light (RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977), This tort allows plaintiffs to seek remedy when they are portrayed in a 
false light that “is highly offensive to a reasonable person” because the defendant publicly disclosed certain 
matters or information.); [3] Public Disclosure of Private Facts (RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D 
(1977)), This tort allows plaintiffs to seek remedy for the disclosure of a private fact that is “highly 
offensive to a reasonable person” and not about a matter of public concern.); and [4] Appropriation 
(RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977), This tort allows plaintiffs to seek remedy when their 
“name or likeness” is appropriated for the defendant’s “use or benefit.”).
52 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
53 Id.
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It wasn’t until 1965 in Griswold v. Connecticut54 that the Supreme Court 
recognized that a constitutional right to personal privacy was implied in the “penumbras” 
and “emanations” of the protections guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. For the majority, 
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed 
by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and 
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of 
association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as 
we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the 
quartering of soldiers “in any house” in time of peace without the consent 
of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth Amendment 
explicitly affirms the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” 
The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen 
to create a zone of privacy which government may not force him to 
surrender to his detriment.55
Because privacy has only been recognized as a constitutional right for forty years, it is no 
surprise that it is still vaguely defined.  This makes conceptualizing a constitutional right 
of information privacy, typically conceived of as a subset of this more general privacy 
right, more difficult.  
Not until 1977, in Whalen v. Roe,56 did the Supreme Court finally recognize a 
constitutional right to information privacy.  In Whalen the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a 
New York state statute that required doctors to submit to the New York Department of 
Health forms containing the personal information of patients for whom the doctors had 
prescribed potentially addictive medications.  Justice John Paul Stevens wrote for the 
54
 318 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court struck down a Connecticut law making it illegal for married couples to 
purchase contraceptives because it was an unconstitutional invasion of couple’s fundamental liberty to 
define their most intimate relationships.
55 Id. at 484.
56
 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
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Court that the statute in question did not, on its face, invade “a constitutionally protected 
zone of privacy.”57  Nevertheless, the landmark opinion distinguished between two 
different privacy interests: “One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters, and another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
important decisions.”58 Information privacy was thus distinguished from decisional 
privacy.
In Whalen the Court said that information privacy was a “liberty” protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment from abridgement by the states.  There was no other explanation 
in the text of the opinion as to the source of the constitutional protection for information 
privacy.  The only explanation was in a footnote citing several privacy cases, noting 
Brandeis’s characterization of privacy as “the right to be let alone,”59 and quoting 
language from Griswold v. Connecticut.60  The quote was, “The First Amendment has a 
penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion.”61  The Court left 
many questions unanswered as to the source and scope of information privacy protection.
Despite the Court’s distinction between information privacy and decisional 
privacy, law Professor Paul Schwartz wrote, “Decisional and information privacy are not
unrelated; the use, transfer, or processing of personal data by public and private sector 
organizations will affect the choices that we make.”62  Gayle Horn of the Institute for 
57 Id. at 600.
58 Id.
59 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478.
60 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
61 Id. at 483.
62 Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2058 (2004).
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International Law and Justice at New York University described a “problematic” chilling 
effect that she said occurs when “individuals seeking to engage in lawful activity are 
deterred from doing so by a governmental regulation not specifically directed at that 
activity.”63  Despite the fact that they might be deciding to participate in  many perfectly 
legal actions, such as visiting Muslim Websites, purchasing “adult” materials, donating to 
a racist organization, or ordering Viagra online, liberty may be lost as individuals 
consider the ramifications of having information regarding such choices added to their 
dossiers and made available to the government. As law Professor Jeffrey Rosen wrote, 
“[W]hen intimate information is removed from its original context and revealed to 
strangers, we are vulnerable to being misjudged on the basis of our most embarrassing, 
and therefore most memorable, tastes and preferences.”64
Law Professor Stan Karas seemed to agree with Schwartz that informational and 
decisional privacy are interrelated and offered insight into why a chilling effect such as 
63 Gayle Horn, Note, Online Searches and Offline Challenges: The Chilling Effect, Anonymity and the New 
FBI Guidelines, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.L. 735, 749 (2005); see also K. A. Taipale, Technology, 
Security and Privacy: The Fear of Frankenstein, the Mythology of Privacy and the Lessons of Old King 
Ludd, 7 YALE SYMP. L. & TECH. 123, 146 (2004/2005), 
http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/yjolt/files/20042005Issue/6_Taipale121804Fx.pdf. He cites Roger 
Clarke in defining a chilling effect resulting from data mining as “the concern that potential lawful 
behavior, particularly constitutionally protected activity, would be inhibited due to the potential for a kind 
of post hoc surveillance (often referred to as dataveillance) that is said by many to result from the increased 
sharing of information among currently discrete sources.); see Clarke, supra note 1, at 498-512.
64 JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA  9 (2000); see also
Arthur R. Miller, Computers, Data Banks and Individual Privacy: An Overview, in SURVEILLANCE, 
DATAVEILLANCE, AND PERSONAL FREEDOMS: USE AND ABUSE OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 11, 19
(Columbia Human Rights Law Review Staff eds., 1972) (asserting many people had come to feel that their 
success or failure in life ultimately turned on what other people put in their file and an unknown 
programmer’s ability—or—inability—to evaluate, process, and interrelate that information); C.f. Solove, 
supra note 9, at 1417-18 (arguing that the most insidious aspect of the surveillance is missing in the context 
of databases--human judgment about the activities being observed, that since marketers generally are 
interested in aggregate data they do not care about snooping into particular people’s private lives, and since 
individuals are watched not by other humans, but by machines, this impersonality makes the surveillance 
less invasive); see generally  C.f. Zarsky, supra note 5 (arguing that automated data processing is more 
equalitarian because various biases common among human analysts won’t be part of the query and thus 
search results will be truly objective).
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that described by Horn might occur. Karas described a power imbalance when he argued, 
“[T]he rationale behind the Griswold line of cases may be characterized as follows: 
intruding on private decisions is knowing, knowing is classifying, and classifying is 
impermissibly controlling.”65 Having knowledge about an individual’s personal 
information is to have power over that individual.  This notion is not new. In 1967 
Professor Alan Westin wrote: 
The most serious threat to an individual’s autonomy is the 
possibility that someone may penetrate the inner zone and learn his 
ultimate secrets, either by physical or psychological means.  This 
deliberate penetration of the individual’s protective shell, his 
psychological armor, would leave him naked to ridicule and shame and 
would put him under the control of those who knew his secrets.66
Stated another way, knowledge is power.
Solove once described information privacy law as “a mosaic of various types of 
law: tort law, constitutional law, federal and state statutory law, evidentiary privileges, 
property law, and contract law.”67  This dissertation is focused solely upon judicial 
conceptualizations of the constitutional right to information privacy, a protection that is 
only invoked when the government or an agent of the government infringes upon the 
right.  The body of law regarding this requirement of government infringement is called 
65 Karas, supra note 25, at 426. He argued: “[P]ossessing information about an individual allows 
classification and exercise of discursive power over him or her.); see also Miller, supra note 64, at 13. “In a 
computerized society those who control the recordation and preservation of personal data will have a 
degree of power over the individual that is at once unprecedented and subject to abuse.” 
 
66 WESTIN, supra note 20, at 33.
67 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 56.
19
the state action doctrine. Almost always, the state action doctrine is interpreted to exclude 
the actions of private persons, organizations, or businesses from constitutional scrutiny.68
The heavy involvement of the private sector in federal dataveillance challenges 
the existing state action doctrine. Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Washington Post reporter and 
associate of the Center for Investigative Reporting, noted: “It’s a simple fact that private 
companies can collect information about people in ways the government can’t. At the 
same time, they can’t be held accountable for their behavior or their mistakes the way 
government agencies can.”69  Law Professor Neil Richards also warned, “To the extent 
that such private [data] collection is not state action, it allows the government, in effect, 
to outsource surveillance beyond the scope of otherwise applicable statutory and 
constitutional restrictions.”70  Determining whether the private companies that contribute 
to federal dataveillance are state actors is beyond the scope of this study.  The analysis in 
this dissertation will focus solely on participation by the federal government in
dataveillance programs. 
In sum, many modern privacy protections are rooted in the Founders’ notions of 
personal right and in the common law. The Supreme Court eventually recognized that a 
constitutional right to privacy exists in the penumbras and emanations of the Bill of 
Rights and later that each individual possesses a constitutional right to avoid the 
disclosure of personal matters to the government.  The government’s use of KDD 
68
 Commonwealth of Virginia. v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1879). “The provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Constitution we have quoted all have reference to State action exclusively, and not to 
any action of private individuals.”
69 O’ HARROW, JR., supra note 3, at 8-9.
70
 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1159 
(2005).
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technology for domestic surveillance in the name of national security represents a 
significant challenge for what can only be considered a nascent legal doctrine.  
Scholarly debate has been ignited over the value of information privacy and how 
to balance society’s interest in protecting that value against the federal government’s 
need to conduct dataveillance in its counterterrorism efforts. A discussion of the 
significant privacy conceptualizations that have emerged in privacy scholarship is 
presented below and serves as the conceptual framework of this dissertation.
Conceptualizations of Privacy: A Review of the Scholarly Literature
This review of privacy scholarship71 provides a conceptual framework for the 
following analysis of privacy case law and its eventual application to KDD.  This section 
describes some of the principle conceptualizations of privacy that have emerged since 
Warren and Brandeis urged recognition of privacy rights beyond the private property 
interests protected by the Bill of Rights.72 The term “conceptualization” is used to refer 
to a characterization that comprises either a statement of what a right of privacy is 
intended to protect (space, intimacy, information, etc.), a discussion of the societal and 
individual values that a privacy right safeguards (autonomy, self-government, reputation, 
etc.), or both.   
71
 This literature review focuses on works discussing the conceptualizations of a constitutional right to 
privacy, the fundamental value of privacy in general, and information privacy.  It does not discuss the 
growing body of public policy research that deals with implementation strategies for information 
technologies that promote civil liberties.  Other literature not examined includes topics such as privacy 
torts, privacy policies/contracts, federal and state privacy statutes, and information ethics. There is also a 
large body of historical literature that might offer insight into the present national security posture. 
Nevertheless, those bodies of literature would not directly advance this query and are therefore excluded 
from this review.
72
 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 48.
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Some of these conceptualizations are the original ideas of scholars and others 
originate in case law discussed by scholars.   During the twentieth century, 
conceptualizations of privacy have gradually evolved from privacy as the right to a 
private, physical space to privacy as the right to control access to and the use of personal 
information.  However, even today, as law Professor Anita Allen has asserted, “There is 
no universally accepted philosophical definition of ‘privacy.’”73 Professor Jerry Kang 
agreed, “Privacy is a chameleon that shifts meaning depending on context.”74
Three major conceptualizations of privacy are discussed below: privacy as space, 
privacy as secrecy, and privacy as information control.  Variations and major concepts 
associated with these conceptualizations are also discussed.  Though no one 
conceptualization has succeeded in defining privacy in every context, they are all linked 
by one commonality;75 each involves an individual’s right to conceal, manipulate, or 
73
 Anita L. Allen, Privacy as Data Control: Conceptual, Practical, and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 
CONN. L. REV. 861, 864 (2000). 
74
 Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN L. REV. 1193, 1202 (1998); see 
also Allen, supra note 73 (attributing the wide variation in definitional accounts of privacy to three factors: 
“(1) variation in the use and denotational and connotational meanings of privacy; (2) variation in the 
purposes for which the definition of privacy is undertaken; and (3) variation in approaches taken to the task 
of definition itself”).
75
 A number of privacy scholars have grouped privacy conceptualizations by common elements in order to 
simplify their analysis or to discredit concepts contrary to their own.  Compare JUDITH WAGNER DECEW, 
IN PURSUIT OF PRIVACY: LAW, ETHICS, AND THE RISE OF TECHNOLOGY 75-79 (1997) (recognizing three 
aspects of privacy: information privacy (control over information about oneself), accessibility privacy 
(limits on information and physical access that allow for seclusion), and expressive privacy (protects a 
realm for expressing one’s self-identity or personhood through speech or activity”),  and  Kang, supra note 
74, at 1202-05 (defining three “clusters” of privacy interests: space, decision, and information), and Daniel 
J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (arranging privacy conceptualizations 
into six groups for purposes of analysis: (1) the right to be let alone—Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis’s 
famous formulation of the right to privacy; (2) limited access to the self—the ability to shield oneself from 
unwanted access by others; (3) secrecy—the concealment of certain matters from others; (4) control over 
personal information—the ability to exercise control over information about oneself; (5) personhood—the 
protection of one’s personality, individuality, and dignity; and (6) intimacy—control over, or limited access 
to, one’s intimate relationships or aspects of life).
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grant access to personal information. The conceptualizations are discussed in the order in 
which they emerged in the legal scholarship. 
Privacy as Space
Under this conceptualization, privacy protections guard against physical or 
technological intrusion into some physical space by unwelcome third parties. The most 
common example of this conceptualization is the Fourth Amendment. Ratified in 1791 in 
the tradition of “a man’s house is his castle,” the Fourth Amendment protected the right 
of the people to be secure in their “persons, houses, papers, and effects,”76  but it did so 
only against invasions by agents of the state, leaving citizens unprotected from invasions 
by private entities.77  As legal analyst Irwin Kramer noted, “Consequently, the Fourth 
Amendment applied only to a small percentage of privacy invasions,” and he asserted 
that it was dissatisfaction “with the lack of effective legal remedies available to those 
who found their privacy invaded, particularly those victimized by an overzealous and 
increasingly invasive press,”78 that led Warren and Brandeis to write their famous law 
review article.79
76 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
77
 Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 
703, 705 (1990).
78 Id. at 709.
79 See also Prosser, supra note 51 (asserting that Warren was motivated to write the article because of 
intrusive press coverage of his daughter’s wedding); C.f . James Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right 
to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 875 
(1979) (explaining that Warren’s annoyance could not be about his daughter’s wedding as she was only ten 
years old in 1890); see also SMITH, supra note 16, at 121 (suggesting it was the “cumulative impact of 
intrusive reporting by the press over the years” that caused Warren’s outrage).
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By 1890, when the Warren and Brandeis article was published, the Supreme 
Court had interpreted the Fourth Amendment as a private property right intended to 
prevent the government from using general warrants to search tangible space such as 
one’s home for criminal evidence to be used against citizens.80 Nevertheless, Warren and 
Brandeis not only conceived of privacy as a protection of a private space but also as an 
individual’s broader right to be left alone.81  They thought a person should be able to step 
out of the public sphere and claim sanctuary in a private space. 
Smith noted that “each time there was a renewed interest in protecting privacy it 
was in reaction to new technology.”82  Between 1870 and 1890 great advances were 
made regarding sound recording, telephony, and instant photography, and these 
technologies made it much easier for private entities such as the press to invade private 
homes.  Warren and Brandeis warned, “Instantaneous photographs and newspaper 
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life; and numerous 
mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that ‘what is whispered in the 
closet shall be proclaimed from the house-tops.’"83   The pair sought to expand 
individuals’ privacy interests to include intangible property, such as their thoughts or 
emotional wellbeing, which were being threatened by these “recent” inventions.  
80 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1889). “Breaking into a house and opening boxes and 
drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own 
testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods, is 
within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run almost into 
each other.”
81
 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 48.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 195.
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According to Warren and Brandeis, the value that they believed should be 
protected by privacy law was one’s “inviolate personality.”84 They argued that private 
physical space was necessary to protect intangible privacy interests such as one’s 
emotional wellbeing, and this interest was not recognized by the law at that time. They 
wrote, “The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have 
rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence of 
culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become 
more essential to the individual.”85 Alan Westin described this as a need for a “back stage 
area” because no individual can “play indefinitely, without relief, the variety of roles that 
life demands” while interacting in public.86
This line of reasoning frames privacy law as a means to protect an individual’s 
emotional well-being against harms that would result from the loss of one’s private space.  
As Cohen explained, “The injury, here, does not lie in the exposure of formerly private 
behaviors to public view, but in the dissolution of the boundaries that insulate different 
spheres of behavior from one another.”87  Professor Amatai Etzioni ascribed a societal 
value to a protected legal space.  He wrote that in order for an individual to fulfill a 
public role, a “societal license that exempts a category of acts (including thoughts and 
84 Id. at 205.
85 Id. at 195.
86 WESTIN, supra note 20, at 35-36.  He went on to note that on any given day a man may move through the 
roles of a stern father, loving husband, carpool comedian, skilled lathe operator, union steward, water 
cooler flirt, and American Legion Committee Chairman—all psychologically different roles that he adopts 
as he moves from scene to scene on the social stage; see also Charles Fried, Privacy 77 YALE L. J. 475, 477 
(1968) (asserting that private space was necessary as “a context for respect, love, friendship, and trust” 
which is why “a threat to privacy seems to threaten our very integrity as persons” and thus tying the spatial 
concept of privacy to personhood).
87
 Cohen, supra note 25.
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emotions) from communal, public, and governmental scrutiny” must be provided.88
Etzioni argued that the preservation of individual privacy should be a social priority.
Schwatrz agreed with Etzioni.  He wrote, “Rather than on a right of control, the 
focus of information privacy law should be construction of a privacy space that promotes 
civil society and individual decision making.”89  In this way, private space might be 
considered vital to the success of a democracy. Westin explained the connection between 
the preservation of private space and the promotion of civil society as a need for 
“individuality” when he wrote:
This development of individuality is particularly important in 
democratic societies, since the qualities of independent thought, diversity 
of views, and non-conformity are considered desirable traits for 
individuals. . . .  The independence necessary for participation in self-
government requires time for sheltered experimentation and testing of 
ideas, for preparation and practice in thought and conduct, without fear of 
ridicule or penalty.90
Thus, Westin argued that development of individuality was necessary for the sound 
decision making that promotes a civil society.  Others have argued that it is the 
development of autonomy that is the societal value of maintaining private spaces.
For example, Cohen wrote, “Development of the capacity for autonomous choice 
is an indispensable condition for reasoned participation in the governance of the 
community and its constituent institutions -- political, economic, and social.”91  Using 
88 AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 196 (1999) (suggesting that a sound communitarian treatment 
of privacy views it as the realm in which the actor--a person, a group, or a couple--can legitimately act 
without disclosure and accountability to others). 
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 Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1607, 1677 (1999).
90 WESTIN, supra note 20, at 34.
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 Cohen, supra note 25, at 1426; see also id. (asserting that autonomy in a contingent world requires a zone 
of relative insulation from outside scrutiny and interference—a field of operation within which to engage in 
the conscious construction of the self). 
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similar reasoning to Westin’s, Cohen argued that a functioning democracy requires 
intellectual autonomy and that private space provided “the freedom to explore areas of 
intellectual interest that one might not feel as free to explore in public.”92  It is this 
intellectual exploration that leads to an informed populace capable of self-government.
If the barrier between one’s private and public spheres is eroded by surveillance, 
there is a danger of self-censorship. Cohen wrote:  “[T]he experience of being watched 
will constrain, ex ante, the acceptable spectrum of belief and behavior.  Pervasive 
monitoring of every first move or false start will, at the margin, incline choices toward 
the bland and mainstream.”93  Schwartz called this pressure to conform the “coercive 
standardization of the individual . . . when private or government action interferes with a 
person’s control of her reasoning process.”94  Self-censorship may thus impede the 
formation of autonomous individuals, which is so important to self-governing societies.
Smith defined privacy as “the desire by each of us for physical space where we 
can be free of interruption, intrusion, embarrassment, or accountability and the attempt to 
control the time and manner of disclosures of personal information about ourselves.”95
His definition is notable for two reasons.  First, he incorporated information privacy 
within the spatial concept of privacy. Smith asserted that one reason to protect a private 
space was to facilitate the control of information.  Second, he recognized “harms” in his 
definition.  Smith noted that one might suffer embarrassment or accountability if others 
92 Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 575, 579 (2003). She wrote that private 
space “also affords the freedom to dictate the circumstances—the when, where, how, and how often—of 
one’s own intellectual consumption, unobserved and unobstructed by others.”
93
 Cohen, supra note 25, at 1426.
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 Scwartz, supra note 89, at 1654-55.
95 SMITH, supra note 16, at 6. 
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had knowledge of what was occurring behind closed doors or written within sealed 
envelopes. 
In sum, the privacy-as-space conceptualization involves the maintenance of both a 
private and public sphere of existence for each individual. Individuals value this zone of 
privacy because it facilitates the intellectual and emotional exploration necessary for the 
development of autonomous individuals. The existence of this space also has a societal 
value, the maintenance of an informed populace capable of self-government.  Self-
censorship for fear of potentially negative ramifications from third-party knowledge of 
certain behaviors may result from an invasion or dissolution of this private space. 
Privacy as Access to Self
A variation of the privacy-as-space conceptualization is privacy as access to self. 
Under this conceptualization, space in the sense of land, a dwelling, or a file drawer was 
no longer the sole concern. Rather, one’s “self” was conceptualized as the zone of 
privacy.    The self is one’s personality, thoughts, beliefs, intellect, body, and bodily 
fluids.  Thus, privacy as access to self may be invoked to protect against a body cavity 
search or a urinalysis test.  It also might protect against having a love letter read aloud, 
having political contributions disclosed, or having law enforcement personnel access 
one’s library records. This privacy conceptualization is reflected in Brandeis’s 1928 
dissent in Olmstead. The information being intercepted in the telephone wires could 
provide law enforcement with a glimpse into the speaker’s personality, a violation of 
privacy as access to self.
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A number of scholars have conceptualized privacy in this way. Sociology 
professor Stephen Nock wrote: “Privacy results from the legitimate denial of access to 
one’s actions or records.  Privacy is defined by the socially-recognized legitimate right to 
restrict others from observing or knowing about one’s actions.”96  Professor Ruth 
Gavison also discussed this conception of privacy when she wrote, “Our interest in 
privacy . . . is related to our concern over our accessibility to others, the extent to which 
we are known to others, the extent to which others have physical access to us, and the 
extent to which we are the subject of other’s attention.”97  Rosen has argued for a more 
prominent role for privacy as access to self in privacy jurisprudence. Referring to Roe v. 
Wade,98 Rosen opined:
[B]y focusing on an amorphous vision of privacy that is really a 
misnomer for the freedom to make intimate decisions about reproduction, 
the Supreme Court has neglected a more focused vision of privacy that has 
to do with our ability to control the conditions under which we make 
different aspects of ourselves accessible to others.99
This concept is still ultimately about an individual’s right to maintain a zone of 
privacy.  However, it can be distinguished from the spatial privacy conceptualization 
because the zone does not need to be anchored to a physical location.  It is anchored in 
one’s personality or identity or body. As noted above by Horn and Karas, government 
knowledge about intimate decisions could ultimately lead to a chill in certain activities 
96 STEPHEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY, SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN AMERICA 11-12 
(1993); see also WESTIN, supra note 20 (defining privacy as the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions 
to determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is communicated to 
others).
97
 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L. J. 421, 423 (1980); id. at 428.  Gavison defines 
a loss of privacy as occurring as “others obtain information about an individual, pay attention to him, or 
gain access to him.”
98 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
99 ROSEN, supra note 64, at 15.
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despite the legality of the actions in question. Like the spatial concept of privacy, privacy 
as access to the self is primarily concerned with a zone of privacy, information flow, and 
the avoidance of a chill.  
Privacy as Secrecy
Solove has dubbed the collection of privacy conceptualizations that are predicated 
upon the obligation of individuals to define their own private space the “secrecy 
paradigm.” 100  Sometimes referred to as the third-party doctrine, this conceptualization 
assumes a societal presumption toward disclosure rather than privacy.  Under the secrecy 
paradigm, only information that is consciously hidden from others will be considered 
private.101 Solove described infringement under the secrecy paradigm this way: 
“[P]rivacy is invaded by uncovering one’s hidden world, by surveillance, and by the 
disclosure of concealed information . . . . [I]f the information isn’t secret, then courts 
often conclude that the information can’t be private.”102  The value to be served by 
privacy protections under the secrecy paradigm is the protection of individuals from 
harms brought about by the use of personal information by third parties.  
100 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 8.  Also called the third-party doctrine, this phrase was coined by Solove and 
refers to the bedrock principle in American privacy law that information shared with another, or made part 
of the public record, can no longer be private.  Solove argues this paradigm is no longer valid in a society 
were it is “virtually impossible to live as an information age ghost, leaving no trail or residue.”
101 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, 
even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to 
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected;” Id. at 362 
(Harlan, J., concurring). “[C]onversations in the open would not be protected against being overheard . . . . 
The critical fact in this case is that ‘(o)ne who occupies it (a telephone booth) shuts the door behind him, 
and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume’ that his conversation is not 
being intercepted;” Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1970). “This Court consistently has held that 
a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties.”
102 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 8.
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According to Smith, a number of cultural changes after World War II created a 
“mania for personal information gathering.”  These changes included an increased use of 
credit coupled with a mobile population that could not be serviced by local credit 
bureaus, mandatory state drivers’ insurance, and broader adoption of medical insurance, 
and, as noted above, the rapid increase in the number of governmental programs that 
required qualifying information.103  When the Founders drafted the Fourth Amendment, 
privacy was valued as a check on federal power. When Warren and Brandeis argued for 
legal protections for private space, privacy was threatened by invasive new technologies 
and valued as necessary for the development of individuals capable of self-government. 
The secrecy paradigm originated at a time when society needed access to personal 
information in order to function, and this need conflicted with individual privacy rights in 
personal information.  
Modern scholars recognize that the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization has 
influenced information privacy law. Privacy expert Anita Allen suggested: 
“Informational privacy obtains where information actually exists in a state of 
inaccessibility, whether it is locked in a file drawer, computer, or in someone’s mind.  
Anonymity, confidentiality, reserve, and secrecy—not merely having the choice to bring 
these about—are forms of privacy.”104  Nevertheless, some argue that new information 
technologies make the conceptualization unworkable.
An important idea in privacy-as-secrecy scholarship is that of limited privacy, 
which was defined by Professor Lior Strahilevitz as “the idea that when an individual 
103 SMITH, supra note 16, at 313-14.
104
 Allen, supra note 73, at 868-69.
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reveals private information about herself to one or more persons, she may retain a 
reasonable expectation that the recipients of the information will not disseminate it 
further.”105  For instance, a person might inform his family members during dinner that 
he lost his job and assume that they will not reveal that information beyond their small 
circle of intimates.  Relationships such as patient-physician and lawyer-client are 
examples of situations in which the law clearly protects such limited privacy. 
The notion of limited privacy is especially important when considering the 
potential harms associated with digital dossiers and KDD technologies. In regard to 
databases, Solove argued that “information about an individual . . . is not often secret, but 
is diffused in the minds of a multitude of people and scattered in various documents and 
computer files across the country.”106 As discussed above, it is necessary for people to 
share information in order to function normally in society, but, as asserted by Solove, 
“individuals want to keep things private from some people but not from others.”107  Law 
professor Stephen Henderson explained how the nature of database construction 
necessarily erodes the applicability of the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization.  He 
argued:
[T]he third party doctrine . . . becomes especially suspect when one 
considers the extraordinary databases under construction today.  Whether 
one should be considered to have affirmatively given information to a 
third party for use when that information is incorporated into a database of 
entirely unforeseeable scope and intent is not clear.108
105 Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 939 (2005).
106 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 42-43.
107 Id. at 43-44.
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Henderson argued that a key problem with the secrecy paradigm or third-party doctrine 
was that it “treats privacy as an indivisible commodity.”109  Once individuals surrender 
information, it is assumed they have given up all control over the use and dissemination 
of it.  Instead, Solove argued: “We must . . . recognize that what is public can be 
private—not in the sense that it is secret, but in that uses and disclosures of information 
can be limited. Privacy is about degrees of accessibility.”110
KDD complicates matters because it creates knowledge that was never 
surrendered at all. For instance, an individual might voluntarily surrender bits of 
information such as which grocery items he purchases using a discount savings card at a 
local store, but can it be assumed that he knowingly surrendered the insights into his life 
that analysts are able to derive from the raw transaction data? Technology columnist Dr. 
Joseph Fulda identified the problem with applying the privacy-as-secrecy 
conceptualization to information discovered following KDD analysis.  Fulda asked, “Is it 
possible for data that does not in itself deserve legal protection to contain implicit 
knowledge that does deserve legal protection?”111  It stands to reason that individuals are 
not able to choose to conceal knowledge that does not preexist.  Fulda argued, “[T]he old 
legal rule that anything put by a person into the public domain is not legally protected 
served well when the data was not mined so as to produce classifications, clustering, 
109 Id. at 546 (2005).
110
 Solove, supra note 23, at 1217-18.
111 Joseph S. Fulda, Data Mining and Privacy, 11 ALB.L.J. SCI. & TECH. 105, 109  (2000); see also Tien,
supra note 30, at 409 (asserting that the proper response to the obstacle posed by the “knowing exposure” 
doctrine is that the underlying patterns or associations are not the same as the surface facts in a database 
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summaries, and profiles, dependencies and links, and other patterns.”112  This is the 
primary problem, Solove argued, with using the popular Big Brother metaphor for 
describing federal dataveillance.113
Solove wants to retire the secrecy paradigm and the Big Brother metaphor.  He 
has argued for a new metaphor based on the work of novelist Franz Kafka.  He wrote: 
Privacy law has developed with [the secrecy] paradigm in mind, 
and consequently, it has failed to adapt to grapple effectively with the 
database problem . . . . I argue that the problem is best captured by Franz 
Kafka’s depiction of bureaucracy in The Trial—a more thoughtless 
process of bureaucratic indifference, arbitrary errors, and dehumanization, 
a world where people feel powerless and vulnerable, without any 
meaningful form of participation in the collection and use of their 
information.114
This describes a different power imbalance than that asserted by Karas regarding a 
potential for self-censorship when the government can access information regarding the 
intimate decisions in one’s life. Solove feared the imbalance that emerges when 
individuals are at risk because they cannot access or control information held by large 
bureaucracies.115
112 Fulda, supra note 111, at 108. Fulda goes on to argue that so much of an individual’s personality, or 
likeness, is revealed by KDD processes that such new knowledge is protected by the tort of appropriation.  
He does not attempt to define a constitutional right to informational privacy.
113
 Solove, supra note 9. Big-Brother is the totalitarian government in George Orwell’s novel 1984.  
Citizens were always being watched by the government through view screens.  This metaphor is often used 
when discussing domestic surveillance.
114 Id. at 1398 (2001 ).
115 See SMITH, supra note 16, at 315. Smith explains that historically the individual did not have the 
knowledge or funding to access or manage personal data held by third parties.  He noted, “Between the 
1950s and the 1980s, the early days of computing, only the government bureaucracies, colleges and 
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In summary, since the mid-twentieth century life in the United States has required 
the surrender of personal information.  Privacy law reflected that new societal priority 
when it adopted the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization, which stripped away privacy 
protections for any information shared with a third party, placed the burden of protecting 
privacy on the individual, and placed people at risk of being misjudged on incorrect 
information they could not access to correct.  
Privacy as Information Control
The massive growth of direct marketing and the resulting emergence of the data 
industry in the 1990s created both an individual and societal interest in being able to 
control one’s personal information.  It was during this decade that there was a renewed 
interest in privacy conceptualizations that would influence the courts to shift the focus of 
information privacy law away from a fundamental right to conceal or hide personal 
information to a fundamental right to control personal information. 
This conceptualization, as Solove wrote, “entails control over and limitations on 
certain uses of information, even if the information is not concealed.”116  David Brin 
wrote that “if the information contained in [a] system was made available against an 
individual’s wishes or if that information were obtained without consent we could speak 
of a violation of that person’s privacy.”117  Schwartz defined privacy as “a personal right 
116
 Solove, supra note 23, at 1178.
117 NOCK, supra note 96, at 13.
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to control the use of one’s data,”118 and Allen, while critiquing Schwartz’s definition, 
recognized three separate elements of privacy as information control.  She wrote: 
They are, first, the notion that the term “privacy” means control (or 
rights of control) over the use of personal data or information; second, the 
notion that the expression “right to privacy” means the right or claim to 
control the use of personal data or information; and, third, the notion that 
the central aim of privacy regulation should be promoting individuals’ 
control (or rights of control) over personal data or information.119
Schwartz understood the information-control conceptualization to provide 
individuals with a bundle of privacy rights with which to protect their personal 
information.120 The conceptualization presumes that one may access previously shared 
information, may exert control over secondary uses of that information, and may 
determine the degree or type of information shared. Solove considered secondary uses of 
personal information that had been compelled by government and then sold to private 
companies especially troubling.  He wrote that the information in “public records is often 
supplied involuntarily and typically for a purpose linked to the reason why the particular 
records are kept.  The problem is that, often without the individual’s knowledge or 
consent, the information is then used for a host of different purposes by both the 
government and businesses.”121 Since 9-11 this trend is occurring in the opposite 
direction as well.  Information voluntarily given to private companies and organizations 
is being accessed and used by government to discover new knowledge.
118
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A major idea regarding privacy as information control is that privacy protections 
can function as elements of social architecture. In 1968 Professor Charles Fried pondered 
whether a man alone on an island had privacy.  He wrote, “Privacy is not simply an 
absence of information about us in the minds of others, rather it is the control we have 
over information about ourselves.”122  Fried ultimately decided the man had no privacy 
because he had no opportunity to grant or deny access to information to others. His 
example demonstrates that a privacy right can only exist in a relationship and that the 
level of protection provided the right equals a measure of power within that relationship. 
To the extent that privacy protections, through an allocation of power, structure 
relationships, they function as agents of social architecture.123 Solove wrote:
Privacy involves the power to refuse to be treated with 
bureaucratic indifference when one complains about errors or when one 
wants data expunged.  It is not merely the collection of data that is the 
problem—it is our complete lack of control over the ways it is used or 
may be used in the future.124
Thus the value of privacy as control of information is its ability to bolster individual 
sovereignty relative to the entities controlling the new information technologies.  
In 1999 Lawrence Lessig was writing about how to apply constitutional values in 
cyberspace.  His central contention was that the computer code used to structure virtual 
space should be written to support and advance American culture’s most sacred values 
such as free speech and privacy rights.  In this way Lessig conceived of computer code as 
social architecture.  Lessig wrote, “I mean an architecture—not just a legal text but a way 
122 Fried, supra note 86, at 482.
123 See Solove, supra note 32, at 1116. Conceived of in this way, privacy is a form of freedom built into the 
social structure and about the common good as much as it is about individual rights.
124
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of life—that structures and constrains social and legal power to the end of protecting 
fundamental values, principles, and ideals that reach beyond the compromise of ordinary 
politics.”125  Solove saw privacy law in a similar way, as an architecture that built 
freedom into the American social structure.  He asserted:
Protecting privacy through an architecture of power differs from 
protecting it as an individual right.  The problem with viewing rights in 
purely individualistic terms is that it pits individual rights against the 
greater good of the community, with the interests of society often winning 
out because of their paramount importance when measured against one 
individual’s freedom. 126
Solove further suggested, “The [privacy] architecture’s scope should encompass all 
instances where third parties share personal information contained within a system of 
records . . . [and] should focus on at least two sets of relationships: relationships with 
government and relationships with the third parties that possess personal information.”127
Ideally then, the privacy-as-information-control conceptualization should 
empower individuals by allowing them to structure their own relationships with third 
parties holding their personal information. For instance, when consumers shop online 
they are usually prompted to read a Website’s privacy policy, evaluate how the Website 
will collect and use the data supplied, and then make an informed decision as to whether 
to share personal information.  When individuals are empowered to negotiate privacy 
terms on their own, without assistance from the government, it can be said that an 
information marketplace exists and is functional. If the marketplace is functioning 
125 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 5 (1999).
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properly, then individuals will protect their privacy interests without assistance from 
government. Conversely, the market failure critique put forth by some scholars assumes 
that certain social realities will interfere with the marketplace functions unless the 
government interferes.128
Anita Allen alluded to one type of market failure when she wrote: “Having 
control over personal information does not mean having privacy.  The person in control 
of her data might elect to share personal information with others.”129 If the Court were to 
recognize a fundamental value to society in individual control of personal information, 
then the government would need to convince individuals not to give away information 
haphazardly or pass laws that make it difficult for third parties to utilize personal 
information without the consent of the individuals to whom the data pertain. 
Another possible type of market failure is that few individuals may have the 
capacity to track their information once they initially surrender it.  Large businesses and 
government agencies are capable of building digital dossiers, sharing them among 
different databases, and using KDD technologies to develop new information about the 
subject.  Individuals generally are not able to understand these systems and cannot 
manage the use or sharing of their personal information.  As Allen wrote, “It is pointless 
(or merely symbolic) to ascribe a right to data control if it turns out that exercising the 
right is impossible.”130
128 See generally C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 
(1977-1978) (providing a market failure critique to classic First Amendment marketplace theory).
129
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In sum, scholars see a privacy-as-information-control conceptualization as more 
effective than the secrecy paradigm when applied to massive databases and KDD 
technology.  Conceived of as information control, information privacy protections 
empower individuals to control access to and use of their personal information.  To the 
extent that a right to information privacy allocates power, it structures relationships.  
Thus, information privacy protections are elements of social architecture and even 
economic architecture.  The market failure critique, when applied to the privacy-as-
information-control conceptualization, posits that people will not be able to control their 
personal data without government support because individuals often give away their 
personal information or are incapable of controlling it.
Privacy as Property
One variation of the privacy-as-information-control conceptualization is the 
privacy-as-property conceptualization.  Some scholars, such as Richard Murphy, take the 
view that “personal information is in fact, property.”131  This conceptualization differs 
from the private property concept discussed relative to the Fourth Amendment because 
here individuals have a property right in information that can be traded – not in physical 
space. For example, Professor Eugene Volokh noted that one can argue for property 
rights in personal information “on functional grounds: Those who communicate personal 
information about others are engaging in a sort of free riding, enriching themselves 
without compensating the people whose existence makes their enrichment possible; and 
131 Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 
GEO. L. J. 2381, 2393 (1996).
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property rights, the argument goes, are the way to avoid this free riding.”132  Like the 
secrecy conceptualization, the property conceptualization assumes individual agency in 
defining which information is to remain private. 
Understanding privacy as a property right presupposes ownership of two assets:  
the privacy right itself (my privacy) and personal data (my information). Here privacy 
law protects an individual’s right to negotiate the terms of sale, trade, or surrender of 
personal data.  As does the privacy-as-information-control conceptualization, the privacy-
as-property conceptualization can empower individuals relative to large bureaucracies. 
When applied to the privacy-as-property conceptualization, a market failure 
critique would highlight that there is no guarantee that individuals will use property rights 
in their personal information in a manner that benefits themselves or society.  Professor 
Michael Froomkin referred to the tendency of people to “sell their data too often and too 
cheaply” as “privacy myopia.”133 The popularity of participating in reality TV, live 
webcams, and blogs might indicate that one’s fleeting fame is more enticing than the 
maintenance of a private zone for the facilitation of intellectual and spiritual self-
development. 
Another market failure critique is that when privacy is conceptualized as a 
tradable property right, it should not be assumed that information transactions will take 
place between two equal partners.  Individuals with more technological savvy, more 
education, more experience, or insight into how information is managed may be better 
able to leverage their personal information.  These disparate levels of social power will 
132
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reveal a disparity in what Tal Zarsky, a resident fellow in the Information Society Project 
at Yale Law School, described as “sophistication.” He wrote:
In today’s technological reality, equal access to information is 
insufficient, and access to raw data is almost as good as having no access 
to data at all. To grasp and analyze the vast amounts of information 
available, sophistication is now the key . . . . [D]ata mining applications 
are expensive and at times beyond the reach of the general public . . . . 
Should such uneven access persist in a transparent society, transparency 
will in fact increase the disparity between individuals and large entities, 
rather than level the information playing field.134
In this passage Zarsky was critiquing the notion of a transparent society as 
proposed by best-selling science fiction author David Brin.  Brin argued that the Big 
Brother domestic surveillance scenario could be diffused if individual citizens were 
technologically empowered to conduct surveillance on government and big business.  
Zarsky recognized that those with less education and fewer resources would be 
disadvantaged in such a system.  Cohen agreed and described this scenario: 
Under a regime of tradable privacy rights,  “privacy” simply will 
become a status that can be chosen (and paid for) the way one might 
choose a neighborhood, a health club, or a brand of automobile . . . . A 
perverse consequence of a purely market-based approach to data privacy 
rights, then, may be more discounts for the rich.  If so, then the poor will 
lose twice over.  They will have less privacy, and they will also pay more 
for goods and services than more desirable customers.135
Control under the privacy-as-property conceptualization can be exercised in two 
ways.  First, individuals can treat their privacy as if it were an “indivisible 
134 Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and Pseudonymity as 
Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 991, 
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commodity.”136 This all-or-nothing approach means that people may trade away all their 
personal information and all rights to control what is done with that information at one 
time and in one transaction. The second way to exercise property rights in personal 
information is for individuals to use what Schwartz calls inalienabilities.  
An inalienable property right is a restriction placed on someone who is using or 
holding your property.137  For instance, one might rent a room to a student with the 
restriction, or inalienability, that the student not sublet the room to anyone else.  With 
regard to personal information, inalienabilities might include restrictions such as third
parties may not share personal data without one’s consent, third parties may not use the 
data for direct marketing purposes, or third parties may not share personal information 
with law enforcement without providing notice to those whose data are being accessed.
Schwartz wrote, “In the context of personal data trade, a single combination of 
these inalienabilities proves to be of greatest significance - namely, a restriction on the 
use of personal data combined with a limitation on their transferability.”138  Schwartz 
suggested that by identifying a number of inalienabilities and understanding the privacy-
as-property conceptualization as “a bundle of rights rather than despotic dominion over a 
thing” will help frame “a viable system of rights with respect to personal data.”139
136
 Henderson, supra note 108, at 546. 
137 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 774 (8th ed. 2004).
138
 Schwartz, supra note 62, at 2098.
139Id. at 2094; see also Cohen, supra note 25, at 1391 (asserting that current systems for processing 
transactions are designed to facilitate a one-time surrender of control over personal information, but they 
need not be because systems can be designed to make information privacy ownership “sticky” and efficient 
and that the design of such systems is a matter of choice).
43
Law Professor Andrew McClurg argued against the privacy-as-property 
conceptualization from a pragmatic position.  He noted that the government does not 
generally recognize a property interest in mere information.140  McClurg warned that if 
true property rights were to be recognized in personal facts, an entirely new doctrine of 
intellectual property would need to be established, and from both a practical and 
substantive perspective, this would be very difficult.141 For example, even if the 
government supported property rights in individual facts, the problem would then shift to 
ownership of information revealed through the use of KDD technologies. In order to 
create such knowledge, a computer program has to be written and used to compile and 
organize that data. Some entity must provide the time, equipment, and expertise needed 
to build the dossier. Such entities may have valid legal grounds to argue ownership rights 
in discovered knowledge.   
Fulda suggested that privacy protects reputation, and he argued for attaching 
property rights to reputation.142  This avoids the “no property rights in mere information” 
problem by presuming that facts alone have no value, but, instead, it is the information 
derived from the facts that does.143  One difficulty with Fulda’s suggestion is that 
individuals would need to be able to know what knowledge was derived from their data, 
when, for what purpose, and by whom. Only if third parties are obligated by law to keep 
140 McClurg, supra note 24, at 92.
141 Id.  “A substantial infrastructure would be necessary to implement a property rights-based system of 
consumer data.”
142 See generally Joseph S. Fulda, Reputation as Property, ST. CROIX REV. 33, April 2000, at 30.
143 Karas, supra note 25, at 424. “[I]t is important to note that privacy law and scholarship seek to protect 
not mere information relating to a person, but rather ‘information plus,’ information that is expressive of 
one’s self.”
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individuals informed as to what information is being mined from their digital dossiers 
will placing a property interest in reputation offer reliable protection of information 
privacy.
The privacy-as-property conceptualization differs from the original concept of 
privacy under the Fourth Amendment because here privacy is conceptualized as a 
tradable property right. The property model empowers individuals and therefore 
structures relationships within society.  It also provides a context in which information 
transactions can occur. Scholars have criticized this model for being unworkable.  Market 
failure critiques such as individual neglect of property rights, unequal partners to a 
transaction, and failure of the government to recognize property rights in facts alone all 
weaken this conceptualization.  Some scholars like Fulda and Schwartz have suggested 
solutions to these problems such as the use of inalienabilities and privacy rights in 
reputation. 
Privacy as Contract
A second variation of the privacy-as-information-control conceptualization is the 
privacy-as-contract conceptualization. A privacy-as-contract conceptualization would 
empower individuals to utilize contracts to negotiate disclosure. Ideally a privacy contract 
would outline exactly what control each of the parties has over the data in question. This 
conceptualization would also establish a fundamental privacy default rule, which means 
that in all cases companies holding personal information would be forced to disclose how 
they make the information available to the government, and whenever information 
contracts are unclear the courts will interpret the contract to prevent the disclosure of the 
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plaintiff’s personal information. The opposite of a privacy default is a disclosure default. 
A system with a disclosure default would interpret disputed contracts to allow access to 
and use of the information in question.  
Richard Murphy defined the basic principle of the privacy-as-contract144
paradigm: “Because information is voluntarily disclosed, there is no reason both sets of 
consumers cannot be satisfied through a contracting process.”145  Nevertheless, like the 
property model, the contract model requires a rather extreme cultural shift to be effective.  
America would need to adopt a privacy default standard as opposed to a disclosure 
default.  Privacy expert Charles Sykes outlined how America might be transformed into a 
culture and society that respects privacy. He explained:
We can begin to give individuals that control by creating a 
presumption of privacy as the default setting of the Information Age.   Our 
presumption of privacy should be as strongly held—and jealously 
guarded—as our presumption that we have free speech, freedom to 
worship, the right to own private property, and equality of opportunity, all 
values that are deeply ingrained in our culture, law, and politics. In the 
case of the presumption of privacy, the burden should be on others to say 
why they have any right to know about our lives.  Absent that, the 
presumption should be that each of us has control over such information.  
In practical terms that means that we should not be required to “opt-out” 
of a system that invades our privacy; the presumption of privacy would 
dictate that no one is allowed onto our zone of privacy without our 
specific choice to “opt-in.”146
Under Sykes’ paradigm, the courts would assume that in all circumstances 
individuals have a fundamental right to information privacy instead of disclosure and that 
individuals must “opt-in” to any disclosure contracts.  An opt-in information market 
144
 This conceptualization is sometimes called the privacy-as-choice concept.
145
 Murphy, supra note 131, at 2406.
146 SYKES, supra note 22, at 246.
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would mean that individuals must initiate any transaction that involves sharing their 
personal information.  An opt-out information market is the opposite.  Third parties could 
simply use personal data until they were asked to stop.  An opt-in information market 
would empower individuals relative to the third parties that hold their personal data.  
Murphy wrote, “[A] privacy default rule, by forcing the seller to contract out, could 
generate more dynamic benefits and be less costly than a disclosure rule, even in a 
situation where only a minority prefers privacy to disclosure.”147
Cohen commented that the privacy-as-contract conceptualization recognized 
what, for her, is the primary value in a privacy right, promoting the development of the 
autonomous self.  Cohen wrote, “[A] market model of tradable privacy rights is fully 
consistent with first-order normative commitments to dignity and equality, in that it treats 
each individual as an autonomous, rational actor and presumes that all individuals are 
equally capable of ascertaining and pursuing the goals that will maximize their own 
happiness.”148
Nevertheless, Cohen provided a market failure critique. She wrote that the 
contract model “presumes both the ability and the desire to alienate personal information 
(on the right terms), and thus devalues the argument that ownership necessarily includes 
the right to assert ongoing control.”149  Stated another way, the privacy-as-contract 
conceptualization assumes that individuals want to exercise ongoing control over their 
personal information, but there is a good chance people will not know how to do this or 
want to do this. To the extent that individuals contract away their right to ongoing control 
147
 Murphy, supra note 131, at 2416.
148
 Cohen, supra note 25, at 1424. 
149 Id. at 1393. 
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to third parties, the privacy-as-contract conceptualization will be an ineffective 
information privacy protection.
In another market failure critique, Tal Zarsky noted that many individuals do not 
truly understand how their personal information will be used by third parties even if they 
read privacy policies and the terms of privacy contracts. He said individuals sign off on 
privacy polices without fully understanding the terms of the contract in question – what 
he called the “autonomy trap.”150  Individuals believe they are determining how their 
information will be used, but they are really unequal parties to the agreement because 
they don’t know enough about private-sector and government use of personal information 
to make informed decisions regarding the terms of privacy contracts.
Professor Volokh, a prolific supporter of the privacy-as-contract 
conceptualization, argued the extreme position that contracts are the only information 
privacy protections that do not violate the free speech protections of the First 
Amendment. Volokh wrote: 
The difficulty is that the right to information privacy—my right to 
control your communication of personally identifiable information about 
me—is a right to have the government stop you from speaking about me.  
We already have a code of  “fair information practices,” and it is the First 
Amendment, which generally bars the government from controlling the 
communication of information (either by direct regulation or through the 
authorization of private lawsuits), whether the communication is  “fair” or 
not.  While privacy protection secured by contract is constitutionally 
150 See generally Zarsky, supra note 5, at § C ¶1. He explained the concept of the “autonomy trap,” which 
asserts that even though individuals can make privacy choices regarding posted privacy policies, they are 
controlled by those collecting the information. He argued that the answer to the autonomy trap is a massive 
public opinion campaign that might prepare citizens to see around the choice limitations and avoid faux 
choices.  He wrote, “The public, when aware of privacy concerns, could reduce the amount of personal data 
it provides collectors with, and insist on proper compensation when they choose to submit such 
information. In addition, people might apply general caution toward any feedback they receive from 
various content providers and advertisers, knowing that it might have been tailored especially for them.”
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sound, broader information privacy rules are not easily defensible under 
existing free speech law.151
Schwartz responded to Volokh’s argument and warned that “[b]y 
constitutionalizing out of existence privacy protections found in many legal sources, 
Volokh uses the First Amendment to set the stage for a reign of contract.”152  He argued
that exclusive reliance on the privacy-as-contract model vests too much power in the 
individual. Because of a lack of technical knowledge and resources, individuals will be at 
a distinct disadvantage when sitting at a bargaining table with large private or 
government entities interested in getting their personal data.
Another problem noted by Schwartz is the role played by the courts in a strict 
privacy-as-contract paradigm. He pointed out: “One problem is that this reading of the 
First Amendment [as making privacy protections unconstitutional] would transform 
federal judges into arbiters with the power to decide if there existed a social convention 
of confidentiality that merited inclusion in the First Amendment’s contract 
exemption.”153  Judges would be deciding whether an implied right of privacy existed in 
a contract between two parties within a given social context. 
Conclusion
This review of privacy scholarship covered three broad conceptualizations of 
privacy.  First, the privacy-as-space conceptualization was discussed. Originally 
151 Volokh, supra note 132, at 1050-51.
152
 Paul M. Schwartz, Free Speech v. Information Privacy: Eugene Volokh’s First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 52 STAN. L. REV.1559, 1568 (2000).
153 Id. at 1569.
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grounded in Fourth Amendment protections for private property, spatial privacy 
broadened to include privacy-as-access-to-self, which protected intangible interests such 
as one’s inviolate personality.  Next, the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization was 
discussed.  As citizens have become compelled to surrender personal data in order to 
function in society, the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization has been weakened by the 
necessity of recognizing limited privacy wherein individuals can retain some privacy in 
information they have shared with third-parties. Lastly, the privacy-as-information-
control conceptualization was discussed. Central to this conceptualization and its 
variants, privacy-as-property or privacy-as-contract, is personal agency. When the right
to privacy is conceived of this way, privacy law functions to empower individuals to 
control access to their personal information.
The common element among all of these conceptualizations and their variants is
the control of information flow.  None has succeeded in defining privacy or the value of 
privacy in every context, but they all ultimately describe an individual’s ability to 
conceal, manipulate, or share personal information.  These conceptualizations are used in 
the chapters that follow as a framework in which to analyze what the U.S. Supreme Court
and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have said about the fundamental right to control 
personal information in First and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and within the
emerging information privacy doctrine.
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Research Questions
This dissertation addresses the following research questions: 
RQ1: How has the U.S. Supreme Court conceptualized the constitutional right to privacy 
in general in First and Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence?  
RQ2: How have the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal 
conceptualized the constitutional right to information privacy? 
RQ3: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current conceptualizations of the 
constitutional right of privacy in general or the constitutional right of information privacy 
in particular as protection against KDD? 
RQ4: If a conceptualization more protective of information privacy is needed, what 
should it be? How might KDD applications and policies be designed to better comply 
with the individual constitutional right to avoid the disclosure of personal matters?
51
Method
This dissertation presents a traditional legal case analysis involving three types of 
case law. First, U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment anonymous speech and 
association cases and Fourth Amendment privacy cases are examined in turn. Then 
Supreme Court and U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal cases that discuss information privacy 
as either a protected liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment154 or as an implied right under one of the Amendments in the Bill of 
Rights155 are analyzed. Language from each decision is examined in order to identify the
conceptualization(s) of privacy implicit or explicit in the court’s determination of the 
privacy interest at risk in each case: privacy as space, privacy as secrecy, or privacy as 
information control. Evidence is also sought regarding the emergence of any new 
conceptualizations of privacy not discussed in privacy scholarship reviewed above.
Within each of the three types of case law, analysis is conducted chronologically 
in order to identify the historical evolutionary progression of the courts’ 
conceptualizations of privacy within each doctrine.  Conceptual trends revealed in the 
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and information privacy law are discussed in 
terms of which conceptualization is most likely to underlie the courts’ decisions in any 
future constitutional challenge to the use of KDD technologies. 
A preliminary list of 135 cases was generated using three methods. First, Westlaw 
database searches were conducted using combinations of the following search terms:
154 U.S. CONST. amend, XIV, § 1. The clause reads: “[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.” These cases typically involve a constitutional challenge to a federal, state, or local 
statute which compels individuals to surrender personal information. 
155 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 318 U.S 479, 484 (1965).
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First Amendment, freedom of speech, privacy, surveillance, dataveillance, information 
privacy, database(s), Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment. Second, following 
a cursory review, decisional and statutory privacy cases were removed and the 
preliminary case list was divided into two categories: First Amendment anonymous 
speech and association cases and Fourth Amendment privacy cases.  The landmark cases 
were then selected from these shorter lists.  The landmark cases are those most often cited 
by the Supreme Court in its privacy jurisprudence and are the most referenced in the 
scholarly literature. This resulted in a list of ten First Amendment cases and twelve 
Fourth Amendment cases that are analyzed in chapters 2 and 3 respectively.
Information privacy is a new and vaguely defined legal doctrine that began with 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Whalen v. Roe.156 The Supreme Court has only decided 
one case, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,157 since Whalen that has further 
shaped the Court’s information privacy doctrine.  Therefore, a list of U.S. Circuit Courts 
of Appeal information privacy cases was generated by using LexisNexis to Shepardize
the phrase “interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters” from Whalen. The 
process yielded a list of 264 cases.  All district court cases and circuit court decisions that 
merely cited to the language in Whalen were eliminated, and a core of twenty appellate 
decisions in which the phrase was followed, explained, distinguished, or criticized 
remained.  These twenty cases are analyzed in Chapter 4.
Chapter 5 details the KDD process, which has two distinct stages: pre-KDD 
processes and KDD applications, and applies the five privacy conceptualizations to the 
156
 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
157
 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
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second stage.  Chapter 6 summarizes the answers to the four research questions presented 
above.
Study Limitations
This study is an exploration of the conceptualizations of a constitutional right to 
privacy in general and information privacy in particular.  It discusses how these rights 
have been articulated by the Supreme Court and the U.S. Courts of Appeal and also how 
they might be applied to the use of KDD by the federal government. There are a number 
of related areas that this dissertation does not address.  It does not delve into issues of 
criminal law that are related to information privacy.  Issues arising under the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments regarding self-incrimination and fair trial are not discussed.  Neither 
are evidentiary rules that might affect the admissibility of evidence gathered through the 
use of dataveillance discussed. No statutory privacy protections or privacy torts are 
discussed, and no case law arising from privacy rights granted in state constitutions is 
discussed.  Also, other than the circuit court opinions discussed in Chapter 4, cases from 
the lower federal courts and state courts are beyond the scope of this dissertation, as are 
the many policy debates about dataveillance. 
CHAPTER II
THE FIRST AMENDMENT: PRIVACY AND ANONYMITY
Privacy within First Amendment jurisprudence has been conceptualized as the 
right to control the dissemination of personal information, especially one’s identity, and 
to a lesser extent, as a right to limit access to one’s self.  It has been used by the Supreme 
Court to defend both anonymous speech and anonymous association. Since First 
Amendment privacy cases involve challenges to the government’s ability to directly 
compel individuals to surrender identifying information, comprehension of how privacy 
has been conceptualized in First Amendment privacy jurisprudence will be useful for
evaluating current privacy protections against the government’s use of KDD 
dataveillance.
Though the word “anonymous” does not appear in the First Amendment,158
through the application of historical analysis, the Court has recognized that anonymous 
speech was highly valued by the Framers as a tool for protecting those expressing 
158 Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 70 (1960) (Clark, J., dissenting).  “The Constitution says nothing 
about freedom of anonymous speech. In fact, this Court has approved laws requiring no less than Los 
Angeles' ordinance.”  Justice Clark is referring to Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913), which
upheld an Act of Congress (39 U.S.C. § 233) requiring any newspaper using the second-class mails to 
publish the names of its editor, publisher, owner, and stockholders and United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 
612 (1954), which upheld The Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act, (2 U.S.C. § 267) requiring those 
engaged in lobbying to divulge their identities and give ‘a modicum of information’ to Congress.
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political views.159 Moreover, in NAACP v. Alabama, 160 the Court recognized “the vital 
relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations.”161
This chapter discusses five Supreme Court anonymous speech cases decided 
between 1943 and 2002 and five Supreme Court anonymous association cases decided 
between 1958 and 1972.  These ten cases were identified as landmark cases in the 
scholarly literature and were frequently cited in subsequent First Amendment privacy 
cases.  Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, events such as the Civil Rights 
movement, McCarthyism, and the peace movement during the Vietnam conflict rekindled 
the government’s desire, at all levels, to identify individuals who held dissident 
viewpoints. The cases discussed below resulted from challenges to state action in this 
regard.  This chapter reveals that throughout these First Amendment privacy cases the 
Court has primarily conceptualized the constitutional right to privacy as one of 
information control.   
In cases involving First Amendment anonymity, the Court must decide whether, 
in a particular circumstance, the government is empowered to compel the disclosure of 
identifying information.  Therefore, anonymity is necessarily predicated upon 
information control. Nevertheless, the acceptance of privacy-as-access-to-self variant of 
159
 McEntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343, n.6 (1995). In the Court’s dicta. examples are 
provided of politicians in history who opted to write anonymously under pseudonyms.  The list includes: 
Publius (James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay), Cato (allegedly New York Governor George 
Clinton), Centinel (probably Samuel Bryan or his father, George Bryan), The Federal Farmer (maybe 
Richard Henry Lee), Brutus (likely Robert Yates), and Junius (a pre-revolutionary English pamphleteer as 
yet unidentified); see also id. at 360-71 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas provided a thorough, 
historical argument to support his assertion that given the historical context in which the First Amendment 
was drafted, the Founders intended the First Amendment to protect the individual’s right to express 
thoughts and opinions regarding political candidates or issues in an anonymous manner.
160 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
161 Id. at 465.
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the privacy-as-space conceptualization is subsumed within the Court’s recognition of a 
right to control identifying information.  Justice William O. Douglas once wrote, “ [T]he 
right of privacy implicit in the First Amendment creates an area into which the 
Government may not enter.”162 This “area” is the inviolate personality discussed by 
Warren and Brandeis.163 It is the interior realm in which individuals guard their most 
intimate beliefs, knowledge, and values. Constitutional privacy protections under the 
First Amendment protect individuals from being compelled by the government to 
surrender this type of personal information.
For purposes of this analysis, the term “anonymous speech” is used in reference to 
any instance when an individual chooses to speak, publish, or distribute information 
without revealing his or her identity. Among other functions, anonymous speech has been 
considered to reduce the chance of retribution for the expression of unpopular 
sentiment,164 to remove listeners’ perceptions of a speaker from the process of evaluating 
the merit of the information being disseminated,165 to allow those seeking information on 
sensitive topics to feel less apprehension, and to allow for the preservation of as much 
privacy as possible.166
162 Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 569-70 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring).
163
 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 48, at 205.
164 McEntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42.  “The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of 
economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as 
much of one’s privacy as possible.”
165 Id. at 342. “[A]n advocate may believe her ideas will be more persuasive if her readers are unaware of 
her identity. Anonymity thereby provides a way for a writer who may be personally unpopular to ensure 
that readers will not prejudge her message simply because they do not like its proponent.”
166 See generally MADELEINE SCHACHTER, LAW OF INTERNET SPEECH, 311-14 (2d. ed. 2002) (describing in 
broad terms the social values served by anonymous speech).
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The term “anonymous assembly” or “anonymous association” is used to describe 
an instance in which individuals would prefer not to share with the government a list of 
groups to which they belong, of those they support, or of fellow members.  Like 
anonymous speech, anonymous association plays a vital role in self government. In 
NAACP, the Court recognized that the “inviolability of privacy in group association may 
in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of association, 
particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs.”167 Framed in this manner, 
anonymity promotes individual and group sovereignty through the exercise of the right to 
control the disclosure of identifying information. 
Privacy in Anonymous Speech Cases
In anonymous speech cases involving the distribution of pamphlets, the collection 
of signatures on petitions, and door-to-door proselytizing, the Court has recognized that 
individuals have a right to limit access to their selves by controlling the disclosure of 
their identity to others.  The individual privacy interest is the ability to avoid any 
retaliatory harms that might result when those receiving unpopular or offensive 
information are able to identity those disseminating it.  In none of the anonymous speech 
cases reviewed did the government put forth a substantial reason for compelling the 
disclosure of such personal information.  In adopting the privacy-as-information-control 
conceptualization, the Court concomitantly recognized limited privacy. Individuals do
not automatically surrender the right of anonymity because they disclose, by standing 
167 NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
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physically in front of others distributing leaflets, that they support a specific belief, cause, 
or candidate. Other bits of personal information can still be concealed. 
An iconic construct in First Amendment jurisprudence has been the “Lonely 
Pamphleteer,”168 a mythic champion for those who espouse unpopular views in the 
marketplace of ideas despite what John Stuart Mill would have called the tyranny of the 
majority.169 During the twentieth century the Court has ruled on cases involving 
pamphleteers who allegedly threatened national security by disseminating subversive 
materials,170 who violated city ordinances designed to prevent littering,171 who violated 
ordinances designed to protect homeowners from those distributing literature door-to-
door,172 and who violated ordinances designed to prevent fraud in elections.173
168 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703 (1972) (lamenting the difficulty of determining whether the 
“liberty of the press is the right of the lonely pamphleteer who uses carbon paper or a mimeograph just as 
much as [it is a right] of the large metropolitan publisher who utilizes the latest photocomposition 
methods”).
169 See, e.g., John Stuart Mill, On the Liberty of Thought and Discussion, ON LIBERTY, ch. 2 (1869), 
available at http://www.utilitarianism.com/ol/two/html. Mill argued that protection against the state is not 
enough;  individual expression also needs to be protected against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and 
feeling in society; against the tendency for society to impose its owns ideas, practices, and rules of behavior 
on those  who dissent from them.  Social stigma is a powerful tool of repression when used against 
dissenters.
170 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding that distributing circulars to men about to be 
drafted that encouraged insubordination and draft resistance was a violation of the Espionage Act of 1917), 
Abrams v. United States, 250 US 616 (1919) (convicting five Russian Jews of violating the Espionage Act 
of 1917 for distributing two anarchist circulars (entitled The Hypocrisy of the United States and her Allies
and Workers Wake Up respectively) including “some by throwing them from a window of a building where 
one of the defendants was employed in New York City”), and Gitlow v. United States, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) 
(convicting Gitlow, a socialist during the nation’s first “Red Scare,” of criminal anarchy for violating a 
New York City ordinance when he “printed, published and knowingly circulated and distributed a certain 
paper called 'The Revolutionary Age,' containing the writings . . . advocating, advising and teaching the 
doctrine that organized government should be overthrown by force, violence and unlawful means”).
171 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).The primary rationales behind both § 28.01 of the Los 
Angeles Municipal Code and Milwaukee ordinance St.1937, § 103.53(1)(e) were to prevent littering, which 
was perceived as  an undesirable byproduct of distributing handbills.  Both ordinances were struck down as 
unconstitutional restrictions upon free speech.
172
 These were primarily nuisance laws aimed at eliminating the annoyance caused by door-to-door 
canvassing or solicitation.
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Most of these cases resulted in the Court ruling that city ordinances prohibiting 
the distribution of handbills, pamphlets, or leaflets on city streets or door-to-door were 
generally unconstitutional restrictions of free speech.174 These decisions stressed the 
central role this method of sharing information has played in the history of the United 
States. As Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes wrote in Lovell v. City of Griffin that 
pamphlets and leaflets “indeed have been historic weapons in the defense of liberty, as 
the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in our own history abundantly attest.”175
Once such outright prohibitions on distributing pamphlets, handbills, etc. were 
ruled unconstitutional, cities began to “condition” their distribution. A number of city 
ordinances did so by requiring those disseminating information to obtain permits from the 
city. The permit application process necessarily forced individuals to surrender their 
identifying information to the government in order to participate in public discourse.176
Justice Hugo Black stressed the importance of the anonymity threatened by such 
173
 McEntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995). The Court struck down § 3599.09(A) of 
the Ohio Code, which prohibited the distribution of “campaign literature that does not contain the name and 
address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature.”
174
 Many cities passed nuisance laws designed to stop canvassers, religious missionaries, salespersons, 
petitioners, etc. from either passing out literature in public areas, preaching/speaking on street corners, etc., 
or from going door-to-door.  A number of these statutes and ordinances were challenged by Jehovah’s 
Witnesses who felt they were commanded by Jehovah to spread his truth, and thus any man-made law was 
considered an insult to their religious practice.
175 Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938). In this case the Court ruled that a city ordinance 
that prohibited “the distribution of literature of any kind at any time, at any place, and in any manner 
without a permit from the city manager” would in fact “restore the system of license and censorship in its 
baldest form” and thus was unconstitutional.
176 See Schneider, 308 U.S. at 157-58. The Court overturned an Irvington, New Jersey, ordinance that 
required that each “canvasser must make an application giving his name, address, age, height, weight, place 
of birth, whether or not one was previously arrested or convicted of crime, by whom employed, address of 
employer, clothing worn, and description of project for which he is canvassing; [and] that each applicant 
shall be fingerprinted and photographed.”
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ordinances in the 1960 case Talley v. State of California.177 Justice Black wrote: 
“Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets, brochures and even books have played an important 
role in the progress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time 
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices and laws either 
anonymously or not at all.”178
Since anonymity had already been recognized as a vital element in political 
speech, the Court was tasked with balancing the legislative purpose for prohibiting 
anonymity against the individual’s right to keep identifying information private. Thus, 
the “pamphleteer” cases yield a rich vein of anonymous speech jurisprudence, which 
provides insight into the Court’s conceptualization of privacy in First Amendment free 
speech doctrine.
Anonymity and Pamphleteering
Talley was the first “pamphleteer” case in which the Supreme Court ruled on the 
right to anonymity for those distributing handbills. The Court recognized anonymity as 
the individual right to control the disclosure of identifying information for the purpose of
limiting access to one’s self, to keep one’s inner realm private. The Court thus subsumed 
the privacy-as-access-to-self conceptualization of privacy under the privacy-as-
information-control conceptualization.  Understood in this way, one’s right to protect the 
177 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
178 Id. at 64. He went on to argue that the English seditious libel cases of John Lilburne, John Penry, and 
John Udal demonstrate the lengths to which governments would go to silence opposition.
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self is only actualized through the exercise of the broader right to control access to 
personal information.
At issue in Talley was a challenge to a Los Angeles, California, ordinance that 
required that the name and address of the person(s) or group(s) responsible for producing 
and distributing any handbills, leaflets, etc. be printed on all literature disseminated 
within the city.179 The question before the Court was whether government can burden 
individuals desiring to participate in public discourse with the compelled disclosure of 
personally identifying information.  
Justice Black drew on American history to establish that anonymity had often 
been “assumed for the most constructive purposes.”180  He compared the individual 
handing out handbills in Los Angeles to the Founding Fathers when he focused on the 
harms that might befall those speaking publicly.  For instance, he wrote, “Before the 
Revolutionary War colonial patriots frequently had to conceal their authorship or 
distribution of literature that easily could have brought down on them prosecutions by 
English-controlled courts.”181  He then noted that the justification of preventing such 
harms had also been used by the Court in mid-twentieth century anonymous assembly 
cases wherein statutes that compelled the disclosure of group membership lists were 
179 L.A., CAL. MUNICIPAL CODE § 28.06. This section provided that  “no person shall distribute any hand-
bill in any place under any circumstances, which does not have printed on the cover, or the face thereof, the 
name and address of the following: (a) The person who printed, wrote, compiled or manufactured the same.
(b) The person who caused the same to be distributed; provided, however, that in the case of a fictitious 
person or club, in addition to such fictitious name, the true names and addresses of  the owners, managers 
or agents of the person sponsoring said hand-bill shall also appear thereon.” The handbill at question in 
Talley urged citizens to boycott certain businesses with allegedly discriminatory hiring practices and was 
labeled as being from the National Consumers Mobilization.
180 Talley, 362 U.S. at 64-65.
181 Id. Justice Black used the Letters of Junius and the Federalist Papers as examples of these revolutionary 
era writings.
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struck down because “identification and fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful 
discussions of public matters of importance.”182  The Court in Talley ruled that the Los 
Angeles ordinance was “subject to the same infirmity” and thus, like the ordinance in 
Lovell, was “unconstitutional on its face.” 183
In Talley the Court implicitly recognized the privacy-as-information-control 
conceptualization.  The decision empowered individuals to control access to their
identities, and in doing so it legitimized the notion of limited privacy.  For instance, it 
could be argued that in choosing to stand in a public place and distribute literature, 
individuals are surrendering their right to personal privacy.  As discussed in chapter one, 
under the privacy-as-secrecy paradigm, any information shared with a third party cannot 
be private, and, had the Court utilized that conceptualization it could have ruled that one 
shares one’s entire identity when standing bodily in front of others. Reasoning under the 
privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization incorporates an all-or-nothing concept of personal 
information.
Instead, in striking down the ordinance because an “identification requirement 
would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of
expression,”184 the Talley Court recognized that individuals can choose to identify 
themselves with a belief or political stance without providing any other information about
themselves. Justice Black empowered individuals to share select aspects of their identity 
without surrendering complete access to themselves to the government and, by extension,
to those to whom they distribute literature.
182 Id. at 65. 
 
183 Id.
184 Id. at 64.
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Ultimately, the Talley decision is about the Court allocating the power to control 
information.  This ruling is also important because not all personal information is created 
equal.  To know an individual’s name is to gain the ability to access additional personal 
information about that person.  For example, if a person’s name is known, it is rather 
simple to access his or her phone number, but it is slightly more difficult to access his or 
her name given a phone number.  Certain bits of information, like an address or a Social 
Security number, provide a “gateway” through which one might learn more about another 
person.  The permit requirement in Talley involved such “gateway” information.  By 
striking down the Los Angeles ordinance, the Court recognized privacy as the individual 
right to control personal information in general and thereby to limit access to one’s self as 
well as to enjoy limited privacy in contrast to the commoditized, all-or-nothing, privacy-
as-secrecy conceptualization.
Privacy as information control was also evident in the next landmark ruling 
involving anonymous speech and the distribution of handbills, McEntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Commission.185  Whereas the handbill in Talley called for an economic boycott, 
the literature in McEntyre was part of the political process itself in that it encouraged 
voters to vote down a proposed school tax.  Justice John Paul Stevens referenced the 
Court’s reasoning in Talley, which he thought supported  “a respected tradition of 
anonymity in the advocacy of political causes . . . perhaps best exemplified by the secret 
ballot, the hard-won right to vote one’s conscience without fear of retaliation.”186  Justice 
Stevens framed the question in McEntyre as “whether and to what extent the First 
185
 McEntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).  Ohio’s statute prohibiting the distribution 
of any anonymous campaign literature was held unconstitutional.
186 Id. at 343.
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Amendment’s protection of anonymity encompasses documents intended to influence the 
electoral process.”187
The Ohio statute under scrutiny in McEntyre prohibited the distribution of any 
campaign literature that did not include, on its face, “the name and residence or business 
address of the chairman, treasurer, or secretary of the organization issuing the same, or 
the person who issues, makes, or is responsible therefore.”188  The Court ruled that the 
statute was a regulation of “pure speech” as it did not directly control “the mechanics of 
the electoral process,”189 and, therefore, the Court needed to apply “exacting scrutiny.”190
Similar to Justice Black in Talley, Justice Clarence Thomas, in his McEntyre
concurrence, stressed the importance of anonymity in the American tradition.191  He 
wrote:
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a 
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of advocacy and 
of dissent. . . . Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority . . . .  
It thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights  and of the First 
Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from retaliation 
-- and their ideas from suppression -- at the hand of an intolerant 
society.192
187 Id. at 344.
.
188 OHIO REV.CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (1988).
189 McEntyre, 514 U.S. at 345.
190 Id. at 347.
191Id. at 370 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Clarence Thomas, following a lengthy and detailed historical 
analysis of anonymous authorship in American political history, concluded, “After reviewing the weight of 
the historical evidence, it seems that the Framers understood the First Amendment to protect an author's 
right to express his thoughts on political candidates or issues in an anonymous fashion.”
192 Id. at 357.
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The disclosure statute was ruled unconstitutional because Ohio’s stated interests in 
“providing voters with additional relevant information” and in preventing the likelihood 
of election fraud did not justify a “state requirement that a writer make statements or 
disclosures she would otherwise omit.”193
Like Justice Black had in Talley, Justice Stevens recognized that disclosing 
personal information to the government placed individuals at risk for nothing more than 
exercising their fundamental right to free speech.  He recognized the right of individuals 
to decide when and to whom to make information about themselves accessible, the 
privacy-as-information-control conceptualization.  In McEntyre, Justice Stevens 
explicitly described the importance of this ability to control identifying information as the 
ability to protect the self. He used language reminiscent of Warren and Brandeis’ notion 
of “inviolate personality.”194 He wrote: “A written election-related document --
particularly a leaflet – is often a personally crafted statement of a political viewpoint. . . . 
As such, identification of the author against her will is particularly intrusive; it reveals 
unmistakably the content of her thoughts on a controversial issue.”195
Since the purpose of a political handbill is ultimately to persuade, it stands to 
reason that an individual’s reasons for supporting a particular position or candidate would 
be printed on the handbill.  These talking points may directly expose the pamphleteer’s 
deeply held beliefs and values and thus provide a window into one’s personality.  Justice 
193 Id. at 348-49.
194
 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 48, at 205.
195 McEntyre, 514 U.S. at 355.
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Stevens reasoned that a compelled disclosure of one’s identity, in combination with such 
a statement of belief, exposed too much of the self. 
As it was in Talley, limited privacy was central to the McEntyre Court’s 
reasoning.  Justice Stevens explicitly recognized that political literature often exposes 
what an individual thinks, believes, or supports, but without “gateway” knowledge, the 
pamphleteer is able to remain anonymous. Absent “identifying” information individuals 
are better shielded from the possibility of private retaliation enabled by government 
mandated disclosure.
Four years after McEntyre, the Court again conceptualized privacy as limiting
access-to-self through the exercise of a right to control identifying information as it 
considered the value of anonymity to individuals collecting signatures on petitions in 
public places.  Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the majority in Buckley v. 
American Constitutional Law Foundation,196  wherein the Court struck down as 
unconstitutional restrictions of free speech provisions in a Colorado statute that required 
initiative-petition circulators197 to wear identification badges198 and proponents of a ballot 
initiative to report the names, addresses, and salaries of all paid circulators.199  Also 
weighed in the Court’s analysis was that initiative proponents were required to submit an 
affidavit (at the time they file their petition) containing the name, address, and county of 
196 Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
197
 Colorado allows citizens to make laws directly by placing ballot issue initiatives in elections once 
enough signatures are obtained on initiative petitions.  This case involved constitutional challenges to six 
rules intended to control the ballot-initiative process.
198 COL. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(2).  Along with the circulator’s name, his or her status as “paid” or 
“volunteer” had to be noted.  Badges on circulators who were paid also had to note who was paying them.
199 COL. REV. STAT. § 1-40-121.  This information was to be submitted as part of an affidavit submitted 
with completed petitions.
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voter registration of all paid circulators; the amount of money proponents paid per 
petition signature; the total amount paid to each circulator; and reports of monthly totals 
containing the names of the proponents, the name and address of each paid circulator, the 
name of the proposed ballot measure, and the amount of money paid and owed to each 
circulator each month.200
Central to Justice Ginsburg’s reasoning was the potential harm to individuals 
circulating the initiative-petitions.  Again, the issue was that individuals should have the 
ability to control the revelation of personal information to others, especially in situations 
where there was a heightened possibility of retaliatory harm. Justice Ginsburg 
distinguished between the levels of risk associated with the affidavit disclosures and the 
name badge requirements. She wrote: “While the affidavit reveals the name of the 
petition circulator and is a public record, it is tuned to the speaker's interest as well as the 
state's. Unlike a name badge worn at the time a circulator is soliciting signatures, the 
affidavit is separated from the moment the circulator speaks.”201
In Talley and McEntyre the Court had recognized that individuals have a right to 
limited privacy regarding their identity when handing someone a pamphlet.  In Buckley
the Court ruled that the decision to disclose one’s identity lies with the individual who, at 
the moment of face-to-face communication, can best assess the level of risk of retaliation 
by those receiving their information.  This notion was intimated when Ginsburg wrote, 
“The injury to speech is heightened for the petition circulator because the badge 
200 Id.
201 Buckley, 525 U.S. at 198-99. Should anyone receiving the information in question become passionate, 
offended, or enraged, they might note the petitioner’s name and plan some type of future retribution.  
Should a name or identifier not be visible, the recipient’s emotional response might ebb before he or she is 
able to attain the petitioner’s identity.
68
requirement compels personal name identification at the precise moment when the 
circulator’s interest in anonymity is greatest.”202  Thus, again, the Court’s 
conceptualization of privacy was as a right to limit access to self through a right to 
control access to personal information, and this privacy interest is increasingly 
heightened as the immediate threat of harm increases.
In regard to the personal information that Colorado required to be submitted on 
the affidavit when petitions are turned in, the Court recognized a lesser privacy interest.  
Relying on language from the Tenth Circuit decision,203 Ginsburg noted, “The affidavit, 
in contrast, does not expose the circulator to the risk of ‘heat of the moment’ 
harassment”204 because the affidavits, though public records, are not instantly accessible 
and less likely to be used to harm the initiative-petition circulators in some way. This is a 
concept running throughout First Amendment anonymous speech and association cases; 
the more remote the risk of potential harm, the exact nature of which was never defined 
by the Court, the lesser the individual privacy interest relative to the state.
Thus, in Buckley, Colorado’s name badge requirement was struck down and the 
affidavit disclosure provision was allowed to stand.  Underlying this distinction is the 
concept of “practical obscurity,” which is a term used in reference to how difficult 
information is to access.205 The Court first recognized this concept in 1989 in U.S. Dept. 
202 Id. at 199-200.
203
 Am. Const. Law Found. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d, 1092, 1102 (10th Cir. 1997).
204 Buckley, 525 U.S. at 198-99.
205 See SYKES, supra note 22, at 254 (explaining that “one of the elements of privacy enjoyed in the past 
was precisely the ‘practical obscurity’ of personal information.  The Court not only found that individuals 
had a genuine privacy interest in keeping their criminal past out of the public domain, but they also had an 
interest in the ‘practical obscurity’ of a precomputerized age.”).
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of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of Press.206 In this case a descendant of a 
suspected mob criminal filed an injunction to prevent disclosure to the press of his 
father’s criminal record.  Individual “rap sheets” had recently been compiled into a 
centralized government database.  Prior to this compilation, such information, though 
public records, had been scattered throughout a number of states and government 
departments. It was a laborious task to compile someone’s complete rap sheet.  The 
impracticality of doing so actually served as a layer of privacy protection for personal 
information.207  This layer of protection dissolved when records were combined in 
accessible databases. 
Justice Ginsburg used similar reasoning to Justice Stevens’ in Reporters 
Committee.  Those canvassing for signatures on initiative petitions could be too easily 
identified by name badges just as Charles Medico’s criminal records were too easily 
obtainable in a computerized database. Without the name badge requirement, practical 
obscurity could balance the interests of the speaker and the city.  It would require an 
investment of time for someone who had been annoyed by a petition circulator to go to 
the Board of Elections and request a copy of the initiative proponent’s filed affidavit, 
then to learn the name and address of the petition circulator, and then plan some 
retaliatory action.  
206 489 U.S. 749 (1989).  Records for Charles Medico were requested by the media under the federal 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1)(C) (2002).  The U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
disclosure of these compiled files was an unwarranted invasion of privacy and thus qualified for a FOIA 
exemption under § 552(b)(7)(C).
207 Id. at 764. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote: “[T]he issue here is whether the compilation of otherwise 
hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy interest implicated by disclosure of that information. Plainly 
there is a vast difference between the public records that might be found after a diligent search of 
courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized 
summary located in a single clearinghouse of information.”
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The Colorado provisions at issue in Buckley allegedly allocated too much power 
to the state.  This threat to personal privacy was closely related to one of the core values 
of the U.S. Constitution, limited government, because the rules under review directly
governed elections. Should individuals be chilled from participating in the democratic 
process, then these provisions would have directly impeded the power of the people to 
self-govern.  The Court recognized that the provisions destroyed “practical obscurity” 
and the ability of individuals to control access to identifying information, and was able to 
restore the balance in the relationship between voters and the state by striking down the 
name badge provision and upholding the affidavit disclosures.
Anonymity and Canvassing
 In the preceding pamphleteering cases the Court upheld the individual privacy 
interest in avoiding any potential retaliatory harms that might result from the disclosure 
of one’s identity against various city and state interests in preventing littering, informing 
voters, and preventing fraud. In each case pamphlets were being distributed in a public 
space, but the Court has also evaluated anonymity, and thus privacy, in instances where 
individuals desired to distribute literature or collect signatures going door-to-door in 
neighborhoods that had ordinances in place to prohibit such behavior . 
In these canvassing cases the Court balanced two separate individual privacy 
interests: that of the homeowners who did not want to be disturbed and that of canvassers 
who did not want to be compelled to disclose their identities in exchange for permission 
to canvass neighborhoods.  Both of these interests were conceptualized as the right to 
control the flow of information.  Canvassers, like the pamphleteers in the preceding 
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cases, had an interest in controlling the disclosure of their identity.  Homeowners had an 
interest in being able to control the flow of general information into their homes.
Just as some cities and states had attempted to enact outright bans on the 
distribution of pamphlets in public spaces, in some cases similar bans were passed 
regarding door-to-door canvassing. In 1943 the Court struck down as “the naked 
restriction of the dissemination of ideas”208 a city ordinance that completely banned door-
to-door distribution of literature whether for “political, social, religious, or commercial 
purposes.”209 In Martin v. City of Struthers,210 Justice Black wrote for the majority and 
embraced the every-man’s-house-is-his-castle philosophy. He used language that 
signaled his belief that the spatial privacy conceptualization was all about the right of 
homeowners to control the flow of information into their homes. In the opening lines of 
the Martin decision, Justice Black wrote: 
For centuries it has been a common practice in this and other 
countries for persons not specifically invited to go from home to home and 
knock on doors or ring doorbells to communicate ideas to the occupants or 
to invite them to political, religious, or other kinds of public meetings. 
Whether such visiting shall be permitted has in general been deemed to 
depend upon the will of the individual master of each household, and not 
upon the determination of the community.211
208 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
209 Id. The city ordinance read as follows: “It is unlawful for any person distributing handbills, circulars or 
other advertisements to ring the door bell, sound the door knocker, or otherwise summon the inmate or 
inmates of any residence to the door for the purpose of receiving such handbills, circulars or other 
advertisements they or any person with them may be distributing.”
210 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
211 Id. at 141.
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Implied here is that individuals have a First Amendment right to share information door-
to-door, but private property rights are more important than the First Amendment rights
in this context.212
The Martin decision did reinforce a private property right, but Justice Black 
seemed to conceive of this right as one of information control.  He reasoned that 
homeowner privacy was preserved when the law provided mechanisms through which 
residents could limit the flow of outside information into their private space. This 
sentiment was also noted in a concurrence by Justice Felix Frankfurter who wrote, 
“Door-knocking and bell-ringing by professed peddlers of things or ideas may . . .  be 
confined within specified hours and otherwise circumscribed so as not to sanctify the 
rights of these peddlers in disregard of the rights of those within doors.”213
Justice Black provided a summary of state trespass laws and noted, “Traditionally 
the American law punishes persons who enter onto the property of another after having 
been warned by the owner to keep off.”214  Thus, Justice Black established that 
homeowners’ privacy was protected by state trespass law and that time, place, and 
manner restrictions on canvassing would be constitutional.  He asserted that any dangers 
associated with the distribution of literature were easily controlled by “traditional legal 
methods” that left to each homeowner “the full right to decide whether he will receive 
strangers as visitors.”215  This right of homeowners to decide whether to receive visitors 
212
 Id. at 146-47. Justice Black wrote, “Freedom to distribute information to every citizen wherever he 
desires to receive it is so clearly vital to the preservation of a free society that, putting aside reasonable 
police and health regulations of time and manner of distribution, it must be fully preserved.”
213 Id. at 153. (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
214 Id. at 147.
215 Id.
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should be understood as a right to control the flow of information into their homes.  
The privacy rights of both homeowners and canvassers were again balanced in 
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton.216  Here, the Court 
had to balance the privacy interest of the homeowners, which was conceptualized in 
much the same way as it had been in Martin, against the right of individuals to control the 
disclosure of their identifying information.
In Watchtower the Court reviewed a First Amendment challenge to a Stratton, 
Ohio, ordinance that prohibited “canvassers and others” from going on private residential 
property to promote any cause without first obtaining a “solicitation permit” that was to 
be carried by individuals going door-to-door and shown to any home resident upon 
request.217  Canvassers were required to fill out a lengthy permit application (which asked 
for one’s name, home address, purpose, employer, and residence(s) for the previous five 
years among other bits of information), which would be kept on file with the mayor’s 
office in Stratton. 
The Sixth Circuit had previously upheld the Stratton ordinance.218  Rejecting the 
idea of limited privacy, the appellate court held:
[I]ndividuals going door-to-door to engage in political speech are 
not anonymous by virtue of the fact that they reveal a portion of their 
identities -- their physical identities -- to the residents they canvass, . . . 
[T]he very act of going door-to-door requires the canvassers to reveal a 
portion of their identities.219
216
 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
217 ORD. NO. 1998-, §§ 116.01-03.
218
 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y. v. Vill. of Stratton , 240 F.3d 553 (6th Cir. 2001).
219 Id. at 563.
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The circuit court then reasoned that the ordinance did not force individuals to surrender 
their entire identities, only “the remainder of their identities, i.e., their names.”220
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Watchtower
and framed the legal issue this way: “Does a municipal ordinance that requires one to 
obtain a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to 
display upon demand the permit, which contains one's name, violate the First 
Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse?”221  The 
Court said the village ordinance applied not only to the “religious proselytizing” that had 
triggered the case, “but also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of 
handbills.”222 The Court overturned the Sixth Circuit decision and struck down the 
ordinance as an unconstitutional restriction of free speech.  
Whereas the lower court applied the all-or-nothing model of surrendering one’s 
personal information more common under the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization, the 
Supreme Court again accepted the idea of limited privacy as it had in Talley, McEntyre, 
and Buckley. Justice Stevens wrote, “[In Buckley], the fact that circulators revealed their 
physical identities did not foreclose our consideration of the circulators’ interest in 
maintaining their anonymity.”223  Stevens noted that strangers to the residents of Stratton 
maintained their anonymity even in door-to-door canvassing and that “the ordinance may 
preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular causes.”224
220 Id.
221 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 160.
222 Id. at 153.
223 Id. at 167.
224 Id. 
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Justice Stevens left the door open for future regulation of door-to-door canvassing 
by noting that such an ordinance may be justified in “some situations” such as “protecting 
the integrity of a ballot-initiative process” or “the interest in preventing fraudulent 
commercial transactions.”225 However, the Court considered the village ordinance to be 
overly broad because it “[covered] unpopular causes unrelated to commercial transactions 
or to any special interest in protecting the electoral process.”226  Thus again in 
Watchtower the Court recognized that a right of anonymity, predicated on the notion of 
limited privacy, exists under the First Amendment.  Individuals rather than the state 
control access to themselves by exercising a right to control identifying information.  
The Court in Watchtower also explicitly recognized the privacy-as-space 
conceptualization in its discussion of Stratton residents’ ability to limit solicitations. 
Similar to Martin, it did so by discussing how the law enabled homeowners to control the 
information flow into their homes. Homeowners in Stratton were able to file a “No 
Solicitation Registration Form” with the mayor’s office.227  The form was designed to 
allow homeowners to either prohibit all home solicitations or to prohibit members of 
certain groups from entering their property. 
Even if canvassers had filed for and received a “solicitation permit,” they were 
required to abide by the list of homeowners who had filed no-solicitation registration 
forms.  These solicitation bans were legally enforceable by property holders who had 
both filed the no-solicitation form and posted a “No Solicitation” sign on their property.
225 Id. 
226 Id.
227 ORD. NO. 1998, § 107.
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One of the justifications put forth by Stratton for the ordinance was to protect the 
privacy of homeowners.  The Court reasoned that since “the annoyance caused by an 
uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether or not the visitor is armed with a 
permit,”228 disclosure of one’s identity was not relevant to the purpose of the ordinance. 
Justice Stevens wrote, “With respect to [protecting homeowner privacy], it seems clear 
that [the ordinance], which provides for the posting of “No Solicitation” signs and which 
is not challenged in this case, coupled with the resident's unquestioned right to refuse to 
engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the 
unwilling listener.”229  Like Justice Black in Martin, Justice Stevens recognized the right 
of individual homeowners to control the flow of information into their homes. 
 Therefore, in Watchtower the Court implicitly recognized the right for each party 
to control information; the canvassers need not reveal their identifying information and 
homeowners are able to control the flow of information into their homes. Privacy as 
information control was applied as the primary privacy conceptualization through which 
canvassers could control access to the self and homeowners could control information 
entering their private space.  
The privacy-as-information-control conceptualization permeates Supreme Court 
anonymous speech cases.  Individuals, whether distributing literature in public spaces or 
door-to-door, have a right to control the disclosure of their identities absent a compelling 
government interest.  In each of the cases discussed above the Court recognized that 
228 Watchtower, 536 U.S. at 168-69; id. at 165. “Had this provision been construed to apply only to 
commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the 
Village's interest in protecting the privacy of its residents and preventing fraud. Yet, even though the 
Village has explained that the ordinance was adopted to serve those interests, it has never contended that it 
should be so narrowly interpreted.”
229 Id. 
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when individuals’ identities are known, they are at a greater risk of suffering retaliatory 
harms. The explicit reasoning in these cases concerned the potential for these increased 
risk levels to chill the exercise of their First Amendment rights. Nevertheless, implicit in 
these decisions was the notion that individuals should determine their own level of 
exposure to risk, not the government. This individual determination is implemented when 
a privacy interest, conceptualized as information control, is exercised in order to limit 
access to the self or to private space.
Privacy in Anonymous Association Cases
In the anonymous speech cases examined above, the Court noted the value of 
anonymity in enabling free speech throughout the history of the United States and 
considered it an implied right protected by the First Amendment.  Anonymity has also 
been valuable in allowing citizens to join groups that espouse unpopular ideas without 
fear of retaliation by the government.  As Justice Arthur Goldburg once wrote, “Joining 
groups seems to be a passion with Americans.”230  This passion was essential to the 
founding of the United States. Justice Potter Stewart, in his 1963 concurrence in Gibson 
v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, reflected, “Like freedom of speech and a 
free press, the right of peaceable assembly was considered by the Framers of our 
Constitution to lie at the foundation of a government based upon the consent of an 
informed citizenry -- a government dedicated to the establishment of justice and the 
230 Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 564 (1963)  (Douglas, J.,  concurring).
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preservation of liberty.”231 The ability to prohibit the government from knowing one’s 
associations has been thought to prevent a chill of the exercise of First Amendment 
associational rights.
There are two ways that the government can compel disclosure of one’s group 
associations. First, the government can use laws to force groups to turn over membership 
lists.  Rulings in these cases are a direct refutation of the privacy-as-secrecy
conceptualization of privacy.  In the act of joining a group, an individual entrusts his or 
her identity, along with other bits of personal information, to the group. As it has in the 
anonymous speech cases discussed above, the Court embraced the notion of limited 
privacy and recognized that the government can’t compel individuals to disclose their 
membership in a group simply because a third party (the group itself) is aware of the 
individual’s membership.232 Second, the government can directly compel individuals to 
disclose their own memberships by questioning them or forcing them to testify before a 
public body about their involvement with a particular group.
The following analysis reveals that the Court embraced the same notions of 
limited privacy and privacy as a right to control information about one’s self in 
anonymous association jurisprudence as it had in the anonymous speech cases above. The 
association cases provide more insight into the limits of a First Amendment right to 
privacy. At different points in history, certain groups like communists were considered 
significant internal threats to national security, and the Court considered national security 
231 Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960) .
232
 In the third-party doctrine, the government should be considered the second party since it is the entity 
attempting to access the first party’s information.  For instance, the government (second party) argues that 
it is entitled to a group member’s (first party) information because the member has already shared the fact 
of his or her membership with the group itself (third party).
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to be a sufficiently compelling state interest to justify infringement upon the individual 
right to control personal information.
Group Control of Member Information
The Supreme Court has protected anonymity by recognizing the right of groups to 
protect parens patriae233 against the compelled disclosure of the identities of their 
members. These cases involve state and local statutes that mandated the disclosure of 
group membership lists, and the Court upheld the right of organizations to control access 
to the identities of their members. These cases differ from the pamphleteer cases in that 
third parties (groups) holding personal information, rather than the individual members,
argued to maintain control over private information.  
In NAACP v. Alabama , Justice John M. Harlan wrote, “This Court has recognized 
the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations.”234
The Court reasoned, as it had in the anonymous pamphleteer cases, that individuals might 
be less likely to associate with others or join groups if they couldn’t do so privately. The 
Court again embraced the notion of limited privacy as it supported an individual right to 
share one’s personal information with one organization with the expectation that the 
organization would not share the information with other third parties without consent.
Two landmark anonymous association cases involved membership lists for 
branches of the NAACP in Alabama and Arkansas: NAACP v. Alabama235 and Bates v. 
233 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (8th ed. 2004). “The state regarded as a sovereign; the state in its 
capacity of provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves.”
234 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958).
235 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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Little Rock.236  They were argued before the U.S. Supreme Court in 1958 and 1960.  In  
NAACP, the Court reviewed a request by the Alabama State Attorney General’s Office 
for “a large number of the [Alabama NAACP’s] records and papers, including bank 
statements, leases, deeds, and records containing the names and addresses of all Alabama 
‘members’ and ‘agents’ of the Association.”237  When the organization did not provide 
the information requested, it was found in contempt and fined.  At that point the NAACP 
surrendered all of the requested documents except its membership lists.  The organization 
feared that the surrendered names of individual members might somehow be leaked to 
private citizens who might decide to harm NAACP members.
In 1958 the Civil Rights Movement was underway and building momentum,
which increased racial tensions in the South.238  Justice John M. Harlan wrote for the 
Court that his decision to overturn the contempt charge was based primarily on the 
NAACP’s demonstration that disclosing the names of members in Alabama would place 
those individuals at risk.239 Justice Harlan recognized that members who were identified 
236 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
237 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 453.  The request was part of a discovery process stemming from a case involving 
the NAACP’s appeal of an injunction that had been filed to stop the organization from conducting business 
for alleged noncompliance with an Alabama statute that required businesses and organizations from outside 
the state to qualify by “filing its corporate charter with the Secretary of State and designating a place of 
business and an agent to receive service of process;” see ALA. CODE, 1940, Tit. 10, §§ 192-198. The 
NAACP alleged that it was not subject to the qualification statute because it was a nonprofit organization, 
and it moved to quash the enjoinder that the State Attorney General had obtained for the organization’s 
failure to comply.
238
 For a complete timeline of the Civil Rights Movement (1954-2005) visit: 
http://www.infoplease.com/spot/civilrightstimeline1.html. 
239 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462- 63. Justice Harlan wrote: “Under these circumstances, we think it apparent that 
compelled disclosure of petitioner's Alabama membership is likely to affect adversely the ability of 
petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the 
right to advocate, in that it may induce members to withdraw from the Association and dissuade others 
from joining it because of fear of exposure of their beliefs shown through their associations and of the 
consequences of this exposure.”
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might be exposed to “economic reprisal, loss of employment, threat of physical coercion, 
and other manifestations of public hostility.”240  His concern was not that the State of 
Alabama would directly retaliate against those advocating for racial equality.  Instead, he 
feared that once released, the membership list might be leaked to private citizens. He 
wrote, “The crucial factor is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is 
only after the initial exertion of state power represented by the production order that 
private action takes hold.”241
Justice Harlan cited language from the 1950 case American Communications 
Association v. Douds,242 which asserted that a statute need not directly threaten members 
of a group to be constitutionally infirm.  In Douds, the Court wrote: “[T]he fact that no 
direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or assembly does not determine the 
free speech question. Under some circumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’ undoubtedly 
have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as 
imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.”243 Similarly, Justice Harlan considered the 
threat of retaliatory harms against exposed Alabama NAACP members an “indirect 
discouragement” of free association. 244
240 Id. at 462.
241 Id. at 463.  Today the situation is reversed.  The government can access information collected in the 
private sector and potentially “harm” citizens as a result of misidentifying them as terror suspects in data 
mining programs.
242 Am. Commc’n Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
243 Id. at 403. This was a labor case in which officers of a Labor Union were required to submit affidavits 
attesting to the fact that they were not members of the Communist Party.
244 NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. “Petitioner argues that in view of the facts and circumstances shown in the 
record, the effect of compelled disclosure of the membership lists will be to abridge the rights of its rank-
and-file members to engage in lawful association in support of their common beliefs. It contends that 
governmental action which, although not directly suppressing association nevertheless carries this 
consequence, can be justified only upon some overriding valid interest of the State.”
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As established in the preceding analysis of anonymous speech cases, as the level 
of risk to those exercising their First Amendment rights increases, so too does their 
privacy interest in controlling personal information.  In 1958 the level of risk to 
individuals advocating racial equality in the South was deemed significant. Only a 
compelling government interest in disclosure could justify infringement upon the right of 
the NAACP to control identifying information on behalf of its members. The State of 
Alabama’s desire to include a membership list in an organization’s charter did not 
represent such a compelling state interest.
The right of the NAACP to control the personal information of its members was 
again supported in Bates v. Little Rock.245 In 1960 the Court reviewed two Arkansas city 
ordinances under which local governments sought to compel the NAACP to surrender
membership lists. Two municipalities, Little Rock and North Little Rock, had identical 
ordinances246 that allowed them to levy taxes on any person, firm, individual, or 
corporation engaging in trade, business, profession, vocation or calling within their 
corporate limits.  Charitable organizations like the NAACP were exempted from the 
ordinances until 1957, when amendments to the ordinances required such organizations 
operating within city limits to provide, among other information, “a statement as to dues, 
assessments, and contributions paid … [and] by whom.” 247 Furthermore, the ordinances 
245 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
246 LITTLE ROCK ORD. NO. 7444; NORTH LITTLE ROCK ORD. No. 1786.
247 Bates, 361 U.S. at 518. Altogether, the ordinances required six types of information: “(1) the official 
name of the organization; (2) its headquarters or regular meeting place; (3) the names of the officers, 
agents, servants, employees, or representatives, and their salaries; (4) the purpose of the organization; (5) a 
statement as to dues, assessments, and contributions paid, by whom and when paid, together with a 
statement reflecting the disposition of the funds and the total net income; (6) an affidavit stating whether 
the organization is subordinate to a parent organization, and if so, the latter's name.” 
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explicitly stated that all the information collected would be public and made available to 
“any interested party at all reasonable business hours.”248  Justice Potter Stewart seems to 
have considered this latter provision to be the same type of “indirect discouragement” 
discussed in Douds and considered by Justice Harlan in NAACP.249
Daisy Bates was the custodian of records in the Little Rock branch of the 
NAACP, and Birdie Williams held the same position for the North Little Rock branch. 
Both refused to disclose their membership lists. In the Bates trial, evidence was 
introduced by the NAACP “to show that many former members of the local organization 
had declined to renew their membership because of the existence of the ordinance in 
question.”250 At the Williams trial , evidence was entered that demonstrated that  “those 
who had been publicly identified in the community as members of the National 
Association for the Advancement of Colored People had been subjected to harassment 
and threats of bodily harm.”251  Bates and Williams were both convicted at trial and their 
cases were combined on appeal. 
Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the majority in Bates, and both convictions were 
overturned.252  In language similar to the “indirect discouragements” discussed in Douds, 
Justice Stewart noted, “Freedoms such as [anonymous assembly] are protected not only 
248 Id.
249 Id. at 523-24. 
250 Id. at 521.
251 Id. at 521-22.
252 Id. at 527. “We conclude that the municipalities have failed to demonstrate a controlling justification for 
the deterrence of free association which compulsory disclosure of the membership lists would cause. The 
petitioners cannot be punished for refusing to produce information which the municipalities could not 
constitutionally require. The judgments cannot stand.”
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against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from being stifled by more subtle 
governmental interference.”253 The municipalities argued that they had a right to tax, but 
the Court, having established that the ordinances were a significant infringement on 
associational rights, ruled that the right to tax is not a sufficiently compelling state
interest to justify the infringement.
In both NAACP and Bates, the Court granted the control of personal information 
to groups in situations where there was a serious threat of harm to individual members if 
their identities were disclosed.  Conversely, the Court has ruled that the government can 
compel the surrender of lists of campaign donors absent such potential harms if the 
government can demonstrate a compelling interest and the disclosure is narrowly tailored.  
In one such case, Buckley v. Valeo,254 the Court reviewed challenges made by several 
plaintiffs regarding the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 as 
amended in 1974.255 The reporting and disclosure requirements of the Act were
challenged in particular as an abridgement of the First Amendment right of anonymous 
association.  
When considered from a privacy perspective, the question becomes a matter of 
information control.  Many individuals join others of like mind in financially supporting 
particular candidates, parties, or issues. This is association, and individuals may have a 
privacy interest in not disclosing the amount of their contributions and the groups they 
253 Id. at 523.
254
 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
255 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq.  (1970 ed., Supp. IV).
85
support. In Buckley the Court had to decide whether individuals had the right to control 
information regarding their donations to political campaigns.
The Court ruled that disclosure of contributions would likely not result in the type 
of harms the Court sought to avoid in NAACP, but it did recognize the potential chill on 
First Amendment political association. It held: “It is undoubtedly true that public 
disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties will deter some individuals 
who otherwise might contribute. In some instances, disclosure may even expose 
contributors to harassment or retaliation.”256  Such a chill would likely harm smaller 
political parties in particular. The Court noted: “These movements are less likely to have 
a sound financial base and thus are more vulnerable to falloffs in contributions. In some 
instances fears of reprisal may deter contributions to the point where the movement 
cannot survive.”257 Nevertheless, the Court ultimately held that the disclosure 
requirements were constitutional because the appellants could only “offer the testimony 
of several minor-party officials that one or two persons refused to make contributions 
because of the possibility of disclosure.”258
In Buckley, the Court recognized that the government had a substantial interest in 
disclosure that was evident in the legislative history of the Act. The government reasoned 
that disclosure of campaign contributions informs the electorate as to the source and 
allocation of a candidate’s money, may deter actual corruption and avoid the appearance 
of corruption, and provides a means of gathering the data necessary to detect violations of 
256 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68.
257 Id. at 71.
258 Id. at 71- 72.
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contribution limitations.259 These interests, absent the type of potential harm recognized 
in NAACP and Bates, were found to justify infringements upon the right to anonymous 
association.
Compelled Testimony about Group Membership
Another way for the government to discover whether someone is a member of a 
group is through direct interrogation of suspected members.  Whereas the Court 
supported the right of canvassers and pamphleteers to control the disclosure of their 
identities in the face of legislative interests such as the prevention of littering, fraud 
prevention, and homeowner privacy, it held that the government could compel the 
disclosure of personal information when facing a perceived national security threat such 
as Communism.  
In 1959 the Supreme Court limited the right of anonymous association in
Barenblatt v. United States.260 This case dealt with compelled testimony from a witness 
before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC).261  Lloyd Barenblatt 
was a college professor suspected of having associated with a Communist-front 
organization while a graduate student at the University of Michigan. Barenblatt was 
summoned before HUAC and asked to reveal whether he was or ever had been a member 
of the Communist Party.  He was also asked to reveal the identities of anyone else he 
259 Id. at 66- 68.
260 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
261 See generally VICTOR S. NAVASKY, NAMING NAMES  (3d ed. 2003) (providing a general description of 
the committee and an overview of its history).
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knew who was or had been a member of the Communist Party.  Barenblatt refused and 
was held in contempt of Congress.
Justice Harlan wrote the opinion in Barenblatt, an opinion that needs to be 
evaluated within its historical context. A number of events in the 1950s -- the Korean 
War, the McCarthy hearings, and the acquisition of the hydrogen bomb by the U.S.S.R. --
had elevated the threat of Communism in the public consciousness. By 1959, the internal 
and external threats posed by Communism were considered national security priorities, 
and thus preventing Communist infiltration of organizations and industries inside the 
United States was considered a compelling state interest.  
Justice Harlan, referring to his earlier opinion in NAACP, wrote: “Undeniably, the 
First Amendment in some circumstances protects an individual from being compelled to 
disclose his associational relationships. However, the protections of the First Amendment 
. . . do not afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all circumstances.”262  Thus, along 
with protecting the integrity of the election process as established in Buckley, domestic 
intelligence gathering about specific groups thought to pose an internal security threat to 
the United States justifies a suspension of the individual privacy right to control personal 
information.
Justice Harlan acknowledged “the interest of the people as a whole in being able 
to join organizations, advocate causes and make political ‘mistakes' without later being 
subjected to governmental penalties for having dared to think for themselves.”263
Individuals publicly identified as Communists by HUAC in the late 1950s were barred 
262 Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 126.
263 Id. at 144 (Black, J., dissenting).
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from government employment, may have had difficulty securing employment in the 
private sector, and might have been shunned socially. Nevertheless, the potential harms 
resulting from disclosure did not rise to level of those he had considered in NAACP.
Justice Harlan ruled that Baranblatt’s contempt conviction was constitutional as Congress 
was within its historical and legislative authority to investigate how far into the United 
States university system Communists had infiltrated.  The Court ruled that the threat of 
Communists taking down the U.S. Government was sufficiently compelling to survive 
scrutiny.
In 1963, a Florida state legislative committee empowered to investigate 
subversive and Communist activities tried to compel the Miami branch of the NAACP to 
disclose its membership lists so that the committee could determine whether known 
Communists were members of the organization.264  Justice Arthur Goldburg wrote the 
majority opinion in Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 265and the 
Court ruled that the NAACP need not disclose its membership lists.  
Using language similar to that in NAACP and Bates, Justice Goldburg wrote that
anonymous association rights are “all the more essential here, where the challenged 
privacy is that of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors and 
the deterrent and ‘chilling’ effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined rights 
264 Gibson v. Fla. Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 548 (1963). “[The] record indicates that the 
association was and is against communism and has voluntarily taken steps to keep Communists from being 
members. Each year since 1950, the N.A.A.C.P. has adopted resolutions barring Communists from 
membership in the organization. Moreover, the petitioner testified that all prospective officers of the local 
organization are thoroughly investigated for Communist or subversive connections and, though subversive 
activities constitute grounds for termination of association membership, no such expulsions from the 
branch occurred during the five years preceding the investigation.”
265 372 U.S. 539 (1963). In 1957 the State sought to compel the disclosure of the Miami branch 
membership lists.  When the NAACP refused, Florida sought a court order, which was fought by the 
NAACP.  This action started the judicial procedure that was under review in Gibson.
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of free speech, expression, and association is consequently the more immediate and 
substantial.”266 Despite the national security threat posed by Communism in the early 
1960s, in Gibson the Court ruled that Florida’s desire to link Communists to legitimate, if 
regionally unpopular, groups did not justify government intrusion upon individual 
associational rights. In his concurrence in Gibson, Justice Douglas referred to Justice 
Harlan’s decision in NAACP.  He wrote: 
The right of association has become a part of the bundle of rights 
protected by the First Amendment, and the need for a pervasive right of 
privacy against government intrusion has been recognized, though not 
always given the recognition it deserves. Unpopular groups like popular 
ones are protected. Unpopular groups if forced to disclose their 
membership lists may suffer reprisals or other forms of public hostility. 
But whether a group is popular or unpopular, the right of privacy implicit 
in the First Amendment creates an area into which the Government may 
not enter.267
What distinguishes Gibson from Barenblatt is that in Barenblatt the individual 
being interrogated was suspected of participating in subversive activities.  In Gibson, the 
privacy and associational rights of individuals not suspected of any wrongdoing were 
being infringed by a government body investigating individuals already identified as 
subversives.  Justice Douglas asserted: “One man’s privacy may not be invaded because 
of another's perversity. If the files of the NAACP can be ransacked because some 
Communists may have joined it, then all walls of privacy are broken down.”268  Justice 
266 Id. at 556-57.
267 Id. at 569-70 (Douglas, J., concurring).
268 Id. at 572 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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Douglas indicated that associational privacy can be constitutionally invaded when a 
particular individual is suspected of a crime.  He wrote: 
Whether the problem involves the right of an individual to be let 
alone in the sanctuary of his home or his right to associate with others for 
the attainment of lawful purposes, the individual's interest in being free 
from governmental interference is the same, and, except for the limited 
situation where there is “probable cause” for believing that he is involved 
in a crime, the government's disability is equally complete.269
The Court’s primary conceptualization of privacy in anonymous association cases 
has been the same as in anonymous speech cases: privacy as information control.  In both 
types of cases the Court recognized that in order to protect anonymity under the First 
Amendment, it must accept the idea that individuals, or groups acting on behalf of their 
individual members, have a right to control the disclosure of identity.  Barenblatt 
established that this right is limited and if the government is able to demonstrate a 
compelling state interest, such as a national security threat, then it is constitutional for the 
government to compel disclosure.
As it had in the anonymous speech cases, the Court recognized that when 
individuals’ identities are known, they may perceive themselves to be at risk of suffering 
retaliatory harms. This perception might make individuals less likely to join groups or 
associate with those who hold beliefs similar to their own.  This would be a chill on the 
exercise of their First Amendment rights. Explicit and implicit in these anonymous 
association decisions was the notion that individuals, or groups on their behalf, should 
have the right to determine their own level of exposure to risk, not the government.
269 Id. at 570, n7 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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First Amendment Privacy and Surveillance
The Court has ruled that, absent a compelling state interest, when legislative 
bodies attempt to compel the disclosure of either membership lists or individual 
testimony as to group membership, individuals and groups have an implied First 
Amendment right to anonymity. This right was conceptualized as a right for individuals, 
or groups on behalf of individuals, to control access to identifying information by the 
government. Nevertheless, there is another method that has been utilized by the 
government to identify members of groups espousing unpopular or dissident beliefs.  The 
government can simply observe or infiltrate groups and then record the names of group 
members and track group activities.
The Court had an opportunity in 1972 to apply the privacy conceptualization it 
had used in cases like Tally, McEntyre, NAACP, and Gibson to the U.S. Army domestic 
surveillance program, which had been in operation since 1967.  Even though Laird v. 
Tatum270 was decided on a procedural issue, plaintiffs’ lack of standing, the Court 
discussed at length whether domestic surveillance might cause a chill on First 
Amendment rights to assemble anonymously.  
What distinguished Laird from the anonymous speech and association cases 
previously discussed is that the Court did not recognize an alleged chilling effect on a 
group’s association rights to be sufficient grounds upon which to mount a constitutional 
challenge.  In anonymous speech cases, the Court reasoned that individuals might be less 
likely to participate in the marketplace of ideas if they had to disclose their identities to 
others and thereby place themselves at risk.  In anonymous association cases, the Court 
270
 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
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recognized that members of groups that espoused unpopular beliefs might be at risk of 
retaliatory actions by others if their identities were known.  Fear of such retaliations 
might chill the desire of individuals to associate with such groups. The question of 
privacy in one’s associations was never reached by the Court in the landmark 
surveillance case decided in 1972.
Writing for the Court in Laird, Chief Justice Warren E. Burger ruled that the 
“subjective chill” that resulted from fear that information collected by the government 
might someday be used to harm those about whom the information had been collected 
was not a sufficient justification to issue an injunction against domestic intelligence 
operations conducted by the U.S. Army.271  In 1967 the U.S. Army was deployed to 
Detroit to assist state and local law enforcement in handling a series of race riots.  
Afterward, the Army developed a plan to collect information on those individuals and 
groups most likely to be involved in future demonstrations.272  It was thought that this 
would help the Army identify situations most likely to turn violent.273
Thus, in 1968 and 1969 the Department of the Army was engaged in “surveillance 
of lawful and peaceful civilian activity” in an effort to attain “information relating to 
potential or actual civil disturbances (or) street demonstrations.”274 The information was 
271 Id. at 13-14. “Allegations of a subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific 
present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm.”
272 Id. at 24-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting).  Groups under surveillance when this case was filed included: the 
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Clergy and Laymen United against the War in Vietnam, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, Women’s Strike for Peace, and the NAACP.
273 Id. at 2  (holding that “Since the Army is sent into territory almost invariably unfamiliar to most soldiers 
and their commanders, their need for information is likely to be greater than that of the hometown 
policeman”); id. at 5-6 (reasoning that “When force is employed it should be intelligently directed, and this 
depends upon having reliable information--in time”).
274 Id. at 2.
93
collected from the news media and other publications and from Army agents who 
attended public meetings.  Field reports were submitted by the agents “describing the 
meetings, giving such data as the name of the sponsoring organization, the identities of 
speakers, the approximate number of persons in attendance, and an indication of whether 
any disorder occurred.”275
The intelligence information was then sent to Fort Holabird, Maryland, where it 
was stored on computer tape and then disseminated to bases around the country.276
Members of the Central Committee of Conscientious Objectors filed suit to challenge the 
constitutionality of this Army surveillance system.  The plaintiffs did not show any 
evidence of having suffered direct harms or monetary damages but instead insisted that a 
“deprivation of fundamental constitutional rights of intangible value [was] involved.”277
Unlike the decisions in NAACP and Bates, the Court had no evidence that innocent 
individuals had been harmed because the Army was aware of their membership in certain 
groups or of their participation in demonstrations.278 The Army did modify its 
intelligence program as a result of the case, but the Court never concluded whether the 
program constituted a direct infringement on First Amendment rights.
275 Id. at 6; See also id. at 24-25 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that “The Army uses undercover agents to 
infiltrate these civilian groups and to reach into confidential files of students and other groups. The Army 
moves as a secret group among civilian audiences, using cameras and electronic ears for surveillance”): id. 
at 26-27 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting also that “[T]he Army's surveillance was not collecting material 
in public records but staking out teams of agents, infiltrating undercover agents, creating command posts 
inside meetings, posing as press photographers and newsmen, posing as TV newsmen, posing as students, 
and shadowing public figures”).
276 Id. at 6.
277 Tatum v. Laird, 444 F.2d 947, 950 (C.A.D.C. Apr. 27, 1971).
278 Laird, 408 U.S. at 8. “It was the view of the district court that respondents failed to allege any action on 
the part of the Army that was unlawful in itself and further failed to allege any injury or any realistic threats 
to their rights growing out of the Army's actions.”
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Justice William O. Douglas wrote a dissent in Laird in which he argued that the 
need to show harm should not have been central to the Court’s review of an Army 
domestic intelligence program. He wrote: “One need not wait to sue until he loses his job 
or until his reputation is defamed. To withhold standing to sue until that time arrives 
would in practical effect immunize from judicial scrutiny all surveillance activities, 
regardless of their misuse and their deterrent effect.”279  Justice Douglas argued that 
Army surveillance is counter to the very principles of the Constitution.  He asserted: 
The Bill of Rights was designed to keep agents of government and 
official eavesdroppers away from assemblies of people. The aim was to 
allow men to be free and independent and to assert their rights against 
government. There can be no influence more paralyzing of that objective 
than Army surveillance. When an intelligence officer looks over every 
noncomformist's shoulder in the library, or walks invisibly by his side in a 
picket line, or infiltrates his club, the America once extolled as the voice 
of liberty heard around the world no longer is cast in the image which 
Jefferson and Madison designed, but more in the Russian image.280
Justice Douglas would have preferred the Court move beyond the issue of standing and 
apply a substantive review of domestic surveillance.  It remains to be seen if the Court 
will adopt the same conceptualizations of privacy in surveillance cases as it has in 
anonymous speech and assembly cases.
Privacy under the First Amendment
The primary privacy conceptualization embraced by the Court in First 
Amendment jurisprudence is privacy as information control.  Using historical examples, 
279 Id. at 26 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
280 Id. at 28-29 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the Court has established the substantive value of anonymity to free speech and 
association especially in regard to individuals and groups espousing unpopular or 
dissident ideas. Anonymity is the ability to keep one’s identity private even if other 
aspects of one’s personality, such as political or religious affiliation, have already been 
disclosed.  This notion of sharing only some aspects of one’s identity is referred to as 
limited privacy and the Court has supported this idea as central to the right to speak or 
associate anonymously.
Other conceptualizations of privacy discussed in Chapter One, namely privacy-as-
access-to-self and privacy-as-space, emerge in First Amendment privacy jurisprudence as 
privacy interests that have been subsumed under the broader umbrella of the privacy-as-
information-control conceptualization. For example, in Watchtower the Court recognized 
the right of homeowners to protect their home as private space, yet the concept of spatial 
privacy was discussed in terms of the homeowners’ ability to control the flow of 
information into their homes.  McEntyre provided a similar example.  The Court reasoned 
that persuasive, political pamphlets would likely contain information that might provide 
insight into a pamphleteer’s deeply held faiths or beliefs.  This information, when
combined with the compelled disclosure of identity, could provide an unwarranted 
glimpse of an individual’s inviolate personality, his or her self. Nevertheless, the Court 
reasoned that this privacy interest could be protected by recognizing that individuals have 
the right to control access to their identifying information.
CHAPTER III
PRIVACY AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
Since, dataveillance is about government access to information that citizens have 
shared with others in order to participate in daily life, the Court’s conceptualizations of 
privacy in First Amendment privacy jurisprudence will be helpful when evaluating KDD 
dataveillance from an access perspective.  However, the purpose for accessing such 
information in the case of KDD dataveillance is for the government to identify potential 
criminal suspects.  Therefore, understanding how the Supreme Court has conceptualized 
privacy in Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence is also necessary when determining 
if the Court’s current privacy conceptualizations will protect privacy rights against 
infringement by federal KDD dataveillance programs.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the “well-known historical purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment, directed against general warrants and writs of assistance, was to 
prevent the use of governmental force to search a man's house, his person, his papers, and 
his effects, and to prevent their seizure against his will.”281 It was a common practice 
281 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 463 (1928). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
624-26 (1886) (explaining how the British used writs of assistance to search private property for stolen 
goods and defining “the practice of issuing general warrants by the secretary of state, for searching private 
houses for the discovery and seizure of books and papers that might be used to convict their owner of the 
charge of libel” as a “grievous abuse”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (asserting that 
resistance to general warrants and writs or assistance “had established the principle which was enacted into 
the fundamental law in the 4th Amendment, that a man's house was his castle, and not to be invaded by any 
general authority to search and seize his goods and papers”).
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during the colonial period for royal governors, when seeking evidence of a crime, to send 
members of the militia to forcibly invade a person’s home and seize material that might 
be used against that person at trial. The Fourth Amendment, when ratified in 1791, 
limited government’s power to invade privately held property by requiring due 
process.282 The actual language of the Amendment explicitly limited government access 
to material items and property but did not mention the more substantive notion of 
“privacy” or the right of citizens to be left alone.283
This chapter’s examination of the Supreme Court’s language in Fourth 
Amendment privacy jurisprudence reveals an evolutionary process through which the 
Court gradually moved beyond the colonial, property-based conceptualization of Fourth
Amendment privacy and ultimately developed a broader doctrine. This evolution 
involved four stages of privacy conceptualizations: privacy as Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment procedural due process, privacy as space, privacy as secrecy, and the current 
stage in which the Court recognizes privacy as information control. The privacy doctrine 
was somewhat technologically determined. The continuing development and application 
of new surveillance technologies propelled the Court’s understanding of Fourth 
Amendment privacy through each of these stages.
The Founders were initially concerned about the government’s ability to enter 
upon private property for the purpose of collecting evidence that could be used against 
the property owner in a criminal trial.  This use of the contents of citizens’ own homes, 
282 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (8th ed. 2004). Due process is defined as: “The minimal requirements 
of notice and a hearing guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
esp. if the deprivation of a significant life, liberty, or property interest may occur.”
283 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  “The Right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be 
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
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papers, and effects amounted to a form of self-incrimination.  Thus, in the late eighteenth 
and throughout the nineteenth century, the Court’s concept of Fourth Amendment 
protection was about the admissibility of evidence and was often closely connected to 
Fifth Amendment due process protection. 
Proper procedure under the Fourth Amendment required that the government 
show probable cause and secure a warrant. When it was determined that evidence had 
been secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment, that evidence was not admissible in 
court as this would be considered a violation of one’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination. At this stage Fourth Amendment privacy protections were about 
procedure.
The twentieth century brought new surveillance technologies such as wire taps, 
bugging devices, aircraft, and thermal imagers.  These technologies enabled law
enforcement officers to gather incriminating evidence from personal spaces without 
physical trespass.  This forced the Court to move beyond procedure and grapple with the 
nature of privacy as protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Thus, in the second stage, the Court embraced the privacy-as-space 
conceptualization and required due process in the form of a search warrant whenever law 
enforcement personnel trespassed upon private property.  Evidence collected through the 
use of technology that did not require physical trespass, like wire tapping, was 
admissible.  As such technology became more common and more powerful, it became 
harder to anchor individual privacy interests in physical space.
During the third stage, the Court reduced its emphasis on physical trespass and 
focused instead upon whether an individual had created a reasonable expectation of 
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privacy in the material or information seized. In doing so, the Court recognized the 
privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization in the Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine. 
Individuals were expected to have taken some measures (personal agency) intended to 
conceal information from others. Information that was willingly shared with third parties 
was no longer considered private (third-party doctrine).  
Ultimately, new surveillance technologies prevented individuals from taking steps
toward creating an expectation of privacy in spaces, activities, or information, and the 
role of personal agency was negated.  As individuals were no longer capable of defending 
their own privacy interests, the Court implicitly recognized that constitutional protections 
needed to fill the gap.  This is when the Court adopted the privacy-as-information-control 
conceptualization. The following case analysis details the evolution of the Court’s 
conceptualization of privacy under the Fourth Amendment. 
Due Process and the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
Fourth Amendment protections were initially considered in combination with the 
due process requirements of the Fifth Amendment.284 In Boyd v. United States285 the 
284 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment reads in part: “No person . . . shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”
285
 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In this case the defendant was accused of using illegal means to avoid paying 
customs duties on imported plate glass.  The prosecution relied on statutory authority to compel the 
defendant to produce invoices and other papers that would establish the value of 29 sheets of plate glass. 
This information would be used to build the case against the defendant. The defendant in the case appealed 
on the grounds that the statute, enacted during the Civil War, was an infringement of his Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights.
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Court explained how the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run “almost into each other.”286
Justice Joseph P. Bradley wrote: 
They throw great light on each other. For the “unreasonable 
searches and seizures” condemned in the fourth amendment are almost
always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against 
himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment; 
and compelling a man “in a criminal case to be a witness against himself,” 
which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light on the question 
as to what is an “unreasonable search and seizure” within the meaning of 
the fourth amendment.287
In Boyd, the Court struck down a federal statute that had been enacted and amended 
between 1863 and 1874 and enabled state attorneys general to compel suspects to 
produce documents, such as shipping invoices or receipts, which could be used as 
evidence against them in trial. If the defendants refused, this failure to produce the 
records was considered an admission of guilt.288
Justice Bradley held in Boyd that the statute was repugnant to both the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments.289 Boyd established that “constitutional liberty and security” 
protected by these amendments “apply to all invasions on the part of the government and 
286 Id. at 630.
287 Id. at 633.
288 Id. at 621. Justice Bradley noted: “It was the first legislation of the kind that ever appeared on the statute 
book of the United States, and, as seen from its date, was adopted at a period of great national excitement, 
when the powers of the government were subjected to a severe strain to protect the national existence.”
289 Id. at 621-22. Justice Bradley wrote that such a statute had the same effect as would the use of 
government agents to physically break into a suspect’s home and search and seize incriminating evidence.  
Bradley wrote:  “[The statute] declares that if he does not produce them, the allegations which it is affirmed 
they will prove shall be taken as confessed . . . . It is true that certain aggravating incidents of actual search 
and seizure, such as forcible entry into a man's house and searching among his papers, are wanting . . . but 
it accomplishes the substantial object of those acts in forcing from a party evidence against himself. It is 
our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge 
against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the fourth amendment to the constitution, in all 
cases in which a search and seizure would be, because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object 
and purpose of search and seizure.”
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its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life.”290  Justice 
Bradley used broad language to define the liberty interests these amendments protected: 
“It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the 
essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, 
personal liberty and private property.291
Between Boyd and the next landmark Fourth Amendment decision in 1928, 
Olmstead v. United States,292 Fourth Amendment cases primarily dealt with the question 
of whether due process, in the form of a warrant,293 was necessary in a particular 
circumstance and whether it had been provided.  In the 1914 case of Weeks v. United 
States,294 the Court explicitly defined the effect of the Fourth Amendment as
to put the courts of the United States and Federal officials, in the 
exercise of their power and authority, under limitations and restraints as to 
the exercise of such power and authority, and to forever secure the people, 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against all unreasonable 
searches and seizures under the guise of law.295
Thus, according to Weeks, an unreasonable (unconstitutional) search or seizure was one 
conducted without due process. The limitation or restraint upon government power was 
understood to be the warrant requirement, which would provide judicial oversight of any 
290 Id. at 630.
291 Id.
292 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
293 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1616 (8th ed. 2004) (defining a warrant as “a writ directing or authorizing 
someone to do an act, esp. one directing a law enforcer to make an arrest, a search, or a seizure”); id. at 
1379 (defining a search warrant as “a judge’s written order authorizing a  law enforcement officer to 
conduct a search of a specified place and to seize evidence”).
294 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
295 Id. at 391-92.
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government intrusion upon private space and of government seizures of private papers or 
effects. 
In 1920, the Court ruled that papers that had been seized without a warrant from a 
defendant’s office while he was being detained by law enforcement officials had been 
seized without “a shadow of authority.”296  The papers were returned to the defendant and 
could not be used as evidence at trial.297  In 1921, the Court ruled that a suspect’s Fourth 
Amendment rights were violated when revenue officers “coerced” his wife into allowing 
them to enter and search her home without a warrant.298 That same year,  the Court ruled 
that a U.S. Army private violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights when he 
pretended “to make a friendly call on …[the defendant], gained admission to his office, 
and in his absence, without warrant of any character, seized and carried away several 
documents.”299
In each of these instances materials were gathered without a warrant or subpoena, 
and since the suspect of the investigation was denied due process, the evidence gathered 
unconstitutionally was considered inadmissible in court. Combining Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment review was understandable since the Court never had to deal with a method
of searching or seizing that didn’t involve physical trespass; admissibility hinged upon 
296 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385, 390 (1920). The district attorney provided 
subpoenas for certain materials thought to be central to the prosecution’s cases, but not until after the 
defendant filed to have the materials returned.  The Court ruled that the materials needed to be returned and 
could not be used at trial
297
 Again, Fifth Amendment protections were applied directly as a result of a Fourth Amendment violation 
as was established in Boyd.  This tendency to hold inadmissable any evidence gained through a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment was termed the “exclusionary rule.” See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 606, NO. 2 
(8th ed. 2004) (defining the exclusionary rule as “A rule that excludes or suppresses evidence obtained in 
violation of an accused person’s constitutional rights”).
298 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313, 317 (1921).
299 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 304 (1921).
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the presence of procedural due process.  Eventually, technology allowed the government 
to gather evidence from within private spaces without physical trespass, and at that point 
the Court was forced to conduct a more substantive Fourth Amendment analysis
regarding what constituted constitutionally protected space. 
Privacy as Space
In the 1928 landmark case Olmstead v. Unites States,300 Chief Justice Howard 
Taft explicitly separated Fifth and Fourth Amendment analyses when he wrote, “There is 
no room in the present case for applying the Fifth Amendment, unless the Fourth 
Amendment was first violated.”301  This language began a new Fourth Amendment 
doctrine, which was limited to the question of whether a particular search or seizure was 
constitutional. Chief Justice Taft’s analysis was influenced by the previously mentioned 
Weeks v. United States,302 in which the Court ended what Taft referred to as a “phase” 
during which the government misused its power of compulsion and the trial courts failed 
to question the method used by the government to obtain evidence whenever the evidence 
was considered relevant to a criminal trial.303 He wrote:
300
 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928).
301 Id. at 462. He also noted, “There was no evidence of compulsion to induce the defendants to talk over 
their many telephones.”  Thus, for Chief Justice Taft, the Fourth Amendment protections were limited to 
due process in cases wherein the government had to conduct a physical trespass while collecting evidence, 
and Fifth Amendment analysis was limited to whether defendants were compelled to provide evidence 
against themselves.  After Olmstead, the Court no longer enmeshed Fourth and Fifth Amendment analysis 
together.
302 232 U.S. 383 (1914). This case involved an individual accused of conducting illegal gambling (lottery 
and betting) operations.  The defendant was arrested without a warrant, and, while he was in custody, the 
police searched his residence twice without a warrant.  Both times the police confiscated papers and 
materials as evidence.
303 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 463-64. See also Weeks, 232 U.S. at 388 (explaining that upon consideration of
the petition filed for a return of the property so seized, the court ordered the return of the material that was 
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The striking outcome of the Weeks case and those which followed 
it was the sweeping declaration that the Fourth Amendment, although not 
referring to or limiting the use of evidence in court, really forbade its 
introduction, if obtained by government officers through a violation of the 
amendment. Theretofore many had supposed that under the ordinary 
common-law rules, if the tendered evidence was pertinent, the method of 
obtaining it was unimportant.304
Weeks prioritized Fourth Amendment analysis because after this landmark 
decision, the ultimate success of a criminal prosecution depended upon the procedure 
used by law enforcement in procuring evidence. The process could no longer be ignored 
in court. As held by Justice William R. Day in Weeks:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and 
used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of 
the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such searches 
and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, 
might as well be stricken from the Constitution.305
Weeks established the importance of Fourth Amendment protections, but it was 
the Olmstead decision that anchored Fourth Amendment due process to the notion of 
private space. Central to Chief Justice Taft’s Fourth Amendment analysis was a 
determination of whether government agents had committed trespass by entering a 
private space without a warrant in the process of collecting evidence.  
not pertinent to the charge against the defendant, but denied the petition “as to pertinent matter, reserving 
the right to pass upon the pertinency at a later time” and that the district attorney “returned part of the 
property taken, and retained the remainder, concluding a list of the latter with the statement that, ‘all of 
which last above described property is to be used in evidence in the trial of the above-entitled cause, and 
pertains to the alleged sale of lottery tickets of the company above named'”).
304 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 462-63.
305
 232 U.S. at 388. “The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, 
praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years 
of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.”
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In Olmstead, law enforcement agents tapped the phone lines leading from the 
private homes and offices of a number of suspects accused of running a sizable import 
business in violation of the National Prohibition Act.306  No law enforcement officers 
actually entered upon private property while setting up the taps.  The office lines were 
tapped in the basement of the large building in which the offices were located, and the 
home lines were tapped from utility poles located in the public streets near each 
residence.
The Court reviewed the procedure followed by law enforcement in accessing the 
targeted conversations, and the review necessarily included a consideration of the nature 
of the evidence in question.  Chief Justice Taft reasoned that intercepting electronic 
information outside of a private space is something different than physically entering a 
property for the purpose of listening to a conversation or of confiscating material objects.  
Chief Justice Taft asserted: 
The [Fourth] amendment itself shows that the search is to be of 
material things -- the person, the house, his papers, or his effects. The 
description of the warrant necessary to make the proceeding lawful is that 
it must specify the place to be searched and the person or things to be 
seized.307
It cannot be said that the information exchanged in a telephone call is material or that a 
stream of electronic pulses is a place. In essence, a phone call is personal information that 
is being delivered via a third party, much like a piece of mail.
306 Olmstead, 277 U.S. 456-57. “The information which led to the discovery of the conspiracy and its 
nature and extent was largely obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones of the conspirators by 
four federal prohibition officers. Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone wires from the 
residences of four of the petitioners and those leading from the chief office. The insertions were made 
without trespass upon any property of the defendants.”
307 Id. at 464.
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In Olmstead, after he reviewed earlier Supreme Court Fourth Amendment 
decisions,308 Chief Justice Taft framed the question regarding Fourth Amendment privacy 
rights as whether the government had the right to enter private property in order to seize 
information to be used as evidence without providing due process.309    Telephones 
presented a challenge to such a conceptualization because there was no tangible evidence 
to be obtained.
Chief Justice Justice Taft then referred back to the 1877 case Ex Parte Jackson,310
a case that concerned the government’s authority to open and search letters or parcels 
traveling through the mails.  This scenario was analogous to the interception of a phone 
call being transmitted by a third party. In Jackson, Justice Stephen Field wrote, “Letters 
and sealed packages of this kind in the mail are as fully guarded from examination and 
inspection, except as to their outward form and weight, as if they were retained by the 
parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.”311  In Olmstead Justice Taft was given 
the opportunity to apply the Jackson holding to information transmitted electronically.  
He did not take advantage of the opportunity.  
Instead, Taft wrote, “The United States takes no such care of telegraph or 
telephone messages as of mailed sealed letters.” 312 When considering the procedure used 
308 Weeks, 232 U.S. 383; Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1920); Amos v. United 
States, 255 U. S. 313 (1921); and Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921).
309 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466. He concluded, “Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal 
decisions brought to our attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant, 
unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person or such a seizure of his papers or his 
tangible material effects or an actual physical invasion of his house  ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of 
making a seizure.”
310 96 U.S. 727 (1877).
311 Id. at 733.
312 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 464.
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by the government to gather the evidence in Olmstead, Taft reasoned: “The amendment 
does not forbid what was done here. There was no searching. There was no seizure. The 
evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry 
of the houses or offices of the defendants.”313  As a result, after Olmstead, Fourth 
Amendment privacy protections attached only to specific spaces.314 In his dissenting 
opinion, Justice Brandeis argued that the use of technologies that enabled the government 
to “listen in” to what was transpiring within private space was constitutional, as long as 
government agents did not bodily enter the space without a warrant.315  He reasoned: 
“The language of the amendment cannot be extended and expanded to include telephone 
wires, reaching to the whole world from the defendant's house or office. The intervening 
313 Id. 
314 C.f. Id. at 487 (Butler, J., dissenting).  Justice Pierce Butler used a contract analogy to refute third-party 
doctrine reasoning.  He wrote: “Telephones are used generally for transmission of messages concerning 
official, social, business and personal affairs including communications that are private and privileged
those between physician and patient, lawyer and client, parent and child, husband and wife. The contracts 
between telephone companies and users contemplate the private use of the facilities employed in the 
service. The communications belong to the parties between whom they pass. During their transmission the 
exclusive use of the wire belongs to the persons served by it. Wire tapping involves interference with the 
wire while being used. Tapping the wires and listening in by the officers literally constituted a search for 
evidence. As the communications passed, they were heard and taken down.”
315 Id. at 473 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). In a strong dissent, Justice Brandeis argued that interpretations of 
constitutional protections would need to be broadened to include new technologies the Founders could not 
foresee. He warned, “Discovery and invention have made it possible for the government, by means far 
more effective than stretching upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the 
closet.” Id. Justice Brandeis continued: “Ways may some day be developed by which the government, 
without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be enabled 
to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home. Advances in the psychic and related sciences 
may bring means of exploring unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions.” Id. at 475- 76. Brandeis 
addressed the specific privacy threat posed by wiretapping when he wrote: “The evil incident to invasion of 
the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved in tampering with the mails. Whenever a 
telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the persons at both ends of the line is invaded, and all conversations 
between them upon any subject, and although proper, confidential, and privileged, may be overheard. 
Moreover, the tapping of one man's telephone line involves the tapping of the telephone of every other 
person whom he may call, or who may call him. As a means of espionage, writs of assistance and general 
warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wire tapping.” 
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wires are not part of his house or office, any more than are the highways along which 
they are stretched.”316
In the Olmstead decision, Chief Justice Taft implicitly invoked the privacy-as-
space conceptualization. He explained: “The reasonable view is that one who installs in 
his house a telephone instrument with connecting wires intends to project his voice to 
those quite outside, and that the wires beyond his house, and messages while passing over 
them, are not within the protection of the Fourth Amendment.”317  Stated, another way, 
telephonic technology projects personal information, via wire, into public space even 
though the information might originate within the intimacy of one’s own home. One can 
not reasonably expect information projected outside of the private sanctuary of the home 
to remain private.  This language shaped Fourth Amendment privacy law for the next
thirty-two years, and the Court’s Fourth Amendment privacy analysis centered upon a 
determination of whether and under what conditions private space was intruded upon by 
the government without due process and whether different methods of seizing 
information required due process.
Ultimately, Olmstead was about the utilization of a new surveillance technology, 
wire tapping, and how that technology infringed upon private space. In 1942 the 
reasoning in the Olmstead decision was used to decide Goldman v. United States.318 In 
Goldman, law enforcement officers attached a device called a “detectaphone” to the wall 
adjacent to an apartment in which suspects were making phone calls.  As with wire 
316 Id. at 465.
317 Id. at 466.
318 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
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tapping in Olmstead, officers were able to intercept and “listen” to conversations within 
the apartment -- a private space -- without entering.  
In Goldman officers had first entered the apartment, without a warrant, in order to 
install a listening apparatus. That device failed, and it was only then the officers decided 
to use the detectaphone, which generated the only information entered into evidence. The 
Court used the reasoning applied in Olmstead. Had the defendant challenged evidence 
collected by the original bug, the information collected would likely have been ruled 
inadmissible under the exclusionary rule for violating the Fourth Amendment.  Yet, the 
evidence obtained was admissible because it had been gathered by a device that did not 
require prior trespass and therefore did not require a warrant.  The Court’s analysis 
implicitly protected an individual privacy interest in a private space rather than in the 
information that was intercepted and recorded.
Conversely, this same logic led to the exclusion of evidence obtained through the 
government’s use of another new listening technology.  In Silverman v. United States,319
the Court determined that the use of a “spike mike” without a warrant constituted an 
unreasonable search. Police officers attached an electronic device—the spike mike—to 
the heating ducts of a house used by defendants.  This device was capable of reading 
small acoustic vibrations and effectively transformed the home’s ductwork into a gigantic 
microphone running throughout an entire residence.  Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the 
Court and held that the spike mike infringed upon the defendant’s Fourth Amendment 
rights.  He also ruled that the evidence so collected was inadmissible because law 
enforcement officers had entered the basement in order to attach the mike.  Under the 
319 365 U.S. 505 (1960).
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Court’s Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine, which implicitly applied a spatial privacy 
conceptualization, such trespass requires a warrant in order to fulfill due process 
requirements. 
Justice Stewart explicitly reinforced the Court’s conceptualization of privacy as 
space when in Silverman he refuted the argument that a “re-examination” of the rationale 
used to decide Olmstead and subsequent cases was “essential in the light of recent and 
projected developments in the science of electronics.”320  He avoided an analysis of the 
technical capabilities of spike mikes and instead linked the use of the spike mike to a 
physical invasion of a constitutionally protected private space.  Justice Stewart wrote: 
“[A] fair reading of the record in this case shows that the eavesdropping was 
accomplished by means of an unauthorized physical penetration into the premises 
occupied by the petitioners.”321  This language brought Silverman in line with Olmstead
and Goldman, and Justice Stewart explicitly stressed that his decision was “based upon 
the reality of an actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”322 Nevertheless, 
Justice Stewart was careful to qualify his holding and explain that not all eavesdropping 
practices involving a physical incursion into private space were subject to due process
requirements. 
One such exception to the due process requirement involves consent.  There are 
instances when a law enforcement officer is in a private space with permission.  For 
instance, in On Lee v. United States, 323 the Court ruled that consent negates the Fourth 
320 Id. at 508.
321 Id. at 509.
322 Id. at 512.
323 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
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Amendment warrant requirement. Justice Robert H. Jackson considered the admissibility 
of evidence obtained when an undercover agent, who was trusted by the defendant, 
entered the defendant’s laundromat and used a hidden microphone to transmit an 
incriminating conversation (initiated by the agent) to another agent outside the premises.
He held that the transmission had not been obtained by a warrantless search or seizure 
and was therefore admissible.  
Since the informant entered the property with consent, the Court did not 
determine that the evidence had been gained by trespass or, stated another way, through 
an invasion of privacy.  In Silverman, when agents surreptitiously entered the basement 
of the home for the purpose of attaching the spike mike to the ductwork, they did so 
without consent and without due process, and their search was thus unreasonable. 
Eavesdropping became an unreasonable search when conducted in an unauthorized 
manner, and authorization could be either a warrant or an owner’s consent.324
In 1966 the Court recognized an additional category of authorized searches. If 
evidence will disappear unless collected immediately, the Court has permitted law 
enforcement officers to perform “emergency” collections.  In Schmerber v. California,325
a person injured in a car accident was taken to a hospital.  A police officer investigating 
the accident had reason to believe the individual had been driving under the influence of 
alcohol, so he ordered medical personnel to draw blood and conduct a blood-alcohol test.
324 Silverman, 365 U.S. at 510. Justice Potter wrote: “But in both Goldman and On Lee the Court took 
pains explicitly to point out that the eavesdropping had not been accomplished by means of an 
unauthorized physical encroachment within a constitutionally protected area.”
325 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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Justice Harry Blackmun wrote the opinion of the Court in Schmerber and, relying 
on Olmstead, held that information revealed in the blood test, which was given over the 
objection of the defendant, was admissible. Justice Blackmun noted that because the 
Court was dealing with “intrusions into the human body rather than with state 
interferences with property relationships or private papers -- houses, papers, and effects --
we write on a clean slate.”326  He wrote, “The overriding function of the Fourth 
Amendment is to protect personal privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by 
the State.”327  This language likened the human body, especially subsurface, to private 
space. Justice Blackmun wrote, “Search warrants are ordinarily required for searches of 
dwellings, and absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the 
human body are concerned.”328
Thus, Justice Blackmun had established that the body was a variant of private 
space, and he then focused on whether the blood test was an unwarranted intrusion into 
that space.  He first determined that the officer had probable cause to suspect a crime had 
been committed. Justice Blackmun wrote: “The police officer who arrived at the scene 
shortly after the accident smelled liquor on petitioner's breath, and testified that 
petitioner's eyes were ‘bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance.’ The officer saw 
petitioner again at the hospital, within two hours of the accident. There he noticed similar 
symptoms of drunkenness.”329  Justice Blackmun accepted these observations as a valid 
showing of cause, and then the analysis turned to the question of due process. The Court 
326 Id. at 767-68.
327 Id. at 767.
328 Id. at 770.
329 Id. at 768-69.
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needed to determine if there was a justification for the officer electing to forgo the 
warrant process prior to ordering the blood test.
After reviewing testimony from the lower courts, Justice Blackmun reasoned that 
the blood test was not an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search because the officer 
“might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the 
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction 
of evidence.”330 He likened such a search to an officer checking a suspect for concealed 
weapons—evidence of a crime—immediately after an arrest.  In Schmerber there was a 
real chance that the officer’s evidence would quite literally disappear unless there was an 
immediate search. Justice Blackmun noted: “We are told that the percentage of alcohol in 
the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to 
eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be 
taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there 
was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant.”331 Thus under the privacy-as-
space conceptualization, the Court had established two exceptions to due process 
requirement: consent and emergency circumstances. 
In sum, the 1928 Olmstead decision separated Fourth Amendment analysis from 
Fifth Amendment analysis and solidified the privacy-as-space conceptualization within 
Fourth Amendment doctrine. The Court has limited its review to the question of whether 
an invasion of constitutionally protected space had occurred.  There were three conditions 
under which the Court ruled that it is reasonable to access information from within such 
330 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770.
331 Id. at 770-71.
114
space. First, law enforcement may do so with judicial oversight.  Such oversight is 
confirmed through the warrant process. Second, if the defendant granted consent to law 
enforcement officers to enter his or her private space, those officers can use any 
information they access, even if they are acting undercover or transmitting the 
information to a third party off the premises. Lastly, it is reasonable for evidence to be 
collected without a warrant if special circumstances exist making it impossible for law 
enforcement to comply with due process requirements and still access vital evidence.  
This was the Court’s approach to Fourth Amendment privacy until a landmark 1967 
decision—dealing with portable technology that allowed law enforcement officers to 
eavesdrop on individuals outside of their home—in which the Court decided that the 
Fourth Amendment protected people and not just places.
Privacy as Secrecy
In 1967 Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the Court and overturned Olmstead in 
Katz v. United States .332 In Katz the Court embraced a new conceptualization of Fourth 
Amendment privacy, privacy as secrecy.  Instead of focusing on the government’s 
intrusion into a specific private space, analysis focused on whether an individual had 
created and was thereby entitled to a reasonable expectation of privacy.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization treats privacy 
as a commodity.  One surrenders all of a particular privacy interest (for instance in 
medical information) when he or she surrenders any one part of it to another individual 
(doctor). Privacy as secrecy does not embrace the notion of limited privacy and instead is 
332 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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predicated upon the third-party doctrine.  Later, at the opening of the twenty-first century, 
the Court would start to embrace limited privacy in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  
Until that time, only information purposely not shared with third parties could be 
considered private.
Charles Katz, the appellant, was convicted of violating a federal statute 
prohibiting the use of a “wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or 
foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or 
wagers on any sporting event or contest.”333  Katz had made gambling calls from a public 
phone booth.  Law enforcement officers used a listening device attached to the outside of 
the telephone booth to access and record his side of the conversations. Katz was 
convicted with the evidence they gathered.
Katz argued that bugging the telephone booth infringed upon his Fourth 
Amendment protections against an unreasonable search and seizure.  Utilizing the 
reasoning in Olmstead, the government argued that since there was no physical invasion 
of the phone booth, there was no Fourth Amendment violation. The government also 
asserted that a telephone booth was public, that individuals using the phone could be seen 
by anyone, and that it was not a constitutionally protected space.
Justice Stewart rejected Olmstead and explicitly moved the Court beyond the 
privacy-as-space conceptualization.  He reconceptualized individual privacy interests 
under the Fourth Amendment as protecting an individual right to conceal certain 
information and materials rather than physical space. Justice Stewart outlined this 
transformation when he wrote: 
333 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a).
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[T]he effort to decide whether or not a given “area,” viewed in the 
abstract, is “constitutionally protected” deflects attention from the 
problem. . . . For the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. What 
a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, 
is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.334
With these words, Fourth Amendment privacy protections were defined by 
personal agency, actions taken by individuals to create a subjective expectation of 
privacy.  After Katz, Fourth Amendment analysis would largely focus on the question of 
whether society at large would consider the plaintiff’s self-defined expectation of privacy 
to be reasonable.  Generally, the only information that might be constitutionally protected 
was that “knowingly” concealed by individuals.  The third-party doctrine now became a 
core component of privacy in Fourth Amendment privacy cases.  Information shared with 
a third party was no longer protected under the Fourth Amendment.
In Katz, Justice Harlan wrote a famous concurrence in which he stated, “My 
understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold 
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of 
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 
‘reasonable.’”335  This became the new test for Fourth Amendment privacy invasion and, 
as mentioned above, it made personal agency central to defining constitutionally 
protected privacy.  Since Katz, the Court has reviewed individual efforts to create a 
subjective expectation of privacy.  
For instance, in Katz Justice Harlan wrote: 
334 Katz, 389 U.S. at 350-51.
335 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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The critical fact in this case is that (o)ne who occupies [a phone 
booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to 
place a call is surely entitled to “assume” that his conversation is not being 
intercepted. The point is not that the booth is “accessible to the public” at 
other times, but that it is a temporarily private place whose momentary 
occupants’ expectations of freedom from intrusion are recognized as 
reasonable.336
Here personal agency was recognized in the act of closing the phone booth door and 
paying the phone company for a private line.  The Court held that Katz had taken 
sufficient actions to create a zone of privacy.
Justice Hugo Black wrote a dissenting opinion in Katz in response to the Court’s    
“rewriting of the Fourth Amendment” and warned that after Katz the Amendment would 
no longer be interpreted as protecting citizens solely against “unreasonable searches and 
seizures,” but rather as protecting the broader notion of every  “individual’s privacy.” 337
Justice Black feared that the broad expansion of Fourth Amendment protections might 
render it useless.  He noted: “Few things happen to an individual that do not affect his 
privacy in one way or another. Thus . . . the Court has made the Fourth Amendment its 
vehicle for holding all laws violative of the Constitution which offend the Court's 
broadest concept of privacy.”338
Justice Stewart did acknowledge the need to limit the scope of Fourth 
Amendment protections. Though he believed “the correct solution of Fourth Amendment 
problems is not necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase  ‘constitutionally 
protected area,’” Justice Stewart qualified this expansion by holding that “the Fourth 
336 Id. 
337 Id. at 373 (Black, J., dissenting).
338 Id. 
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Amendment cannot be translated into a general constitutional right to privacy.”339
Moreover, the third-party doctrine itself actually limits the scope of protected information 
since modern life often compels individuals to share information with third parties in 
return for services. 
Justice Stewart held that each individual had a “general right to privacy,” which 
was conceptualized as “his right to be let alone by other people,” but he did not recognize 
this general right as a fundamental constitutional right but instead “like the protection of 
his property and of his very life [to be] left largely to the law of the individual States.”340
Justice Stewart limited Fourth Amendment privacy to a consideration of the conditions 
under which the Constitution required due process. Thus, after Katz, Fourth Amendment 
privacy was not a fundamental right to be left alone, but rather a right of individuals to 
compel government to provide due process prior to accessing “what [an individual] seeks 
to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public.”341
Again, implicit in this distinction between what privacy interests were protected 
or unprotected is the notion of personal agency.  An individual must have made an effort 
to preserve something as private if he or she wants to invoke constitutional protection. 
Thus, even as it embraced the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization, the Court necessarily 
framed a concurrent privacy right as the right to control access to information. In Katz 
Justice Stewart recognized Katz’s effort to keep his conversation private when he held 
that because “a person in a telephone booth . . . shuts the door behind him, and pays the 
339 Id. at 350.
340 Id. at 350-51.
341 Id. 
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toll . . . [he] is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will 
not be broadcast to the world.”342  Were the door left open, the privacy interest would be
lost.
Justice Stewart noted that the Court had “departed from the narrow view on which 
[the Olmstead] decision rested.” 343 He wrote:
[T]he Fourth Amendment governs not only the seizure of tangible 
items, but extends as well to the recording of oral statements overheard 
without any [trespass] . . . . Once this much is acknowledged, and once it 
is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people--and not simply 
“areas”--against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that 
the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of 
a physical intrusion into any given enclosure.344
The Court held that under this new conceptualization of Fourth Amendment privacy, 
“[t]he fact that the electronic device employed . . . did not happen to penetrate the wall of 
the booth can have no constitutional significance.”345  Justice Stewart stressed this 
portable aspect of personal agency under the Fourth Amendment when he explained: 
“These considerations do not vanish when the search in question is transferred from the 
setting of a home, an office, or a hotel room to that of a telephone booth. Wherever a man 
may be, he is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures.”346  Fourth Amendment privacy protections henceforth attached to individuals.
342 Id. at 352.
343 Id. at 353.
344 Id.
345 Id. 
346 Id. at 359. See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9  (1968) (explaining, in a case examining a 
confrontation in a street between a police officer and a citizen, that this right of privacy attaches “as much 
to the citizen on the streets of our cities as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his secret 
affairs”).
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Fourth Amendment analysis therefore needed to determine in which contexts an 
individual could claim Fourth Amendment protections. It was the concurring opinion of 
Justice John M. Harlan in Katz that created the two-part test that is still used today. In 
order to invoke constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
individuals must demonstrate in court that they knowingly created a condition under 
which they believed particular information or material would remain private, their 
subjective expectation of privacy. Once this personal agency had been established, they 
would then need to convince the court that their expectation of privacy was reasonable 
according to societal standards. This two-part test has been applied to Fourth Amendment 
privacy cases since Katz.347
For instance, in Smith v. Maryland348 the Court applied the Katz test in a case 
involving the use of yet another technology used to monitor phone calls, the pen register.  
These are devices that phone companies routinely use to record the phone numbers dialed 
from a particular phone.  This technology is primarily used to record for billing purposes
how many long distance calls a particular customer makes during a particular billing 
period.  In Smith, law enforcement officers used a pen register to establish that their 
suspect was making harassing phone calls to the victim of a prior crime.
347
 The Court has not retroactively applied the two-part test from Katz  to alleged infringements that might 
have taken place prior to 1967. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971) (The Court ruled on a 
case involving an informant who wore a wire when he conversed with a suspect in a number of locations in 
1965 and 1966 including the suspect’s home. The Court held that On Lee was still binding precedent when 
it held: “It was error for the Court of Appeals to dispose of this case based on its understanding of the 
principles announced in the Katz case. The court should have judged this case by the pre-Katz law and 
under that law, as On Lee clearly holds, the electronic surveillance here involved did not violate White's 
rights to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.” The decision in White turned once again on the 
fact that there was no physical trespass involved in gathering the information and that the suspect willingly 
conversed with the informant.)
348 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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During a robbery, alleged thief Michael Lee Smith acquired the home phone 
number and address of his victim, Patricia McDonough. For weeks after the robbery he 
made threatening phone calls to her home and even drove by her home to terrorize her.  
The police had a physical description of Smith and his car that was provided by 
McDonough.  When police spotted a man who looked like Smith they recorded his 
license plate number and thereby learned his home address.  In an effort to determine if it 
was indeed Smith making the harassing calls to McDonough, police asked the phone 
company to attach a pen register device to his home phone.  It did, and this information 
ultimately led to his arrest.  Smith claimed that the use of the pen register technology 
without a warrant was an unreasonable search and seizure.  
In Smith, Justice Harry A. Blackmun held that the use of the pen register by the 
phone company did not rise to the level of a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment because Smith had willingly shared the phone numbers he wanted to dial 
with a third party, the phone company. Justice Blackmun wrote,  “Since the pen register 
was installed on telephone company property at the telephone company’s central offices, 
petitioner obviously cannot claim that his ‘property’ was invaded or that police intruded 
into a ‘constitutionally protected area.’"349  Instead, using Katz, the Court considered 
whether Smith had a subjective expectation of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed
into his phone.  
349 Id. at 741. One important distinction between Smith and Katz is that pen registers cannot record any of 
the content of the communication transpiring on the phone lines as the “bug” in Katz could.  The pen 
register records only digits that necessarily have to be shared with the phone company in order to complete 
a call; But see. Id. at 748 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (arguing that the numbers dialed from a private telephone
“are not without content" and that a list of numbers might easily reveal the identities of the persons and the 
places called and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life).
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The basis of Justice Blackmun’s decision in Smith was the third-party doctrine 
upon which the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization is predicated. He determined that 
society in general would not consider “any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers 
they dial” to be reasonable, and he stressed that individuals choose to trade knowledge of 
the numbers they dial for phone service.350  He wrote, “All telephone users realize that 
they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company, since it is through 
telephone company switching equipment that their calls are completed.”351
This brought the idea of personal agency into the analysis.  Smith traded some of 
his privacy for the convenience of phone service.  If he strongly desired to keep his 
communication private, he might have forgone the telephone in favor of sending letters 
by post.  Justice Blackmun reasoned that phone subscribers expect the phone company to 
track whom they call. He noted, “All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone 
company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for they 
see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.”352  Thus, absent any 
action on Smith’s part to conceal the phone numbers he dialed and in light of the fact that 
he shared the information willingly with a third party, Justice Blackmun found that when 
the police used the pen register device to identify Smith as the individual making the 
calls, they did not commit an unreasonable search or seizure. Smith’s conviction was 
upheld. 
In a dissenting opinion that foreshadowed a direction the Court would eventually 
take in its Fourth Amendment doctrine, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued: “Privacy is 
350 Id. at 742.
351 Id.
352 Id. 
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not a discrete commodity, possessed absolutely or not at all. Those who disclose certain 
facts to a bank or phone company for a limited business purpose need not assume that 
this information will be released to other persons for other purposes.”353  Justice Marshall 
argued for the right to limited privacy to enable individuals to share information with one 
party and not another. 
This notion is at the core of the privacy-as-information-control conceptualization, 
and Justice Marshall was thus previewing the Court’s reconceptualization of privacy 
under the Fourth Amendment that would occur in 2001. When the Courts eventually did 
embrace limited privacy, the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization lost its practical 
applicability for privacy plaintiffs. The courts would continue, however, to consider the 
extent to which information had been shared with third parties when determining the 
appropriate level of constitutional protection a particular type of information derserves. 
In 1986 the Court again applied the two-part Katz test in order to determine 
whether individuals might have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those portions of 
their backyards that can be seen from the air.  Chief Justice Warren E. Burger penned the 
decision in California v. Ciraolo354 in which the petitioner appealed his conviction for 
growing marijuana in his backyard because the government used evidence gathered 
through aerial surveillance, which the petitioner claimed was an unconstitutional search.  
The Court reasoned that anything outside of the home that can be seen from a 
public space with the naked eye cannot be considered private information.  Again, the 
353 Id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
354 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
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Court relied upon the privacy-as-secrecy paradigm and the third-party doctrine.  
Anything left in plain sight is being shared with the public and thus cannot be private.
The petitioner in Ciraolo claimed that he had built a large fence around his yard 
for the express purpose of preventing others from being able to see the space from the 
street. Thus, he argued that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy. Chief Justice 
Burger agreed that spaces in such close proximity to one’s home are generally considered 
by society to be rather private.  He noted, “The protection afforded the curtilage355 is 
essentially a protection of families and personal privacy in an area intimately linked to 
the home, both physically and psychologically, where privacy expectations are most 
heightened.”356  Nevertheless, when the third-party doctrine was applied to curtilage, the 
fact that the space could be seen from public areas eroded the privacy interest that 
attached to such space. Chief Justice Burger wrote: “That the area is within the curtilage 
does not itself bar all police observation. The Fourth Amendment protection of the home 
has never been extended to require law enforcement officers to shield their eyes when 
passing by a home on public thoroughfares.”357
Personal agency requirements were heightened in Ciraolo.  In Katz, merely 
closing the phone booth door and depositing a dime were sufficient to establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. In Ciraolo the Court said that building a fence was not 
sufficient.  Chief Justice Burger held that the mere fact  “that an individual has taken 
measures to restrict some views of his activities does not . . . preclude an officer's 
355 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 411 (8th ed., 2004). Curtilage is “the land or yard adjoining a house, usually 
within an enclosure.  Under the Fourth Amendment, the curtilage is an area usually protected from 
warrantless searches.”
356 Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 212-13.
357 Id. at 213.
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observations from a public vantage point where he has a right to be and which renders the 
activities clearly visible.”358
He did not mention in his decision the extreme measures the police had 
undertaken to view Ciraolo’s property.  They had to access an aircraft and fly over.  The 
language used by Chief Justice Burger --  “Any member of the public flying in this 
airspace who glanced down could have seen everything that these officers observed”359 --
made it seem as though officers routinely fly overhead and peer into yards!  Burger 
concluded, “The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police traveling in the 
public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the 
naked eye.”360  The decision in Ciraolo was in line with the reasoning in Katz and Smith, 
and it eroded individual privacy interests even further by elevating the level of personal 
agency required to create a subjective expectation of privacy by including anyone in the 
public airspace among third parties sufficient enough to strip away Fourth Amendment
protection.
Two years after Ciraolo, the Court again expanded the third-party doctrine.  In 
California v. Greenwood,361 the Court said that individuals have no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the contents of their garbage bags once trash has been placed at 
the curb for pick-up.  In this case, police searched a narcotics suspect’s garbage bags for 
evidence of illegal drug activity, and the evidence gathered was used as probable cause to 
358 Id. 
359 Id. at 213-14.
360 Id. at 215.
361 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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get a search warrant, which ultimately led to an arrest. Justice Byron R. White delivered 
the opinion of the Court, and he based his decision upon the societal standard regarding a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage.  He wrote: “It may well be that respondents 
did not expect that the contents of their garbage bags would become known to the police 
or other members of the public. An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth 
Amendment protection, however, unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as 
objectively reasonable.”362 Justice White held that society was not.
Using reasoning similar to that in Smith, the Court reasoned that the trash is being 
handed to a third party in return for a service, garbage pick-up.  Justice White noted “It is 
common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side of a public street are 
readily accessible to animals, children, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the 
public.”  This language invoked the third-party doctrine as the decision explicitly noted 
that the garbage was removed from the privacy of the home and exposed to the public.  
Moreover, Justice White wrote, “[R]espondents placed their refuse at the curb for the 
express purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector, who might himself 
have sorted through respondents’ trash or permitted others, such as the police, to do 
so.”363
The Court’s adoption of the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization, predicated 
upon the third-party doctrine and a personal agency requirement, eroded individual 
privacy protections under the Fourth Amendment.  Up until the Greenwood decision, the 
Court had not explicitly used the notion of limited privacy to limit the effects of the third-
362 Id. at 39-40.
363 Id. at 40. 
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party doctrine in Fourth Amendment privacy decisions.  In 2001 it recognized that new 
surveillance technologies erode an individual’s ability to conceal information, and in a 
landmark case the Court took an important first step in upholding the primacy of personal 
agency in constitutional privacy law.
Privacy as Information Control
In Smith, Justice Thurgood Marshall had dissented because he felt that intimate 
information about one’s life could be derived from a careful examination of the phone 
numbers he or she dialed. In Greenwood, Justice Brennan wrote a dissent that made the 
very same point.  The contents of a garbage bag could illuminate many facets of 
someone’s life.  Receipts, junk mail, food containers, and other types of trash might 
provide a snapshot of how life is lived within a particular residence.364
Ultimately, the basis of Brennan’s dissent was that society held a strong 
expectation of privacy in waste. He argued: “Scrutiny of another's trash is contrary to 
commonly accepted notions of civilized behavior. I suspect, therefore, that members of 
our society will be shocked to learn that the Court, the ultimate guarantor of liberty, 
deems unreasonable our expectation that the aspects of our private lives that are 
concealed safely in a trash bag will not become public.”365 Thus, Brennan added his voice 
364 Id. at 50 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan wrote: “A single bag of trash testifies eloquently to 
the eating, reading, and recreational habits of the person who produced it. A search of trash, like a search of 
the bedroom, can relate intimate details about sexual practices, health, and personal hygiene. Like rifling 
through desk drawers or intercepting phone calls, rummaging through trash can divulge the target's 
financial and professional status, political affiliations and inclinations, private thoughts, personal 
relationships, and romantic interests.”
365 Id. 
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to Marshall’s in recognizing that the law ought to prohibit access to personal 
information—whether phone numbers dialed or bits of information discarded in the 
trash—without a warrant.
The most recent landmark case in the Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine was 
decided in 2001, and it changed again the way the Court conceptualized privacy.366
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the majority decision in Kyllo v. United States, which held 
that the warrantless use of sense-enhancing technology to access information that would 
otherwise be inaccessible from within a constitutionally protected space was an 
unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.  Justice Scalia framed the question 
decided in the case as “what limits [are there] upon this power of technology to shrink the 
realm of guaranteed privacy.”367
Throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, technologies such as wire taps, 
detectaphones, hidden transmitters, airplanes, and spike mikes had slowly lessened the 
relevance of physical space to a society’s notion of what a reasonable expectation of 
privacy actually was. Personal agency was also eroded by each succeeding generation of 
surveillance technology. Most individuals were unaware of the types of listening 
technologies in use and therefore were unable to take steps to conceal their information, 
materials, or activities. The Court needed to reconceptualize the privacy interests 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Implicit in the Kyllo decision was that the Fourth Amendment really protected the 
right of individuals to prevent government from accessing information in any 
366 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
367 Id. at 34. 
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circumstance in which new surveillance technologies prevent individuals from being able 
to create a reasonable expectation of privacy. Thus, in Kyllo the Court adopted its fourth 
conceptualization of privacy under the Fourth Amendment, privacy-as-information-
control.  In Boyd the Amendment protected one from self-incrimination.  In Olmstead it 
protected private space.  In Katz it protected individuals, and then in Kyllo it protected 
information. 
In Kyllo, the Court reviewed the conviction of Danny Kyllo for growing 
marijuana in his home. Police used a thermal imager, a camera that records heat waves 
radiating from within a building.368  Heat signatures read from one wall of Kyllo’s home 
and from his garage were sufficiently strong to convince police officers that Kyllo was 
using high intensity lamps to grow marijuana in his home.  These heat signatures 
provided sufficient probable cause to get a warrant to search Kyllo’s home, find the 
plants, and make an arrest.  Kyllo later asserted that the use of the thermal imaging 
equipment was an unreasonable search. 
New surveillance technology has made it possible to “search” private spaces—in 
the sense of being able to discern information regarding what actions, individuals, or 
objects are within such spaces—with no need for police to approach or enter upon 
constitutionally protected areas.  In Kyllo, Justice Scalia implicitly defined privacy as a 
right to prevent the government from knowing rather than to prevent the government 
from entering absent due process.  In Kyllo, the Court defined private spaces not in the 
context of private property and ownership, but rather in the language from Katz. Private 
368 Agents used an Agema Thermovision 210 thermal imager to scan Kyllo’s triplex.
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spaces were those in which, historically, individuals had enjoyed an expectation of 
privacy that society in general would consider reasonable.
If the use of surveillance technology that eliminates the need to enter a private 
space were enough to qualify a search as reasonable, then the Court’s analysis would be 
purely mechanical.  The Court need only establish that law enforcement officials were in 
a public space when using the technology.  In Kyllo, Justice Scalia wrote, “We rejected 
such a mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in Katz, where the 
eavesdropping device picked up only sound waves that reached the exterior of the phone 
booth.”369  The apparatus being used in Kyllo read heat waves emanating from the walls 
of the home rather than sound waves, but the idea was generally the same.  Adhering to 
the Court’s reasoning in Katz, Scalia argued, “Reversing that approach would leave the 
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology--including imaging technology that 
could discern all human activity in the home.”370
Thus, Kyllo established that it is not the square footage of a space that was 
protected, but rather government access to knowledge of what transpires within that 
private space.   Justice Scalia wrote: 
We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any 
information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise 
have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally 
protected area’ . . . constitutes a search--at least where (as here) the 
technology in question is not in general public use.371
369 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 35-36.
370 Id. 
371 Id. at 34.
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This language brings Kyllo in line with Silverman and Katz and implies that the Fourth 
Amendment has always been about accessing information, not invading space.
The earlier Fourth Amendment cases discussed above dealt with familiar 
technologies or technologies that required physical access to a home. If individuals are 
familiar with a given technology, they will understand the steps they need to take to 
create a reasonable expectation of privacy.  For instance, binoculars and telescopes 
enhance one’s sense of sight.  In adjacent high-rise buildings in big cities, individuals 
know they can easily be watched through their windows by others using these 
technologies.  They also understand how to foil these “peeping toms” by drawing their 
shades.
In Ciraolo, marijuana plants were seen from the public airspace with the naked 
eye. Had the thought occurred to him, Ciraolo could have taken steps to conceal the 
plants from observation from the sky with mesh netting or tarps.  In Katz the petitioner 
had taken the precautions necessary to conceal his conversation by closing the phone 
booth door, yet technology was still able to invade that private space.  The Court in Katz
said that use of the listening technology was unconstitutional because Katz had taken 
reasonable steps to maintain an expectation of privacy and could not reasonably be 
expected to take further steps to foil a small transmitter placed on the outside of the 
phone booth.    
In Kyllo the police used technology that was rather rare, and it would not 
normally occur to citizens that the inside of their homes could be monitored in such a 
way. After considering societal awareness of new technologies, Justice Scalia used the 
Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence to reinforce personal agency in circumstances 
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in which new technologies inhibit the ability of individuals to define a subjective 
expectation of privacy.  He also emphasized the sanctity of the home as a constitutionally 
protected space. Justice Scalia assigned a more substantial individual privacy interest 
whenever an invasion of the home is involved. He wrote: “These were intimate details 
because they were details of the home, just as was the detail of how warm--or even how 
relatively warm--Kyllo was heating his residence.”372 Thus access to information about 
what is transpiring within intimate spaces warrants additional protection. In his opinion , 
Justice Scalia quoted Payton v. New York when he reaffirmed that “the Fourth 
Amendment draws a firm line at the entrance to the house,"373 and then wrote, “That line, 
we think, must be not only firm but also bright--which requires clear specification of 
those methods of surveillance that require a warrant.”374
After he reemphasized that the home is a constitutionally protected area, Justice 
Scalia then reinforced the role of personal agency. He seized the notion of familiarity as a 
standard for determining when the use of a particular technology would require a warrant.  
If a technology was generally familiar to the public, like binoculars, then individuals 
must create a subjective expectation of privacy by taking some action, like drawing the 
blinds.  However, Justice Scalia wrote, “Where, as here, the Government uses a device 
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is 
372 Id. at 38.
373
 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980).
374 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40.
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presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”375 Here the Fourth Amendment had 
evened the playing field.
Privacy under the Fourth Amendment
Within Fourth Amendment privacy doctrine, the Court’s conceptualization of 
privacy has evolved through four distinct stages: Fourth and Fifth Amendment due 
process, privacy as space, privacy as secrecy, and privacy as information control. 
Originally, Fourth Amendment protections were enmeshed with the Fifth Amendment’s 
protection against self-incrimination.  The Fourth Amendment was directly inspired by 
the English government’s use of writs of assistance and general warrants prior to the 
American Revolution and the founders’ concern over government intrusions upon private 
property for the purpose of obtaining material evidence to be used against individuals in 
court.  Thus during the first stage of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the court 
generally combined Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests as was typified in Boyd.  
The Court then established Fourth Amendment analysis as being distinct from 
Fifth Amendment analysis. Starting with Olmstead, the Court conceptualized privacy as a 
right to protect private space.  Court decisions under the privacy-as-space 
conceptualization generally involved guaranteeing that the government procured a 
warrant prior to invading any private space absent consent or emergency, evidentiary 
concerns. 
Then in Katz, the Court implicitly reconceptualized privacy as secrecy.  During 
this period the Court would determine whether an individual had taken sufficient action 
375 Id. 
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to create a subjective expectation of privacy in certain information, materials, or space.  
Once such personal agency had been established, the Court would determine whether that
subjective expectation of privacy was one that society in general would recognize as 
reasonable. The privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization was predicated upon the third-party 
doctrine. The notion of limited privacy was not considered by the Court during this stage, 
so information that was shared with a third party could no longer be considered private in 
a constitutional sense.
The final and nascent conceptualization of privacy that has been recognized by 
the Court is privacy as information control.  In Kyllo the Court recognized that new 
surveillance technologies were eroding the significance of historically private spaces, 
such as one’s home, along with protection provided by personal agency in Fourth 
Amendment privacy decisions.  In response, the Court explicitly recognized a heightened 
privacy interest in private homes and in situations wherein the government uses 
surveillance technology that is generally unfamiliar to the public. In Kyllo the Court 
implicitly held that the Fourth Amendment does not protect space so much as it protects 
government knowledge of what transpires within a particular space.  Thus, the advent of 
new surveillance technologies has caused the Court to conceptualize privacy as an 
individual’s right to control access to information in Fourth Amendment privacy 
jurisprudence.
CHAPTER IV
CONFIDENTIALITY IN INFORMATION PRIVACY CASES
The review of First and Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence provided in 
Chapters 2 and 3 revealed a gradual process through which the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
conceptualization of a constitutional right to privacy has become increasingly about an 
individual’s right to control access to, manipulation of, and dissemination of personal 
information. The older privacy-as-space and privacy-as-secrecy conceptualizations used 
by the Court in these doctrines were eventually reinterpreted and described in terms of a 
right to manipulate information flow. Thus, the privacy-as-information control 
conceptualization of privacy will likely inform the legal analysis in any future 
constitutional challenges to KDD dataveillance on privacy grounds.
In 1977 the Supreme Court recognized a distinct right of individuals to “avoid the 
disclosure of personal matters.”376 This established a new privacy doctrine, information 
privacy, which protects individuals against the government’s ability to learn about 
personal aspects of their lives by accessing and analyzing their personal information.  
Since KDD technologies enable the government to obtain such personal insights with 
unprecedented ease, understanding how the courts conceptualize privacy in information 
privacy cases is necessary to an evaluation of the strength of constitutional privacy 
protections against KDD dataveillance. The following examination of information 
376
 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 600 (1977).
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privacy cases in which statutes or officials have compelled individuals to surrender 
control of their personal information to the government reveals the emergence of a new 
conceptualization of privacy, privacy as confidentiality.  
In information privacy law, the privacy-as-information-control conceptualization 
has already partly evolved into a privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization.  The 
difference between the two lies with the agent of control.  In the first, individuals retain 
control over their own information. For example, in the pamphleteer cases in Chapter 2,
the Courts consistently held that individuals rather than the state should control when to 
disclose their identifying information and to whom.  In the second, individuals hold the 
government to a “duty” of confidentiality absent a substantial or compelling government 
interest to justify disclosure. In information privacy cases, this duty typically is 
considered fulfilled if the government can demonstrate the implementation of either 
statutory or procedural safeguards designed to protect against the unnecessary 
dissemination of personal information that has been surrendered to the government.  The 
level of protection required of these safeguards varies depending upon the nature of the 
information under consideration.
Though information privacy law has been described as “a mosaic of various types 
of law,”377 this chapter is concerned only with constitutional information privacy and 
begins with a review of the two Supreme Court cases credited with creating a distinct 
privacy right in personal information and a third that is widely cited by the circuit courts 
regarding which types of information are entitled to protection. Then decisions from the 
circuit courts are discussed in order to define the current scope of the privacy interest in 
377 SOLOVE, supra note 4, at 56. 
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avoiding the disclosure of personal matters in general and the courts’ recognition of 
privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization in particular. Each appellate case was 
selected because it discussed the constitutional privacy right first framed by the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s dicta in Whalen v. Roe,378 the individual privacy interest in “avoiding 
disclosure of personal matters.”379
Information Privacy and the Supreme Court
As previously discussed, the dicta in Whalen v. Roe380 distinguished between 
privacy interests involving independence in making personal decisions and privacy 
interests in personal information for the first time.  Moreover, when Justice John Paul 
Stevens wrote, “The right to collect and use [data] for public purposes is typically 
accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted 
disclosures . . . . [I]n some circumstances that duty arguably has its roots in the 
Constitution . . . ,”381 he explicitly recognized a new conceptualization of privacy, privacy 
as confidentiality. Since Whalen, the courts have been gradually shaping this right to 
confidentiality in personal information surrendered by individuals to the government.
Whalen involved a challenge to a New York statute382 that required physicians to 
378
 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
379 Id. at 598-600.
380
 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
381 Id. at 605.
382
 New York State Controlled Substances Act of 1972, N.Y.LAWS, 878, N.Y.PUB.HEALTH LAW § 3300 
(McKinney, Supp. 1976-1977).  The statute attempted to limit the distribution of drugs that have both 
legitimate and illegitimate uses.
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submit to the New York State Health Department personal information383 for patients 
receiving prescriptions for a number of addictive drugs.384 The health department would 
then store these data on computer tapes, and law enforcement could access and use the 
data to identify patients and physicians who might be abusing or defrauding prescription 
plans for the purpose of obtaining the addictive drugs.
The patients and physicians who filed the suit argued that the statute constituted 
an invasion of privacy.  Their central contention was that individuals requiring these 
medications might not fill prescriptions for fear that “misuse of the computerized data”
might result in their social “stigmatization” as “drug addicts.”385 The district court had 
found that the statute unnecessarily intruded upon the “doctor-patient relationship,” 
which was considered to be one of the “zones of privacy afforded constitutional 
protection.”386
Writing for the Court, Justice John Paul Stevens noted: “The cases sometimes 
characterized as protecting ‘privacy’ have in fact involved at least two different kinds of 
interests. One is the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and 
another is the interest in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”387
383
 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 593 (1977).  Information collected included “prescribing physician; the 
dispensing pharmacy; the drug and dosage; and the name, address, and age of the patient.”
384 Id. at 593, n.8 (1977). This footnote identified “Schedule II” drugs that were targeted by this statute as 
“opium and opium derivatives, cocaine, methadone, amphetamines, and methaqualone” and explained that 
“these drugs have accepted uses in the amelioration of pain and in the treatment of epilepsy, narcolepsy, 
hyperkinesia, schizo-affective disorders, and migraine headaches.”
385 Id. at 595. At trial, plaintiffs entered into evidence the stories of a number of individuals who declined 
treatment and of doctors who would no linger prescribe the medications. Id., at n. 16.
386 Roe v. Ingraham, 403 F.Supp. 931 (D.C.N.Y. 1975). 
 
387 Whalen, 429 U.S. at  598-600.
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His recognition of an interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters was the
beginning of a new privacy doctrine, information privacy, but Whalen provided little 
insight into the constitutional roots of this new strand of privacy other than holding that it 
existed in the penumbras of specific protections in the Bill of Rights as established in 
Griswold v. Connecticut388 and that it was a “personal liberty” protected from violation 
by the states by the Fourteenth Amendment as established in Roe v. Wade.389 Justice 
Stevens accepted the argument that information could leak and said that  fear that their 
use of these drugs might become publicly known could make “some patients reluctant to 
use, and some doctors reluctant to prescribe, such drugs even when their use is medically 
indicated.”390 Thus, Justice Stevens recognized that the New York statute “threatens to 
impair both [patients’] interest in the nondisclosure of private information and also their 
interest in making important decisions independently.”391
Since Justice Stevens held that the privacy interests threatened in Whalen were 
protected liberties under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court would apply substantive
due process review in the case.  This standard of review generally involves balancing the 
content of a regulation and the governmental interest in regulating an activity against the 
individual privacy interest that is being infringed upon by the legislation.  In Whalen, the 
government’s interest was in preventing prescription drug fraud while the privacy interest 
was the possibility that those who needed these medications would refrain from using 
388 318 U.S. 479 (1965).  
389
 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
390 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 600.
391 Id. 
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them.  In other words, the patient’s usage behavior or the doctor’s prescribing behavior 
might be chilled.
Justice Stevens considered the content of the statute and whether evidence of a 
behavioral chill existed. In particular, he focused on safeguards within the statute 
designed to protect personal information surrendered to the state. He held, “The right to 
collect and use such data for public purposes is typically accompanied by a concomitant 
statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures.”392 New York State argued 
that the statute provided adequate procedural safeguards to protect the personal 
information both when it was initially submitted on paper forms as well as after the 
information was transcribed onto computer tape.393
Though he noted that information leaks might still occur despite the provisions, 
Justice Stevens ultimately upheld the New York statute because its duty to safeguard the 
patient information had been fulfilled by what he regarded as adequate safeguards for 
information handling within the statute.394  It is this expectation of the fulfillment of a 
“concomitant duty” that comprises the core of the privacy-as-confidentiality 
conceptualization.  Individuals have a right to expect that the government will keep 
392 Id. at 605.
393 Id. at 594. The statutory safeguards included the fact that following transcription, the remaining paper 
forms were stored in a vault for five years before being destroyed; the receiving room is surrounded by a 
locked wire fence and protected by an alarm system; and once the information was on magnetic tape, the 
statute provided that the tapes were “kept in a locked cabinet. . . . When the tapes are used, the computer is 
run ‘off-line,’ which means that no terminal outside of the computer room can read or record any 
information;” and, regarding the personnel responsible for transcribing and archiving the information, the 
statute mandated, “Public disclosure of the identity of patients is expressly prohibited by the statute and by 
a Department of Health regulation.”  
394 Id. at 595. Justice Stevens held that the mere possibility that security leaks might occur or that personal 
information might be disclosed as evidence at trial was not sufficient to invalidate the statute on its face. 
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confidential the personal information it compels them to disclose, absent a legitimate 
state interest.  
After he accepted the statutory safeguards, Justice Stevens considered whether the 
infringement upon information privacy rights might cause a behavioral chill.  He relied 
upon drug-use statistics supplied by the state health department and compared the usage 
rates of those medications regulated by the statute before and after it was enacted. After 
completing the comparison, the Court held that “the statute did not deprive the public of 
access to the drugs.”395 Justice Stevens distinguished Whalen from decisional privacy
cases involving statutes that banned particular choices altogether.  He summarized three 
types of state interference in an individual’s ability to make intimate decisions: outright 
bans on specific behaviors (laws against abortions, assisted suicide, etc.); state licensing 
of particular behaviors (you need permission from the state to hunt, drive, sell liquor, 
etc.); and state collection of information regarding individuals choosing to take specific 
actions.  The New York statute fit in the last category.396
Justice Stevens concluded that the statute does not insert the state directly into the 
doctor-patient relationship because “access to these drugs [is not] conditioned on the 
consent of any state official or other third party.”397 Having established a legitimate 
purpose for the statute, adequate information safeguards, and that the state was not 
“chilling” behavior regarding access to the medications, Justice Stevens limited the scope 
of the holding in Whalen. He made it clear that Whalen decided only the case at hand and 
395 Id. at 603. “The record supports the conclusion that some use of [the] drugs has been discouraged . . . 
[but] about 100,000 prescriptions for such drugs were being filled each month prior to the entry of the 
District Court's injunction [but after the enactment of the statute].” 
 
396 Id. 
397 Id. 
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did not “decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of 
accumulated private data whether intentional or unintentional or by a system that did not 
contain comparable security provisions.”398
Thus Whalen did no more than assert that there is a right to avoid the disclosure of 
one’s personal information by the government.  The exact source of the right and its 
parameters were left undefined.  It thus falls to other courts to determine what constitutes 
a “serious invasion” of one’s information privacy rights, and the appellate decisions 
discussed below have begun to shape the parameters of the privacy-as-confidentiality 
conceptualization of privacy.
In the same year Whalen was decided, Justice William Brennan wrote the 
majority opinion in the second landmark case that even more firmly established the 
individual privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters by the 
government or the right to confidentiality, Nixon v. Administrator of General Services.399
Like Whalen, Nixon involved a constitutional challenge to a statute on privacy grounds.
Former President Richard M. Nixon had challenged the Presidential Recordings and 
Materials Preservation Act400 on a number of grounds401 including that certain provisions 
of the Act invaded his privacy.
398 Id. at 605-06.
399
 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
400 44 U.S.C. § 2107 (1970 ed., Supp. V).
401
 He alleged that the “archival screening” process outlined in the Act was a violation of presidential 
privilege, a violation of the separation of powers, and a violation of his First Amendment associational 
rights, and he alleged the process was an unconstitutional bill of attainder.  The Court found against the 
former President on all of these grounds as well as on the question of whether the process was an 
unconstitutional invasion of his privacy.
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The Act provided rules used to guide the process of preparing the immense 
number of documents and recordings generated by a presidential administration for 
storage in a presidential library.  Part of this process involved “archival screening,” which 
was the process of separating the President’s personal information from the millions of 
pages of public records. When President Nixon argued that this process – granting 
strangers access to his private papers that were intermixed with the public documents --
constituted an unconstitutional invasion of his privacy, the Court followed Whalen and 
found adequate safeguards among the guidelines for archival screening contained within 
the Act. Stated another way, the Act had provisions to make sure Nixon’s personal 
information remained confidential.
 Justice Brennan cited Whalen and acknowledged, “One element of privacy has 
been characterized as ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal 
matters’”402 and noted that “public officials, including the President, are not wholly 
without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal life unrelated to 
any acts done by them in their public capacity.”403 Quoting Katz v. United States, Justice 
Brennan granted that the President had a “legitimate expectation of privacy.”404
As was the case in Whalen, the statute was subjected to substantive due process 
review and part of this process involved balancing the invasion of former President 
Nixon’s privacy against “the public interest in subjecting the Presidential materials of 
402
 Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Serv’s. 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977). Here Brennan cited the district court’s 
finding that “Presidents who have established Presidential libraries have usually withheld matters 
concerned with family or personal finances, or have deposited such materials with restrictions on their 
screening.”
403 Id. 
404 Id. 
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appellant's administration to archival screening.”405  Justice Brennan framed the elements 
to be weighed when he wrote:
[T]he constitutionality of the Act must be viewed in the context of 
the limited intrusion of the screening process, of appellant's status as a 
public figure, of his lack of any expectation of privacy in the 
overwhelming majority of the materials, of the important public interest in 
preservation of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of 
segregating the small quantity of private materials without comprehensive 
screening.406
Justice Brennan compared safeguards in the Presidential Recordings and 
Materials Preservation Act to the types of safeguards the Court validated in the New 
York statute under review in Whalen. He wrote, “Not only does the Act challenged here 
mandate regulations similarly aimed at preventing undue dissemination of private 
materials but, unlike Whalen, the Government will not even retain long-term control over 
such private information; rather, purely private papers and recordings will be returned to 
appellant under [provisions] of the Act.”407  In Whalen, personal information would be 
retained for five years in paper form and indefinitely in the computerized databases.
In Nixon the Court held that the infringement upon President Nixon’s privacy was 
constitutional because of the public interest in removing his personal information from 
the vast sum of public records and because the Act “provides procedures and orders the 
promulgation of regulations expressly for the purpose of minimizing the intrusion into 
405 Nixon, 433 U.S. at 458.
406 Id. at 465. Justice Brennan said:  “[The] appellant cannot assert any privacy claim as to the documents 
and tape recordings that he has already disclosed to the public . . . . Most of the 42 million pages were 
prepared and seen by others and were widely circulated within the Government.” President Nixon conceded 
“that he saw no more than 200,000 [personal] items.” Ultimately, Justice Brennan said: “The vast majority 
of the materials in question were previously shared, public records.  . . .  [T]he appellant’s privacy claim 
embracing . . . ‘extremely private communications between him and . . . his wife, his daughters, his 
physician, lawyer, and clergyman, and his close friends, as well as personal diary dictablets and his wife's 
personal files,’ relates only to a very small fraction of the massive volume of official materials with which 
they are presently commingled.” Id. at 459.
407 Id. at 458-59.
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appellant's private and personal materials.”408  Another factor that weakened President 
Nixon’s privacy claim was the fact that “any intrusion by archivists into appellant's 
private papers and effects is undertaken with the sole purpose of separating private 
materials to be returned to appellant.”409  In Whalen the materials would be stored longer 
and used as evidence against private individuals in criminal court.
Thus, in both Whalen and Nixon, the Supreme Court established that individuals 
are entitled to a constitutionally protected privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of 
personal matters by the government or, stated differently, an interest in confidentiality.  
Though the parameters of this right remained undefined, in both decisions the Court 
relied upon substantive due process review in the form of a balancing test that weighed 
the government’s interest in accessing the information against one’s privacy interest in 
the information.  The Court has ex plicitly recognized a privacy-as-confidentiality 
conceptualization by creating a “concomitant duty” on the part of government to 
safeguard the personal information it compels citizens to disclose.  One aspect of an 
individual’s information privacy interest is to expect these safeguards when surrendering 
personal information. 
One other Supreme Court case has become a key part of information privacy 
doctrine, the decision in Paul v. Davis.410 In Paul, the name and photograph of an 
individual who had been arrested but not yet convicted of shoplifting had been placed on 
a flyer that identified him as a shoplifter.  The flyers were then distributed to more than
408 Id. at 459.
409 Id. at 462.
410
 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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800 retailers.411 The plaintiff claimed, among other things, that the flyer was a “violation 
of a right to privacy guaranteed by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”412 Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the opinion in Paul and held:
While we have in a number of our prior cases pointed out the 
frequently drastic effect of the “stigma” which may result from defamation 
by the government in a variety of contexts, this line of cases does not 
establish the proposition that reputation alone, apart from some more 
tangible interests such as employment, is either “liberty” or “property” by 
itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process 
Clause.413
This language is often cited by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal in information 
privacy cases when the courts must decide which types of information are entitled to 
protection under Whalen.  Paul effectively eliminates embarrassing but not highly 
personal information.  Moreover, Paul also provided guidance as to what types of 
information should be protected.  Justice Rehnquist reasoned: 
In Roe the Court pointed out that the personal rights found in this 
guarantee of personal privacy must be limited to those which are 
fundamental or “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” . . .  The 
activities detailed as being within this definition were . . . matters relating 
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child 
rearing and education.414
Lower courts cite Paul in concluding that personal information that closely relates to 
these fundamental areas is more likely to be protected under a constitutional right of 
411 Id. at 694-96. In late 1972 two police departments had agreed to combine their efforts for the purpose of 
alerting local area merchants to possible shoplifters who might be operating during the Christmas season.
The flyers were part of the effort. At the time petitioners caused the flyer to be prepared and circulated 
respondent had been charged with shoplifting but his guilt or innocence of that offense had never been 
resolved. Shortly after circulation of the flyer, the charge against respondent was finally dismissed by a 
judge of the Louisville Police Court.
412 Id. at 712. 
413 Id. at 701.
414 Id. at 713.
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confidentiality than is information related to more common areas such as finances. The 
further removed from intimate circumstances such as childbirth or marriage, the less 
likely it is that the information will be entitled to constitutional protects.
Therefore, as of 1978, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal had only three 
guideposts for deciding information privacy cases. First, individuals had a right to avoid 
the disclosure of personal matters by state actors. Second, that right involved a duty on 
the part of government to protect the information that it had compelled individuals to 
surrender. Lastly, the appropriate form of judicial review should involve a balancing test 
weighing the government’s interest in collecting personal information against the 
resulting infringement upon individual privacy rights. The following discussion will 
illuminate how the lower courts have started to conceptualize privacy as a right to 
confidentiality in information privacy cases. For purposes of analysis, the circuit court 
cases have been grouped into two general categories: the first contains cases that involve 
challenges to statutes, subpoenas, and disclosure agreements, and the second contains 
cases involving challenges to the actions of  public officials. Each category of cases has 
its own form of legal analysis as is discussed below .
Challenges to Statutes, Subpoenas, and Disclosure Agreements
In information privacy cases that involve a challenge to an ordinance, statute, or 
policy that has allegedly infringed upon an individual information privacy right, the 
circuit courts apply substantive due process.415 The constitutionality of a particular law is 
415 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 539 (8th ed. 2004). “The doctrine that the Due Process Clauses of the 5th
and 14th Amendments require legislation to be fair and reasonable in content and to further a legitimate 
governmental objective.”
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determined by balancing any infringements caused by the law against those interests the 
government has advanced to justify the legislation.416  This balancing approach has been 
used in privacy jurisprudence since Griswold v. Connecticut417 and has consistently been 
used to determine the constitutionality of statutes that in some way prevent individuals 
from making certain personal decisions.418 Since Whalen distinguished the privacy 
interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal information from decisional privacy, the 
circuit courts have also adopted substantive due process to review statutes that compel 
individuals to surrender personal information to the government.
This section discusses eleven U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal cases that have 
defined the scope of what the Fifth Circuit termed one’s privacy interest in 
confidentiality419 as well as the level of judicial review that should be applied in such 
cases. Three cases involved challenges to statutes that compelled disclosure of personal 
information from individuals.420  Three were challenges to subpoena power granted under 
416 See Myer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923). “The established doctrine is that [liberty as 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment] may not be interfered with, under the guise of protecting the 
public interest, by legislative action which is arbitrary or without reasonable relation to some purpose 
within the competency of the state to effect. Determination by the Legislature of what constitutes proper 
exercise of police power is not final or conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts.”
417
 318 U.S. 479 (1965). 
418 See Washington v. Glucksburg, 521 U.S. 707 (1997)(upholding Washington’s law that makes it a crime 
to assist in a suicide), Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 457 U.S. 261 (1990) (the Court
held that there is no constitutional bar to a State establishing a procedural requirement that requires 
evidence of the patient’s, as opposed to surrogate family members’, intention to forgo treatment), Moore v. 
City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (ruling that an ordinance had drawn the definition of ‘family” 
too narrowly and prohibited, among other combinations, uncles from living in the same residences as 
nephews), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (striking down a Texas statute making it illegal to 
procure an abortion unless it is medically prescribed or performed to save the life of the mother).
419
 Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d. 1119 (5th Cir. 1978) (labeling the privacy interests in Whalen as 
confidentiality (disclosure of personal matters) and autonomy (making certain kinds of important 
decisions)). These terms have been adopted and are widely used in circuit court information privacy 
decisions.
420 Id. (dealing with a claim by five Florida state senators that the financial disclosure provisions within 
Florida’s Sunshine Amendments, Article II, § 8(h)(1) violated their privacy rights), Barry v. City of New 
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both state and federal statutory authority.421 Two concerned situations in which the 
federal government attempted to compel the disclosure of information from federal 
employees,422 and one that concerned personal information that was generated during
pretrial discovery.423 Lastly, two cases from the Sixth Circuit are discussed.424  The Sixth 
Circuit is the only circuit to reject a balancing test as the appropriate form of substantive 
due process review in information privacy law.
The Standard of Review
Despite general recognition that, in the words of Fifth Circuit Judge John Minor 
Wisdom, “[i]n Whalen the Court made an effort to unsnarl some of the tangled strands of 
privacy,”425 opinions from the circuit courts reflect some frustration with the Supreme 
York, 712 F.2d. 1554 (2nd Cir. 1983) (deciding a challenge by New York City Firefighters and Police 
Officers to a New York City ordinance, LOCAL LAW 48, NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE, amending 
LOCAL LAW 48, NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE § 1106-5.0, that required certain city employees to 
submit annual financial reports to the City Clerk’s office, which would then be made available to the 
public), and Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997) (involving a challenge to the registration 
and disclosure provisions of the Washington State sex offender registry law, WASH. LAWS, Ch. 3, §§ 401, 
116).
421
 Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1978) (involving a challenge to the subpoena power of the 
New York State Board for Professional Conduct); United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation, 638 
F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980) (involving a challenge to the subpoena power of the National Institute of 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOH)); and Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981) (challenging 
the confidentiality of information obtained by subpoena under Florida State law, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
119.07(2)(C) & (I)).
422 Nat. Fed’n. of Fed. Employers v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (concerning three questions 
on a questionnaire, DD Form 398-2, that all federal employees with security clearances at or above the 
“secret” level were asked to answer); Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 955 (7th Cir. 2000) (concerning a 
mandatory financial disclosure form to be signed by employees of a government program that provided 
education for high school drop-outs).
423 Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (concerning sensitive commercial 
information surrendered by Mobil Oil Co. as part of the discovery process in a defamation suit).
424
 J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981); Cutshall v. Sundquist, 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999).
425 Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119, 1128 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Court’s decisions in Whalen and Nixon. The Supreme Court had recognized that a right to 
avoid the disclosure of personal information was rooted in the Constitution,426 but, as 
Judge Wilfred Feinberg of the Second Circuit lamented, the “nature and extent of the 
interest . . . and the appropriate standard of review for alleged infringements of that 
interest remain unclear.”427 Judge A. Raymond Randolf, writing for the D.C. circuit in 
National Federation of Federal Employers v. Greenberg,428 wrote, “When we return to 
Whalen and look behind the Supreme Court's general remark . . . we find ambiguity.”429
In completely rejecting the constitutional right to confidentiality, Sixth Circuit Judge 
Cornelia G. Kennedy asserted that there is yet no “clear indication from the Supreme 
Court” regarding the privacy interest in avoiding disclosure and that dicta in Whalen and 
Nixon were “isolated statements” from which she could not “recognize a general 
constitutional right to have disclosure of private information measured against the need 
for disclosure.”430
426 See Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at  577 (holding  that  “the privacy interest asserted in this case falls within 
the first category referred to in Whalen v. Roe, the right not to have an individual's private affairs made 
public by the government); Tavoulareas,  724 F.2d at 1019 (referring to Whalen in holding that “recent 
Supreme Court decisions indicate that a litigant's interest in avoiding public disclosure of private 
information is grounded in the Constitution itself, in addition to federal statutes and the common law); and
Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 955 (7th Cir. 2000) (referring to Whalen in recognizing that “the ‘concept 
of ordered liberty’ protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has been interpreted to 
include ‘the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters’”).
427
 Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d. 1554, 1559 (2nd Cir. 1983); see also Westinghouse, 638 F.2d at 
577 (criticizing the right to avoid disclosure, as recognized in Whalen and Nixon, because the “full measure 
of the constitutional protection of the right to privacy is unclear”).
428 983 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
429 Judge Randolf asked rhetorically; “What ‘individual interests’ receive protection from disclosure? 
Plaintiffs suggest the interest in avoiding humiliation or embarrassment entailed in the disclosure of 
personal information. What ‘personal information’ and disclosure to whom? To the government as 
employer or to the world? However one defines the scope of the protection, what are the provisions in the 
Constitution that are said to confer it?” Id. at 293. 
430
 J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1089 (6th Cir. 1981).
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The fact that Whalen apparently established a right but failed to indicate what 
information was protected, in what circumstances, and to what degree was not only a 
frustration to judges, but plaintiffs too seemed to struggle with their attempts to mount 
constitutional challenges based upon this right.  For instance, in the Ninth Circuit case of 
Russell v. Gregoire,431 Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain complained that the plaintiffs’
case relied solely upon an interpretation of Whalen and Nixon by which they hold that the 
“mere collection of private information may constitute a violation of a constitutional right 
to privacy.”432  He upheld the statute in question partly because the plaintiffs could not 
“pinpoint the source of the [privacy interest at stake] or identify its contours . . . and they 
fail to explain precisely how the Act violates it beyond collating and releasing 
information.”433 Judge Randolf lamented that the plaintiffs’ brief in Greenberg referred 
“to nothing more specific than ‘[t]he Constitution’ as the foundation for this 
constitutional right.”434
The circuit courts must not only identify the source and scope of the 
confidentiality branch of constitutional privacy protections, but they also must develop 
the appropriate form of substantive due process review for information privacy cases. For 
431 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).  This case was a challenge to the registration and disclosure provisions of 
the Washington State Community Protection Act , 1990 WASH. LAWS, ch. 3.§§ 401, 116 (1990), which 
applies only to those with sex offender status. 
432 124 F.3d. at 1093.
433 Id. Judge O’Scannlain asserted that they misinterpreted the Supreme Court because “neither [case] 
established a general constitutional right to privacy in information collected in a database.”
434
 Nat. Fed’n. of Fed. Employers v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Judge Randolf 
actually expressed gratitude that since the case involved a facial challenge, “[T]his case does not require 
any extended survey of this uncharted terrain.”  A facial challenge means that if any legitimate purpose for 
the statute can be identified, it will be allowed to stand.  No substantive review of information privacy law 
was required in the case.
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instance, in Plante v. Gonzales,435 a case cited often by the other circuits, Judge Wisdom 
saw the primary problem to be solved by the Fifth Circuit as “to determine the proper 
standard of review of their claims, then apply it.”436 He noted, “The Court has avoided 
proclaiming such a standard in the two cases raising the issue in which it issued opinions, 
Whalen v. Roe and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services”437 He decided that in the 
Fifth Circuit “the constitutionality of the [statute] will be determined by comparing the 
interests it serves with those it hinders.”438
In adopting this balancing standard as an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny, 
Judge Wisdom reasoned: 
[A] balancing standard seems appropriate. . . . [A]n application of 
strict scrutiny would draw into question many common forms of 
regulation, involving disclosure to the public and disclosure to government 
bodies. . . . [Yet], scrutiny is necessary. . . . Something more than mere 
rationality must be demonstrated. Otherwise, public disclosure 
requirements such as Florida's could be extended to anyone, in any 
situation.439
In Barry v. City of New York,440 Judge Wilfred Feinberg first noted, “Most courts 
considering the question appear to agree . . . that some form of intermediate scrutiny or 
435 575 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
436 Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978). Judge Wisdom first eliminated the senator’s 
privacy interest from the Whalen privacy interest in “independence in making certain kinds of decisions.” 
He noted: “Disclosure laws, unlike laws banning contraception, miscegenation, or abortion, do not remove 
any alternatives from the decision-making process.” He thus wrote “[F]inancial disclosure may . . .  have 
some influence on intimate decision-making, [but] we conclude that any influence does not rise to the level 
of a constitutional problem.” Id. at 1131.
437 Id. at 1134.
438 Id. 
439 Id. 
440
 712 F.2d. 1554 (2d Cir. 1983).
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balancing approach is appropriate as a standard of review.” He then decided the 
appropriate level of judicial review was intermediate scrutiny, a balancing test in which 
the government’s interest in collecting the financial information [from plaintiffs] is 
weighed against the individual privacy interest involved.441 In a later Fifth Circuit 
decision, Fadjo v. Coon,442 Judge Robert Smith Vance cited Judge Wisdom’s decision in 
Plante to firmly establish the use of a balancing test in the Fifth Circuit.  He wrote, “An 
intrusion into the interest in avoiding disclosure of personal information will . . . only be 
upheld when the government demonstrates a legitimate state interest which is found to 
outweigh the threat to the plaintiff's privacy interest.”443
Judge Edward A. Tamm wrote the D.C. Circuit opinion in Tavoulareas v. 
Washington Post.444 Unlike Judges Wisdom and Vance, he thought Nixon clearly 
established intermediate scrutiny as the appropriate level of review in information 
privacy cases. He noted that the opinion in Nixon was written by Justice Brennan who 
held “that the constitutional right to nondisclosure is rooted primarily in the fourth 
amendment.”445 Since Fourth Amendment adjudication typically involves a balancing of 
the state’s interests in infringing upon individual privacy (probable cause) against the 
441 Id. at 1559. 
442
 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981).
443 Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172, 1176 (5th Cir. 1981).
444 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
445 Id. at 1020; see also id. at 1019 (citing Whalen:  “Broad dissemination by state officials of such 
information . . . would clearly implicate constitutionally protected privacy rights, and would presumably be 
justified only by compelling state interests” which established that strict scrutiny might be applied in 
certain circumstances).
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value of that privacy right, he reasoned that this was the form of scrutiny the courts
should adopt for substantive due process privacy analysis. 
Thus, judicial review would require  the circuit courts, in information privacy 
cases, to first define both the individual privacy interest and the government interest in 
disclosure and then weigh them against one another.  In the cases that follow, an 
information privacy calculus begins to emerge.  Were it to be written as a two- step 
algebraic expression, it would appear like this:
(Type of Information + Plaintiff Category)  – Government Safeguards = Individual Privacy Interest
Individual Privacy Interest (>,<) Government Interest in Information = Decision
The Individual Privacy Interest
In applying this balancing test, the circuit courts must first establish the individual 
privacy interest that is at risk. A process for doing this is emerging from the various 
circuit court decisions.  First the court evaluates the type of information at risk and 
determines the level of constitutional protection to which such information is entitled. 
Next, the plaintiff category is evaluated.  The court determines whether circumstances
exist that limit the level of privacy protection to which a plaintiff is entitled, such as he or 
she being a candidate for office or convicted felon. Lastly, the court considers the extent 
to which information safeguards being used by the government lessen the risk to this 
privacy interest. This section will draw upon U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal cases to 
illustrate how these three elements have been combined to define individual privacy 
interests.
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Types of Information
Typically, the courts will first consider the type of information being disclosed. 
Based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Paul, lower courts have ruled that the more 
closely information relates to the fundamental interests traditionally protected by 
decisional privacy rights (marriage, procreation, intimate relationships, etc.), the more 
constitutional protection the information deserves. Among the circuit courts, the 
decisional privacy rights are referred to as the “autonomy” branch of privacy.
Among the statutory challenges discussed here, the court has weighed types of 
information including financial information, medical information, and sensitive 
commercial data. A ranked continuum of protected information is emerging from the 
circuit court cases. Medical information that is related to procreation, familial 
relationships, and sexual preference as well as commercial information that is vital to the 
continued existence of a corporation have been afforded the highest level of protection. 
More general medical information and financial information are entitled to a middle level 
of protection.  Lastly, information that is a matter of public record, such as one’s sex 
offender status, receives the least amount of protection. A few examples are discussed 
here.
In United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corporation,446 Circuit Judge Dolores 
Korman Sloviter upheld a subpoena for employee medical records that had been issued to 
Westinghouse by the National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH).
Westinghouse refused to surrender records for employees working in a particular section 
446 638 F.2d 570 (3rd Cir. 1980).
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of a Pennsylvania plant to NIOSH, so the institute issued the subpoena.447  In determining 
the appropriate level of protection for these records, the court considered a number of 
factors, including that individuals commonly share personal information with a wide 
variety of medical personnel (doctors, pharmacists, insurance companies, counselors, 
etc.), so, invoking the third-party doctrine, Judge Sloviter held that the information was
not entitled to as high a level of protection as is reserved for information that is kept 
secret and never shared. Nevertheless, she distinguished the information at issue in 
Westinghouse from that in Whalen. Judge Sloviter recognized that the medical 
information subpoenaed in Westinghouse was “more extensive than the mere fact of 
prescription drug usage by identified patients considered in [Whalen] and may be more 
revealing of intimate details. Therefore, we hold that it falls within one of the zones of 
privacy entitled to protection.”448
Because the information in Westinghouse was extensive and despite the third-
party doctrine, Judge Sloviter strongly suggested that NIOSH “give prior notice to the 
employees whose medical records it seeks to examine and to permit the employees to 
raise a personal claim of privacy, if they desire.” 449  Thus, though she had found the 
447 Id. at 572. NIOSH initiated the request following a request from the International Union of Electrical 
Workers, Local 601, which alleged that “workers were suffering allergic reactions as a result of exposure to 
methyl ethyl ketone. After repeated requests for medical records of both present and past employees who 
worked with the substance, NIOSH issued a subpoena duces tecum (a subpoena that requests the surrender 
of named documents).  Westinghouse first refused to honor the subpoena and then later offered conditional 
compliance.  It was this refusal to fully comply with the subpoena that led to this case.
448 Id. at 577. She wrote that “there can be no question that an employee's medical records, which may 
contain intimate facts of a personal nature, are well within the ambit of materials entitled to privacy 
protection.”
449 Id. at 581.The Third Circuit suggested that “[the notice] should contain information as to the fact and 
purpose of the investigation and the documents NIOSH seeks to examine, and should advise the employees 
that if they do not object in writing by a date certain, specifying the type of material they seek to protect, 
their consent to disclosure will be assumed.”
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subpoena constitutional, Judge Sloviter sought to reinforce the ability of employees to 
control access to their personal information by providing procedural protections to each 
employee who judges “the information so sensitive that it outweighs that employee's 
interest in assisting NIOSH in a health hazard investigation.”450
Judge Edward A. Tamm made a similar decision regarding sensitive commercial 
information in Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Company.451 The case dealt with an 
attempt by the Washington Post to unseal sensitive commercial documents and testimony 
that had been surrendered by Mobil Oil Company during the discovery phase of a 
defamation suit.452  Prior to the trial, Mobil was granted a protective order to secure the 
confidentiality of the commercial information sought by the Post. 
Mobil had argued that it needed to protect the materials “to avoid impairing the 
competitive position of Mobil, . . . to afford it reasonable protection against disclosure of 
proprietary and confidential business information [and] also to minimize the possibility 
of impairing Mobil's relationship with the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.”453  The court reasoned that if Mobil’s relationship with Saudi Arabia were 
damaged, the corporation’s ability to successfully compete in the marketplace would be 
compromised.  Consequently, after holding that a corporation had a constitutionally 
protected privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of sensitive commercial information, 
Judge Tamm wrote, “We have determined . . . that Mobil's justification . . . was sufficient 
450 Id. 
451 724 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
452 The president of Mobil Oil Company and his son filed a libel suit against the Washington Post for 
defamatory content in two articles that alleged that the younger Tavoulareas achieved his position and 
subsequent success through nepotism. 
453 Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1012.
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to show the disputed documents contained information of the kind deserving 
constitutional protection.”454
Whereas the commercial information in Tavoulareas was considered vital to the 
very existence of the corporation, the circuit courts have not assigned the same level of 
importance to individuals’ personal financial information.  In Plante, Judge John Minor 
Wisdom considered the plaintiffs’ privacy interest in their financial information to be 
“substantial” and acknowledged that “privacy of personal matters is an interest in and of 
itself, protected constitutionally.”455 Nevertheless, central to his holding was the notion 
that those interests protected under the autonomy branch of privacy were entitled to a 
higher level of constitutional protection than were interests under the “confidentiality”
branch of privacy, protections that allow individuals to avoid the disclosure of personal 
matters.
Judge Wisdom noted that the plaintiffs in Plante argued that financial information 
was tied to the fundamental familial interests the Supreme Court prioritize in Paul -- 
“matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child 
rearing and education.”456 Judge Wisdom opined, “The senators are well- advised to try to 
tie their charges to domestic matters.”457 However, he distinguished the Florida Sunshine 
454 Id. at 1025.
455 Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119, 1135 (5th Cir. 1978). 
 
456 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
457 Plante, 575 F.2d at 1128. Here Judge Wisdom is reviewing the plaintiff’s legal argument that the 
financial disclosure provisions are directly tied to the decisional/familial privacy interests protected under 
Paul. His summary of the plaintiffs’ position is thus: “The nature of financial investments, their wisdom, 
worth or desirability are matters decided by family councils for the family's benefit. Whether they should 
be exposed or protected from exposure is a matter of great family concern. Media publication of disclosed 
wealth can bring mischief, even kidnappers or other criminal attention to an office holder. Financial privacy 
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Amendments from those interests in traditional decisional privacy cases such as Roe v. 
Wade.  He reasoned: 
Disclosure laws, unlike laws banning contraception, 
miscegenation, or abortion, do not remove any alternatives from the 
decision-making process. Their effect on financial decisions is more 
indirect. They might deter some decisions. More basically, however, 
disclosure laws do not involve decisions as important as those in the 
earlier decided cases.458
Judge Wisdom also limited the scope of privacy protections for financial information by 
invoking the third-party doctrine, just as the Third Circuit did with medical information
in Westinghouse.  He wrote: “Our society has long regulated people's finances. 
Interference with business activity, through licensing, taxing, and direct regulation, is 
common. All these governmental actions impinge on the ability of the individual to order 
his financial affairs. They do so directly. The indirect effects caused by financial 
disclosure pale by comparison.”459
Moreover, in 1983 the Second Circuit used similar reasoning. In Barry v. City of 
New York,460 a group composed of New York City firefighters and police officers 
claimed that a local ordinance that required city employees to submit annual financial 
reports to the City Clerk’s office, which then made the submitted reports available to the 
is and ought to be protected from governmental intrusion . . . in the manner that marital and family privacy 
is protected.”
458 Id. at 1130-31.  Judge Wisdom said: “Nor can [disclosure laws] be protected as incident to protection of 
the family. The appropriate question is: What impact will financial disclosure have upon the way intimate 
family and personal decisions are made? Will it affect the decision whether to marry? Will it determine 
when or if children are born? There is no doubt that financial disclosure may affect a family, but the same 
can be said of any government action. While disclosure may have some influence on intimate decision-
making, we conclude that any influence does not rise to the level of a constitutional problem.”
459 Id. 
460
 712 F.2d. 1554 (2d Cir. 1983).
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public, violated their right to keep their financial records confidential. Judge Fienberg 
held that the financial disclosures, though they might force one spouse to reveal private 
financial habits to the other, did not implicate the protections of the “autonomy” branch 
of the constitutional privacy interests. Judge Feinberg cited Plante and held: “It is unclear 
whether financial disclosure laws significantly implicate any interests protected by the 
autonomy strand of the right to privacy. The Fifth Circuit has concluded that the 
autonomy interest does not cover ‘financial privacy.’”461 Plante and Barry thus held that 
financial information was not entitled to the highest levels of constitutional protection 
because it is not related closely enough to fundamental familial interests.
The individual privacy interest in information already in the public record, such as 
arrest records, is the weakest.  In 1997, the Ninth Circuit reviewed a challenge to a 
Washington State law that required sex offenders to register personal information and 
allowed the state to disclose that information to the public. Judge Diarmuid O’Scannlain 
held that the type of information collected and revealed under the Act could not be 
protected. He wrote, “The information collected and disseminated by the Washington 
statute is already fully available to the public and is not constitutionally protected.”462
Conversely, in Tavoulareas, Judge Tamm noted that in the discovery process, 
individuals are forced by the court to disclose the kind of personal information deserving 
privacy protection under these decisions. Thus, he reasoned that an individual's 
constitutional privacy interest can be implicated by the discovery process to the same 
extent it is implicated by disclosure requirements of statutes. In both instances, the 
461 Id. at 1559.
462 Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997).
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government is forcing disclosure of personal information.463 In Tavoulareas, sensitive 
commercial information compelled during discovery and not used in trial was allowed to 
remain confidential under a protective order.
Plaintiff Categories
Once the type of information at issue has been categorized, the courts’ analyses 
typically move to the second factor, the plaintiff category. The emerging plaintiff 
categories somewhat mirror plaintiff categories from other legal areas, such as 
defamation law.  By default, private persons seem to be entitled the highest level of 
constitutional protection, government employees to a moderate level, elected public 
officials to little protection, and criminals to the least amount. 
In Plante, Judge Wisdom noted that the Sunshine Amendments under review 
applied specifically to public officials who had voluntarily placed themselves in the 
public eye. He recognized a distinct plaintiff category in information privacy law when 
he wrote: “Plaintiffs in this case are not ordinary citizens, but state senators, people who 
have chosen to run for office. . . . It does put some limits on the privacy they may 
reasonably expect.”464 He summarized his overall evaluation of the privacy interest being 
weighed when he wrote: “Financial privacy is a matter of serious concern, deserving 
strong protection. . . . [P]ublic interests supporting public disclosure for these elected 
463 Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1020-21 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
464 Plante, 575 F.2d at 1135.
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officials are even stronger. . . . [M]andatory financial disclosure for elected officials is 
constitutional.”465
In Tavoulareas, Judge Tamm also broke new ground regarding information 
privacy plaintiff categories when he held that a corporation could claim a constitutional 
right to avoid the disclosure of sensitive commercial information. Following a review of 
relevant case law he concluded, “[W]hile corporations do enjoy privacy protection under 
the fourth amendment that protection is qualified to allow adequate policing of corporate 
conduct.”466 Therefore, when a corporation is compelled to surrender sensitive 
information to the government for reasons other than policing corporate conduct, it has a 
constitutional right to confidentiality in that information.
In the other cases, the formation of plaintiff categories was very closely tied to the 
government’s stated interest in collecting information.  For instance, in Barry, the Second 
Circuit evaluated the constitutionality of a local ordinance467 enacted by the New York 
City Council that required city employees making over $30,000 annually to submit 
annual financial reports to the City Clerk’s office. The reports were to be made available 
for public inspection.  The financial reporting requirements were upheld because these 
465 Id. at 1136.
466 Tavoulareas, 724 F.2d at 1022 (citing United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950) as 
holding that “the government must be free to ensure that corporate behavior is consistent with the law and 
the public interest” and “corporations must disclose information to regulatory agencies so long as the 
demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant”). Discovery, however, is 
not conducted to police or regulate litigants, but to prepare for the trial of a dispute. The purpose of 
discovery is not affected by the fact that a party to the suit is a corporation. Therefore, in the context of 
confidential discovery materials not used at trial, a corporation's privacy interest in nondisclosure is 
essentially identical to that of an individual. id.
467 LOCAL LAW 48, NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. CODE AMENDING LOCAL LAW 1, NEW YORK CITY ADMIN. 
CODE § 1106-5.0.
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individuals were paid with tax dollars and citizens had an interest in knowing how there 
tax dollars were allocated and in eliminating any corruption that the disclosure revealed.
Similarly, Greenberg468 involved a facial challenge to three questions on the 
“National Agency Questionnaire,”469 which all federal employees holding security 
clearances at or above the “secret” level were asked to answer.470 Because these 
individuals were entrusted with national secrets and many had a direct role in national 
security, the court reasoned that the public had a valid interest in learning about their 
financial, medical, psychological, and criminal backgrounds.  
Though these plaintiff categories are taking shape in the wide variety of circuit 
court information privacy decisions, they are not stand-alone classifications.  They are 
necessarily defined by context.  For instance, the federal employees in Greenberg had 
security clearances unlike the federal employee in Denius v. Dunlap.471 Denius involved 
a constitutional challenge to a disclosure agreement that teachers in a government-run 
program for high school dropouts were asked to sign as a condition of continued 
employment.  Judge Joel Martin Flaum held that the plaintiff was exempt from disclosing 
financial and medical information because the government had not advanced a legitimate 
purpose for requiring the disclosure.  
468 983 F.2d 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
469
 DD Form 398-2. The questionnaire seeks the information from each individual’s entire life and requests 
that one sign a release for the government to do a complete background check on any of the items on the 
form. The challenged questions were numbers 18 (criminal arrest history), 19 (credit history), and 20 
(mental health and drug and alcohol use history). The questionnaire resulted from a string of highly 
publicized spying incidents.
470 Greenberg, 983 F.2d at 287. Employees were informed that “failure to furnish the requested information 
. . . could result in your not being considered for clearance, access, entry into a uniformed service, or 
assignment to sensitive duties.”
471 209 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2000).
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Another example where context shaped the court’s consideration of a plaintiff 
category is the Ninth Circuit decision in  Russell v. Gregoire472 in which the court heard 
an appeal from two convicted sex offenders who had challenged Washington State’s 
Community Protection Act,473 which had both  registration474 and disclosure475
provisions.  Not all ex-convicts need to register and disclose personal information, but 
legislators have determined that this category of offenders is a particularly dangerous 
threat to citizens, and the courts have thus held that sex offenders are entitled to fewer 
privacy protections.
The Government’s Duty
The last component of the individual privacy interest side of the information 
substantive due process equation is whether and how the government is fulfilling its duty 
to safeguard the information it has ordered disclosed. Courts consider any statutory or 
procedural information safeguards when they evaluate the potential risk to an individual’s 
privacy interest.  The better the safeguards, the lower the perceived risk. A statute that 
contains specific guidelines regarding how the government will protect the personal 
information is much more likely to be found constitutional. This is why, in the equation 
above, information safeguards are “subtracted” from the plaintiff’s side of the equation. 
A number of constitutional challenges in the circuit courts have failed because of strong 
472 124 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 1997).
473
 1990 WASH. LAWS, ch. 3.
474
 1990 WASH. LAWS, ch.3, § 401.
475
 1990 WASH. LAWS, ch.3, § 116.
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measures the government had in place to honor its duty to prevent unwarranted disclosure 
under Whalen.
For instance, in Barry, after reviewing the statutory procedure through which 
employees could file privacy claims, Judge Feinberg concluded, “[W]e think the statute, 
as strengthened by the privacy claim procedures, 476 withstands constitutional scrutiny 
even with respect to the broad public inspection requirement.”477  Similarly, in 
Schacter,478 the Second Circuit justified the constitutionality of a subpoena for patient 
records largely on the merits of a “coding process” designed to protect patient 
information.479 The Second Circuit accepted the coding system as sufficient to satisfy the 
state’s duty under Whalen and held that “the provisions under attack do not violate the 
patients' constitutional rights.”480
476 Id. at 1561-62. Judge Fienberg summarized the privacy claim procedure outlined in the local law.  It 
generally allows individuals the opportunity to challenge the release of specific bits of information when a 
member of the public requests to access their file.  He noted: “An employee filing a financial report may 
make a claim of privacy with respect to any item of information sought by the City by explaining in writing 
the reasons for the request . . . .  If a privacy claim has been made and someone requests access to the 
claimant's report, the matter is referred to the Board of Ethics for evaluation . . . . [T]he Board must 
consider three factors in evaluating a privacy claim: whether the item is highly personal; whether it relates 
to the claimant's duties; and whether the item involves a possible conflict of interest . . . . We do not think 
that the right to privacy protects public employees from the release of financial information that is related 
to their employment or indicative of a possible conflict of interest. Nor do we think the release of 
information that is not ‘highly personal’, rises to the level of a constitutional violation.”
477 Id. at 1561. See also id. at 1562 (explaining that Judge Feinberg evaluated the effectiveness of the 
privacy claim procedure and noting, “Only three privacy claims [of twenty-six] were denied, apparently 
because insufficient information was provided in support of the claims,” which he accepted as evidence 
that the privacy procedure was working in the majority of cases).
478
 Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978).
479 Id. 
480 Id.  As far as the doctor’s claims, the Second Circuit held that his constitutional right to privacy was also 
not abridged and further noted that Dr. Schacter had less standing to complain than did the patients in 
Whalen because he himself was the subject of an investigation.
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In some cases the court engaged in an accounting of precisely how the 
government would protect the information at issue.  For example, in Westinghouse the 
court reviewed specific safeguards:
Only aggregate data is included in the forms of the study 
distributed to employees and others. The excerpted data which is retained 
by NIOSH is maintained in locked cabinets, inside the Medical Section of 
the agency, in rooms locked during non-office hours. Material from small 
studies is not placed on computers; data from large studies is removed 
from the computer after six months. NIOSH has represented that no 
outside contractors are used for small studies, such as the one in issue 
here, and that when such contractors are used, they are bound to 
nondisclosure by their contract with NIOSH.481
Conversely, in some circuits, review of statutory safeguards is more of a rubber-stamp; 
the presence of safeguard provisions is more important than their substance.  For 
example, in Russell, Judge O’Scannlain concluded that Washington’s law contained 
“adequate mechanisms” to limit unnecessary disclosures, but only generally noted that 
“the collection and dissemination of information is carefully designed and narrowly 
limited.”482
Thus, the individual privacy interest side of the balancing equation comprises
three parts: the type of information being collected, the type of plaintiff filing a claim, 
and the safeguards the government has in place to protect the information it has collected.  
Once the court has established that a constitutionally protected privacy interest in 
avoiding the disclosure of personal matters exists, it must then determine the value of the 
other side of the equation, the government’s interest in collecting the information.
481 638 F.2d at 580. The statutory source for NIOSH’s information handling provisions is 5 U.S.C. §
552a(m).
482
 Russell v. Gregoire, 124 F.3d 1079, 1094 (9th Cir. 1997).
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The Government’s Interest
In defending a statute, order, or subpoena, the government must claim at least a 
legitimate (and in some cases substantial or compelling) state interest in compelling 
individuals to surrender personal information.483 The circuit courts have held that 
improving the electoral process; informing citizens to enable self-government; promoting 
the public’s general health, safety, and welfare; and national security to be substantial and 
sometimes compelling government interests. For instance, in Plante, Judge Wisdom
concluded that Florida had a substantial interest in improving the electoral process by 
instilling confidence in the minds of voters through transparency.  Florida’s Sunshine 
Amendments provided voters with more information about candidates and implemented
reporting procedures intended to lessen the likelihood of corruption or conflicts of 
interest.484 Similarly, in Barry, Judge Feinberg found that the statute had a “substantial, 
483
 Generally, in constitutional law, government interests are considered legitimate, substantial, or 
compelling. If the court is applying rational basis review, a merely legitimate interest is sufficient to 
withstand scrutiny (for instance reducing noise pollution).  Under intermediate scrutiny, a substantial 
interest is warranted (for instance protecting public safety). A compelling interest must be demonstrated 
under strict judicial scrutiny (for instance national security).  Though the information privacy doctrine is 
new, a general tendency is emerging that the more closely related to fundamental values certain 
information is, the more compelling the state interest must be in order to justify infringing upon 
information privacy rights.
484 Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d 1119, 1134-35 (5th Cir. 1978). He summarized the four primary 
justifications for the Sunshine Amendments: [1] the public's “right to know” an official's interests, [2] 
deterrence of corruption and conflicting interests, [3] creation of public confidence in Florida's officials, 
and [4] assistance in detecting and prosecuting officials who have violated the law.”484 (numerals added)  In 
concluding that there was a substantial government interest, Judge Wisdom noted, “Disclosure . . . makes 
voters better able to judge their elected officials and candidates for those positions . . . . [T]he reporting 
requirement will discourage corruption [since] sunshine will make detection more likely, [and] the interest 
in an honest administration is so strong that even small advances are important . . . .  Disclosure may not 
completely remove this doubt. It should help, however. And more effective methods are not obvious.”  The 
only justification about which Judge Wisdom expressed some doubt was the amendments’ effectiveness in 
deterring corruption.  He wrote, “While misdeeds may be deterred by the need to file either honest or 
perjurious financial statements, once they have been committed, the statements may well be useless.” 
Nevertheless, he acknowledged the potential effectiveness of three of the four provisions and concluded 
that the government’s interest was legitimate.
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possibly even a compelling, state interest . . . . to deter corruption and conflicts of interest 
among City officers and employees and to enhance public confidence in the integrity of 
its government.”485 Judge Feinberg held, “Given the magnitude of the City's interests, we 
think the constitutional balance . . . tips in favor of permitting public disclosure.”486
Promoting public safety and welfare has also been upheld as a substantial 
government interest. The Schacter court held that the government interest in obtaining 
patient records as evidence was a necessary component of a “sound state policy . . . 
investigation of licensed physicians for medical misconduct” and had “as much rational 
basis and underlying public-interest justification as the statute identifying patients 
obtaining certain drugs by prescription in Whalen.”487  Protecting the health and safety of 
workers was considered a substantial government interest in Westinghouse. Judge 
Sloviter concluded that NIOSH’s interests were sufficiently substantial when measured 
against the justifications proffered for the statute reviewed in Whalen. She wrote: “[T]he 
interest in occupational safety and health to the employees . . . future employees and the 
public at large is substantial. It ranks with other public interests which have been found to 
justify intrusion into records and information normally considered private.”488  National 
485
 Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d. 1554, 1560  (2d Cir. 1983). See also id. at 1563 (describing the 
legislative intent of financial disclosure as function thusly: “public disclosure of financial reports will spur 
City agencies and officials to be aggressive in their efforts to police corruption, if only for fear that 
evidence of misconduct might be found in a financial report and publicized by the press, a public interest 
group, or a vigilant citizen . . . . [and] public disclosure will enhance public confidence in the integrity of 
City government if only because the reports will demonstrate that most City officials and employees are 
honest and not subject to conflicts of interest in the performance of their duties”).
486 Id. at 1563.
487
 Schacter v. Whalen, 581 F.2d 35, 37 (2d Cir. 1978).
488 United States v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 579 (3rd Cir. 1980).
169
security was the interest put forth in Greenberg.489 Judge Randolph reasoned, 
“Substantial debts, with the attendant financial pressure exerted on employees holding 
security clearances, or on-going mental health problems are, by anyone's light, important 
elements of the [judgment] in determining whether a person can be trusted to maintain 
the nation's secrets.”490
Conversely, in a number of cases, no government interest was put forth.  In 1981, 
Judge Vance wrote the Fifth Circuit opinion in Fadjo v. Coon.491 The court held that, 
absent a substantial government interest, individuals have a privacy interest in 
information compelled by subpoena under Florida law and even to a greater degree if 
they have been promised confidentiality.  Fadjo had been subpoenaed to provide 
information regarding a man’s disappearance at sea.492   He claimed that the information 
sought by investigators, under the Florida’s subpoena power, had involved the most 
private aspects of his life.493  Moreover, prior to testifying, he was assured by 
investigators that “his testimony was absolutely privileged under Florida law494 and that 
489
 The questionnaires were the result of recent spying scandals that compromised national security secrets.
490
 Nat. Fed’n. of Fed. Employers v. Greenberg, 983 F.2d 286, 294 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
491 Fadjo v. Coon, 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981).
492
 Fadjo had been named the beneficiary of six life insurance policies taken out on Kenneth S. Rawdin, the 
man whose disappearance was being investigated.
493 Fadjo, 633 F.2d at 1176. Judge Vance distinguished Fadjo from the Supreme Court’s decision in Paul v. 
Davis because it involves the revelation of intimate information obtained under a pledge of confidentiality 
rather than the dissemination of official information. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976) 
(explaining that the Court has considered fundamental rights to be “matters relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education” and noting that “in these 
areas it has been held that there are limitations on the States' power to substantively regulate conduct”).
494 FLA.STAT.ANN. § 119.07(2)(C) & (I). The Florida legislature amended the Public Records Act to exempt 
from public disclosure “active criminal investigative information” and “criminal investigative information 
received by a criminal justice agency prior to January 25, 1979.” It is clear that the legislature cannot 
authorize by statute an unconstitutional invasion of privacy.
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the contents of his testimony would be revealed to no one.”495 Investigators then revealed 
information from Fadjo’s testimony to a number of private insurance companies 
investigating the disappearance, and Judge Vance held that no legitimate state purpose 
existed sufficient to outweigh the invasion into Fadjo's privacy.”496
In Tavoulareas, Judge Tamm’s final holding regarding the sensitive commercial 
information surrendered during discovery but not used at trial was made because of “the 
absence of a compelling interest supporting disclosure.”497 Likewise, in Denius, Judge
Flaum never needed to define the scope or contours of Denius’ privacy interest because 
Dunlop, the director of the government program, never offered any justification for the 
disclosure agreement. Judge Flaum held: “We conclude that this sweeping disclosure 
requirement, lacking any safeguards against misuse or further disclosure, and supported 
by no justification, infringes Denius's right of privacy in confidential information.”498
Once the level of government interest has been established as legitimate, 
substantial, or compelling, the court will balance it against the individual privacy interest 
at risk in the case.  The court will determine if the government interest is greater than or 
less than the individual privacy interest at stake.  If the government’s interest is greater, 
the legislation, subpoena, or policy in question will likely be ruled constitutional.  If the 
individual privacy interest is found to be more substantial, the legislation, subpoena, or 
policy will likely be struck down.  The information privacy equation for review of 
statutory challenges is not being uniformly applied by circuit courts.  It is offered here as 
495 Fadjo, 633 F.2d at 1174, n.3.
496 Id. at 1175.
497 Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
498 Denius v. Dunlap, 209 F.3d 944, 958 (7th Cir. 2000).
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a construct to represent how the various elements of judicial review in information 
privacy law are emerging form the circuit courts and congealing into a new privacy 
doctrine. 
The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit is the only circuit to have rejected the use of a balancing test in 
its information privacy cases. In the 1981 case of J.P. v. DeSanti,499 Judge Cornelia G. 
Kennedy granted review of whether the post-adjudication uses of the juvenile social 
histories500 violated a constitutional right to privacy. She relied primarily on Paul v. 
Davis,501 which established that information entitled to constitutional protection from 
disclosure typically relates to marriage, procreation, etc.  She concluded that the 
information in the social histories was not intimate enough to reach that level.  She 
further commented that the otherwise “dispositive affect” of Paul was “somewhat 
clouded” by the subsequent decisions in Whalen and Nixon, which resulted in additional 
confusion in “their construction by the courts of appeal.”502
Judge Kennedy criticized the rapid embrace by the other circuit courts of a 
balancing test as the appropriate method of review for constitutional privacy suits.  She 
499 653 F.2d 1080 (6th Cir. 1981).
500 Id. at 1082. A social history contains “information from a number of sources, including the complaining 
parties, the juveniles themselves, their parents, school records, and their past records in the juvenile court. 
They also include any information on record pertaining to other members of the family and any other 
information that the probation officer thinks is relevant to the disposition of a case before the juvenile 
court.” Following the adjudication of a particular case, the social histories are “kept on file at the juvenile 
court, where, upon request, [they are] available to 55 different government, social and religious agencies 
that belong to a ‘social services clearinghouse.’” Id. See also OHIO R. JUV. P. 32, the Ohio rule of civil 
procedure that established the use of the social histories.
501
 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
502 J.P, 653 F.2d at 1088.
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wrote, “Some courts have uncritically picked up that part of Whalen pertaining to 
nondisclosure and have created a rule that the courts must balance a governmental 
intrusion on this ‘right’ of privacy against the government's interest in the intrusion.”503
Judge Kennedy asserted that there is no indication in the Supreme Court case law that 
indicates that a balancing test is the appropriate level of review.
Establishing the method of review for the Sixth Circuit, Judge Kennedy wrote,
“We do not view the discussion of confidentiality in Whalen v. Roe as overruling Paul v. 
Davis and creating a constitutional right to have all government action weighed against 
the resulting breach of confidentiality.”504  She then stressed that the Whalen Court 
“explicitly refused to address the existence of such a right.”505 Judge Kennedy concluded, 
“Absent a clear indication from the Supreme Court we will not construe isolated 
statements in Whalen and Nixon more broadly than their context allows [in order] to 
recognize a general constitutional right to have disclosure of private information 
measured against the need for disclosure.”506
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning seems to have been based upon the fact that the right 
of information privacy is too general to be practical. She reasoned,“[The Framers] cannot 
have intended that the federal courts become involved in an inquiry nearly as broad,
503 Id. She noted in particular Plante, Westinghouse, and Fadjo.
504 Id. at 1088-89.
505 Id.  (citing language from Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977), which stated, “We ... need not, 
and do not, decide any question which might be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated 
private data whether intentional or unintentional” and from Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1977) (J. 
Stewart, concurring), which stated, “[T]he Court's opinion did not support the proposition that broad 
dissemination of the information collected by New York would violate the Constitution.” She also 
reviewed Nixon and concluded, “Nixon does not overrule Paul v. Davis and create a general constitutional 
right of nondisclosure against which government action must be weighed.”
506 J.P., 653 F.2d at 1089.
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balancing almost every act of government, both state and federal, against its intrusion on 
a concept so vague, undefinable, and all-encompassing as individual privacy.”507 Thus, 
she limited privacy protections for personal information surrendered to government to 
those personal rights that can be deemed “fundamental” or “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty” as was established in Paul v. Davis and Roe v. Wade.508 In J.P., she held, 
“The interest asserted by appellant class in nondisclosure of juvenile court records . . . [is] 
‘far afield’ from those privacy rights.”509
In 1999, Sixth Circuit Judge James Leo Ryan wrote the opinion in Cutshall v. 
Sundquist,510 and he followed Judge Kennedy’s reasoning from J.P.. The case involved a 
challenge to the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act511 by Arthur 
Cutshall, who was convicted for aggravated sexual battery in 1990.  The Act contained a 
registry provision that allowed a local law enforcement agency to “release relevant 
information deemed necessary to protect the public concerning a specific [registered] 
sexual offender.”512 The challenge was made on a number of grounds including that the 
Act violated Cutshall’s constitutional right to privacy.513
507 Id. at 1090.
508 Id. 
509 Id. 
510 193 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 1999).
511 TENN. CODE §§c49-39-101 to 108 (1994).
512 TENN. CODE. § 40-39-106(c).
513 Cutshall, 193 F.3d at 470. Cutshall claimed the Act also violated his right to privacy under the 
Tennessee State Constitution, violated the double jeopardy clause, was an ex post facto law, violated the 
Eighth Amendment as a form of cruel or unusual punishment, and violated the due process and equal 
protection clauses as well as violated his right to travel interstate. The Sixth Circuit held that since the 
purpose of the Act was regulatory and not punitive, it did not violate protections against double jeopardy, 
ex post facto laws, and was not an unconstitutional bill of attainder.
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Judge Ryan relied upon J.P., and limited his privacy analysis to two 
considerations: whether Cutshall was entitled to the privacy interest he was attempting to 
assert and, if his right did exist, whether it would encompass information regarding his 
sex offender status. Judge Ryan first reasserted that Whalen did not establish a 
constitutional protection against disclosure.  He wrote: 
[T]o support the existence of a privacy interest in avoiding publication of 
personal matters, the [Whalen] Court cited only concurring and dissenting 
opinions. We find no authority in that case for the proposition that such an 
interest exists. At any rate, the Whalen Court concluded that the law at 
issue, which compiled data on patient prescriptions, did not implicate the 
alleged privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of private matters. In the 
same vein, we are not persuaded that the Act infringes on any 
constitutionally protected privacy interest.514
Once he established that the Sixth Circuit would not recognize Cutshall’s privacy 
right in nondisclosure, Judge Ryan then considered whether Cutshall’s sex offender status 
was sufficient to trigger due process protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as a 
protected liberty. Cutshall argued that the stigma attached to his status would harm his 
ability to find employment and unconstitutionally invade his right to be let alone.  Judge 
Ryan acknowledged that Cutshall’s reputation would suffer significant harm, but he 
relied on Paul v. Davis and held, “Cutshall's claim that the Act violates his Fourteenth 
Amendment rights because it imposes a stigma and deprives him of employment and 
privacy is likewise without merit.”515 He concluded that “reputation alone is not a 
constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.”516
514 Id. at 480.
515 Id. at 479.
516 Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976)).
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§ 1983 and Qualified Immunity Cases
The second broad category of information privacy cases involves claims filed
under §1983 of the Civil Rights Act,517 which “provides a cause of action against ‘any 
person’ who, while acting ‘under color of’ state law, subjects or causes the plaintiff to be 
subjected to a violation of federal constitutional or statutory rights.”518  Often, the 
defendant in a §1983 case will move for summary judgment on one of two grounds: he or 
she is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for the infringement or the plaintiff 
doesn’t have cause to file suit because the privacy right he or she claimed doesn’t exist.519
If qualified immunity is not granted to the defendant, the suit proceeds to trial as a civil 
action.  The constitutional issues are typically addressed  only after the court rules on 
qualified immunity.
Qualified immunity analysis has two steps. First, a court will establish whether 
the plaintiff has a privacy interest in the information at issue. Second, it will determine if 
the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged infringement to such an extent 
517
 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.  With its roots in the Civil Rights Act of 1871,  § 1983 holds that “every person 
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the 
District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the 
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission 
taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree 
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress 
applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of 
Columbia.”  
518
 Jack M. Beermann, Symposium: Association of American Law Schools: Private Parties as Defendants in 
Civil Rights Litigation: Why do Plaintiffs Sue Private Parties Under Section 1983?, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 9 
(2004).
519 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 766 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “qualified immunity” as “immunity from civil 
liability for a public official who is performing a discretionary function, as long as the conduct does not 
violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights”); id. at 499 (defining a “discretionary action” 
as one “involving an exercise of personal judgment or conscience”).
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that a public official, acting in an objectively reasonable manner, would have known that 
his or her action(s) would infringe upon the plaintiff’s right.520
These are not coequal stages. Resolution of these cases often depends solely upon 
the type of information allegedly disclosed.  Courts generally review case law in order to 
determine whether the type of information disclosed (financial, medical, criminal, etc.) 
has been considered constitutionally protected in previous information privacy cases. As 
was the case in the statutory challenges above, the Supreme Court’s holding in Paul v. 
Davis is cited frequently. Generally, the more closely related the information at issue is to 
the personal privacy interests traditionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the more likely a court will expand privacy protections to cover that particular type of 
information.
Once a court has extended constitutional protection to a type of information, it 
must make a determination as to how well established that protection has become within 
the information privacy doctrine. Generally, the more frequently the courts have 
recognized a constitutionally protected privacy interest in a particular type of 
information, the more likely it is that the court will find the right “clearly established,” 
and the less likely a defendant will be granted qualified immunity. 
520 See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (explaining the test for qualified immunity as   
“government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil 
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 
which a reasonable person would have known.”). See also Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639-40 
(1987) (clarifying the Harlow standard by providing a two-part analysis: First, “whether an official 
protected by qualified immunity may be held personally liable for an allegedly unlawful official action 
generally turns on the ‘objective legal reasonableness’ of the action” [as] assessed in light of the legal rules 
that were “clearly established” at the time it was taken (footnotes omitted), and second,  “the right the 
official is alleged to have violated must have been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence 
more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that right”).
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The privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization of privacy is recognized by the 
courts when the government’s duty to safeguard the personal information it collects is 
discussed. In the substantive due process cases discussed above, the courts would review 
a statute, subpoena, or government-mandated information collection process to make sure 
it included statutory or procedural safeguards to protect personal information.  However, 
in the following qualified immunity cases there is no explicit discussion of the 
government’s duty to safeguard information. 
In these cases, the privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization is manifested in
the denial of qualified immunity.  When a court denies an individual acting under the 
color of law qualified immunity, it is in effect penalizing government for failing to honor 
its “concomitant duty” to protect personal information under Whalen.  When a privacy 
right is considered clearly established, state actors have a duty to understand how their
discretionary actions might infringe upon that right. Thus, in qualified immunity cases, 
the privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization manifests itself as professional conduct
rather than as statutory provisions. Rather than considering whether statutory provisions 
are adequate to protect personal information, the court here determines whether a public 
official or other state actor had a “duty” to understand that his or her action violated a 
clearly established privacy right.  
The following discussion draws upon nine U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal cases.  
The first section reviews the extent to which these courts have expanded the scope of 
information privacy protections.  Generally, privacy protections were expanded to 
include disclosures involving information about whether someone was pregnant, sexual 
escapades caught on video, sexual orientation, general medical information, HIV status, 
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and prescription drug use.  Protections were not stretched to include court-ordered 
psychiatric reports, expunged plea agreements, and general financial information. The 
second section discusses the analytical process used by the courts to determine whether a 
particular privacy protection can be considered a clearly established right to privacy. 
The Scope of Protected Information
The Third Circuit held that pregnancy status is constitutionally protected personal 
information that cannot be disclosed by a state actor absent a compelling interest. In 
Gruenkw v. Seip521 the court recognized a privacy interest in this information because 
other courts have protected similar information.  Gruenke involved a claim of qualified 
immunity by a swim coach at a public school who allegedly disclosed the pregnancy 
status of one of his swimmers, Leah Gruenke. Greunke claimed he infringed upon her 
right to avoid the disclosure of personal matters as framed in Whalen.522
Though Greunke’s pregnancy status was a subject closely related to the 
fundamental interests described in Paul, Judge Jane Richard Roth instead considered it a 
form of sensitive medical information. Citing the Third Circuit’s decision in 
Westinghouse, she wrote, “Gruenke’s claim not only falls squarely within the contours of 
the recognized right of one to be free from disclosure of personal matters, but also 
521
 225 F.3d 290 (3rd Cir. 2000). Seip, a high school swimming coach, was not entitled to qualified 
immunity for allegedly infringing upon the privacy rights of a 17-year-old high school swimmer, Leah 
Gruenke.  Suspecting Gruenke was pregnant, the coach pressured her to take a pregnancy test, conveyed his 
suspicions to other parents (not Gruenke’s) as well as other students, and used Gruenke’s fellow swimmers 
to pressure her to take a pregnancy test.  
522 Id. at 297.  The Gruekes’ claims included the following: “[T]he required pregnancy test (1) constituted 
an illegal search in violation of Leah's Fourth Amendment rights, (2) violated Joan and Leah's right to 
familial privacy, (3) violated Leah's right to privacy regarding personal matters, (4) violated Leah's right to 
free speech and association protected by the First Amendment, and (5) violated Joan and Leah's rights 
under state tort law.” For purposes of this analysis, only claim #3 will be discussed as it is the only claim 
that implicated Whalen.
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concerns medical information, which [the Third Circuit] previously held is entitled to this 
very protection.”523 Though the Westinghouse court never distinguished between specific 
types of medical information, its decision recommended that employees should have a 
limited right to determine which medical information is too sensitive to surrender without 
a compelling government interest.  Judge Roth used Westinghouse to justify Greunke’s 
assertion that she had a right to confidentiality in her pregnancy status.  Since her coach 
offered no purpose for disclosure, he was denied qualified immunity.
Similarly, in 2005 the Tenth Circuit extended privacy protection to cover an 
individual’s prescription drug usage. Judge Carlos F. Lucero wrote the opinion in
Douglas v. Dobbs.524 Chez Douglas was under investigation for prescription drug fraud
and claimed that an assistant district attorney (Dobbs) approved a warrantless search of 
her prescription records by filing a motion with a magistrate that would grant access to 
the records without providing “sufficient indicia of probable cause.”525
Judge Lucero cited Whalen and said, “[W]e are primarily concerned . . . with the 
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”526 but he held that no such privacy 
right had been clearly defined.  He instead relied upon an earlier Tenth Circuit decision in 
Herring v. Keenan,527 which held, “Because privacy regarding matters of health is closely 
523 Id. at 302.
524 419 F.3d 1097, 1100 (10th Cir. 2005). In the course of investigating Chez Douglas on suspicion of 
illegally obtaining prescription medication, Assistant District Attorney Pamela Dobbs allegedly “violated 
[Douglas’] privacy and Fourth Amendment rights by authorizing [a police officer’s] submission of the 
Motion and proposed Order to the magistrate judge for approval to search her prescription records.”
525 Id. at 1102-03. Douglas was accused of using aliases to fill multiple prescriptions.  Dobbs needed to 
access and examine her prescription drug records but at the time it was not settled law that a warrant was 
required.
526 Id. at 1101.
527 218 F.3d 1171, 1173 (10th Cir. 2000).
180
intertwined with the activities [procreation, marriage, contraception, etc.] afforded 
protection by the Supreme Court. . . . ‘there is a constitutional right to privacy that 
protects an individual from the disclosure of information concerning a person's 
health.’”528 Thus, in Douglas, Judge Lucero held: 
Although we have not [yet] extended the “zone of privacy” to 
include a person's prescription records, we have no difficulty concluding 
that protection of a right to privacy in a person's prescription drug records, 
which contain intimate facts of a personal nature, is sufficiently similar to 
other areas already protected within the ambit of privacy.529
The Eleventh Circuit related the facts in its 1991 case James v. City of Douglas530
to those in the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Fadjo v. Coon.531 The Eleventh Circuit denied 
qualified immunity to two police officers accused of invading a former informant’s 
privacy when they viewed and showed to others a video tape of her having a sexual 
encounter with an arson suspect.532 James was promised that the tape would be kept 
confidential if she would assist the police in a criminal investigation. Though the courts
have often relied on Paul v. Davis to justify constitutional protection for intimate 
528 Douglas, 419 F.3d at 1102 (quoting 218 F.3d, at1173).
529 Id. at 1102.  Judge Lucero also cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 
(1972), when he explained, “Information contained in prescription records not only may reveal other facts 
about what illnesses a person has, but may reveal information relating to procreation -- whether a woman is 
taking fertility medication for example -- as well as information relating to contraception.”
530 941 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1991).
531
 633 F.2d 1172 (5th Cir. 1981).
532
 Celeste James was being blackmailed by a fraud and arson suspect who had video taped them having 
sexual relations without her knowledge or consent.  Because of this tape she was hesitant to assist police in 
an arson investigation, but after she was told the tape would not be shown to anyone, she agreed.  The tape 
was eventually found during a search of the suspect’s residence, and though, as promised, it was not logged 
as evidence, the tape was held by the police department. While it was in police custody, the tape was 
viewed by a number of police officers, and evidence suggests that a copy was made of the original tape.
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information related to marriage, contraception, procreation, etc., the James court never 
considered the nature of the activity depicted on the tape.  Instead, it relied on Fadjo. 
The plaintiff in Fadjo had also surrendered personal information to investigators 
when subpoenaed and was promised that his information would remain confidential.  
After he cooperated with authorities, Fadjo’s personal information was leaked to 
insurance investigators who suspected him of fraud.  The James court weighed not the 
type of information leaked, but rather whether the investigators’ promise of 
confidentiality created a reasonable expectation of confidentiality.  Holding that the 
promise had created the duty to safeguard the information surrendered, the court held that 
there was a recognized right to confidentiality in information collected by the government 
following a promise not to disclose the information.
Whereas in Greunke, Douglas, and James, judges looked to other courts to 
determine if specific types of information should be protected within their own, a number 
of cases make the determination based upon the relationship between the information in 
question and the fundamental interests listed in Paul.  For example, in Sterling v. 
Borough of Minersville,533 the Third Circuit held that individuals have a privacy right to 
avoid having public officials threaten to disclose their sexual orientation.534  Here the 
court expanded the information privacy doctrine in two ways: by holding that one’s 
533 232 F.3d. 190 (3rd Cir. 2000).
534 Id. at 193. Police officers found two teenaged boys in a car behind a closed beer distributorship.  It was 
evident to the officers that the two had been drinking alcohol, and when the boys gave sketchy answers 
regarding what they were doing in the car, two police officers searched the car and found condoms.
Following his arrest for underage drinking, eighteen-year-old Marcus Wayman was told by a police officer 
that if he “did not inform his grandfather about his homosexuality that [the officer] would take it upon 
himself to disclose this information.” As a result, Wayman told his friend that he would kill himself, and,
after being released, he went home and committed suicide.  
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sexual orientation is protected information and also by holding that a mere “threat” of 
disclosure is enough to trigger constitutional protection.
Judge Carol Los Mansmann held that one’s sexual orientation involves a 
sufficiently intimate aspect of life to qualify as a fundamental protected liberty as 
established in Roe v. Wade.535  She noted that the Supreme Court had placed a “heavy 
emphasis on the intimate relationship of husband and wife in deciding that personal 
decisions relating to marriage are free from unjustified government interference” in 
Griswold,536 and that later in Eisenstadt v. Baird537 the Court had held that “the right to 
privacy is not limited to certain relationships.”538  Judge Mansmann incorporated 
homosexual partnerships under the umbrella of intimate relationships protected by a 
constitutional right to privacy.539
Officials in Sterling had not actually revealed the individual’s sexual identity but 
rather threatened to disclose it. The Third Circuit decided a “threat” of disclosure 
535
 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (defining the personal privacy right as existing only in “personal rights that 
can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’”).
536
 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965). 
537 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
538 Sterling, 232 F.3d. at 194.
539 Id. Judge Mansmann distinguished Bowers from Whalen by reasoning that in Bowers a statute 
criminalized “conduct” but not “status”.  She then held that Bowers “is not determinative of whether the 
right to privacy protects an individual from being forced to disclose his sexual orientation. In other words, 
the decision did not purport to punish homosexual status; and Id. at 196. Judge Mansmann wrote, 
“Wayman's sexual orientation was an intimate aspect of his personality entitled to privacy protection under 
Whalen,” and “it is difficult to imagine a more private matter than one's sexuality and a less likely 
probability that the government would have a legitimate interest in disclosure of sexual identity.” See
 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a Georgia statute that criminalized homosexual 
sodomy); see also. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (overturning Bowers by striking down a Texas 
law that criminalized homosexual, sexual conduct reasoning that  “[such] statutes do seek to control a 
personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of 
persons to choose without being punished as criminals”).
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constituted an infringement upon a privacy right. Judge Mansmann relied upon the 
confidentiality branch of privacy as framed in Whalen and held:
[T]he essence of the right to privacy is in “avoiding disclosure of 
personal matters.” The threat to breach some confidential aspect of one's 
life then is tantamount to a violation of the privacy right because the 
security of one's privacy has been compromised by the threat of 
disclosure. Thus, [the officer’s] threat to disclose [the plaintiff’s] 
suspected homosexuality suffices as a violation of [the plaintiff’s]
constitutionally protected privacy interest.540
Judge Mansmann’s use of the word “security” indicated her understanding that a “secure 
state of mind” attaches to a right of confidentiality.  Thus far, the Third Circuit is the only 
jurisdiction to recognize this interest.
Conversely, the circuit courts have also used other circuit court decisions and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Paul to justify not extending privacy protections to certain 
types of information.  For instance, the circuits did not extend protection to include a 
right of confidentiality in an individual’s court-ordered, psychiatric evaluations. In 
Borucki v. Ryan,541 First Circuit Judge Herbert N. Meletz granted qualified immunity to a
district attorney who had revealed the contents of such a report at a press conference.542
540 Sterling, 232 F.3d. at 197.
541 827 F.2d 836 (1st Cir. 1987).
542
 District Attorney W. Michael Ryan ordered a psychological examination to verify that Robert Borucki 
was fit to stand trial. Borucki was arrested in connection with damage done to twenty-three aircraft at 
Northampton airport in Massachusetts. In Massachusetts the prosecution can order psychiatric evaluations 
not only to determine if a defendant is fit to stand trial but also to determine if the crime in question was in 
any way related to any psychological condition.  Ryan determined that Borucki’s crime was a result of his 
condition. Ryan eventually dismissed the criminal charges against Borucki, yet he held a press conference
at which he revealed the contents of Borucki’s psychiatric examination.  Borucki sued for invasion of 
privacy under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.  Ryan filed a motion for summary judgment and 
argued he was entitled to qualified immunity.
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Judge Meletz held that there was no clearly defined constitutional right of 
confidentiality to avoid the disclosure of one’s psychiatric records. He reasoned that the 
contents of such reports did not rise to the level of the more intimate information that was 
closely tied to decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, child-rearing, or 
education that the Court has recognized as fundamental and thus “protected liberties” 
under the Fourteenth Amendment. He also held that no such privacy interest resided in 
the penumbra of any specific amendment mentioned in Griswold.543
Stressing the vagueness of the privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of 
personal information, he wrote: 
[I]t is not clear . . . whether, to be constitutionally protected by a 
right of nondisclosure, personal information must concern an area of life 
itself protected by either the autonomy branch of the right to privacy or by 
other fundamental rights or whether, to the contrary, the right of 
confidentiality protects a broader array of information than that implicated 
by the autonomy branch of the right to privacy.544
The Eighth Circuit held that a right to confidentiality did not attach to 
embarrassing information related to a failed attempt to become a police officer. In 
Alexander v. Peffer,545  Judge Theodore McMillian held that the wife of a police union 
official lacked constitutional grounds to sue an aide to the Mayor of Omaha, Nebraska, 
for disclosing during an interview on talk radio her failed attempt to join the force.546
543 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (1965). 
544 Borucki, 827 F.2d at 841.
545 993 F.2d 1348 (8th Cir. 1993).
546 Id. at 1349. Jane Alexander alleged that “[Walter Peffer] acting in his official capacity intentionally and 
deliberately publicly disclosed personal information about her in violation of her constitutional right to 
privacy, liberty, and property and in deprivation of her freedom of association as the wife of a union 
official.” Alexander, a secretary in the records section of the City of Omaha Police Department, 
unsuccessfully tried to become a police officer.  Walter Peffer then disclosed Alexander’s attempt while he 
was being interviewed with Alexander’s husband, James, a police officer and member of the Executive 
Board of the Police Union 101, on a radio show.
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Judge McMillian cited Paul to establish that the Supreme Court held that a constitutional 
right to privacy is not intended to protect “reputation alone.”547 He held: “[T]o violate [a] 
constitutional right of privacy the information disclosed must be either a shocking 
degradation or an egregious humiliation  . . . or a flagrant breech of a pledge of 
confidentiality which was instrumental in obtaining the personal information.”548 The
reference to a failed attempt to gain employment did not rise to such a level.
The Eighth Circuit also held that the  record of a plea agreement, even if 
expunged, was not protected under the right of confidentiality. In Eagle v. Morgan,549
Judge Floyd R. Gibson granted qualified immunity to a City Council member who 
disclosed a previously expunged, criminal plea agreement at a City Council meeting and 
to the police officers who used national and state criminal databases550 to locate the 
disclosed records.551
547 Id. at 1350.
548 Id. at 1350-51. He reasoned further: “The disclosures neither involved matters deemed to be 
fundamental rights nor addressed highly personal medical or financial information. Moreover, the 
statements and comments allegedly made by appellee do not constitute the type of governmental abuse that 
demands a constitutional response.” He concluded that the “personal information disclosed on the radio 
show did not rise to the level necessary to be constitutionally protected” and held that “the information 
disclosed by [Peffer], although exhibiting poor judgment and a lack of sensitivity, implicates neither the 
confidentiality nor the autonomous branch of the right to privacy.”
549 88 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1996).
550
 The computer databases used were the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) and the Arkansas 
Crime Information Center (ACIC).  Eagle’s records were also released to a number of reporters through the 
Arkansas Freedom of Information Act.
551 Eagle, 88 F.3d at 623. In 1987, David Eagle, prior to becoming an auditor for the City of Jonesboro, had 
pled guilty to stealing building materials.  Once he had successfully served his sentence and probation, his 
record was expunged as part of a first-time-offender program in Arkansas.  Eagle had completed an audit of 
police salaries for the purpose of making sure personnel were being paid competitive wages, and law 
enforcement officers who were not happy with his findings used computer databases to locate records of 
Eagle’s felony plea bargain.  These records were forwarded to Rohnny McDaniel, who revealed Eagle’s 
past digressions by reading from his file at the City Council meeting in an apparent effort to undermine 
Eagle’s audit results.
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Judge Gibson accepted the plaintiff’s  claim as one rooted in the confidentiality 
branch of privacy protections from Whalen, but wrote: “We acknowledge that the exact 
boundaries of this right are, to say the least, unclear . . . . [W]e discovered that courts 
have traditionally been reluctant to expand this branch of privacy beyond those categories 
of data which, by any estimation, must be considered extremely personal.”552  Further, 
Judge Gibson reasoned that the information in Eagle “seems more analogous to 
circumstances in which courts have refused to recognize a legitimate expectation of 
privacy.”553 He wrote: “Far from being ‘inherently private,’ the details of [the plaintiff’s]
prior guilty plea are by their very nature matters within the public domain. Accordingly, 
we decide without hesitation that Eagle has no legitimate expectation of privacy in this 
material.”554
Moreover, that the plea agreement had been expunged was not found to increase 
its level of privacy protection.  Judge Gibson reasoned:  
An expungement order does not privatize criminal activity. While 
it removes a particular arrest and/or conviction from an individual's 
criminal record, the underlying object of expungement remains public.
Court records and police blotters permanently document the expunged 
incident, and those officials integrally involved retain knowledge of the 
event. An expunged arrest and/or conviction is never truly removed from 
the public record and thus is not entitled to privacy protection.555
552 Id. at 625.
553 Id. (citing circuit court privacy opinions reviewing information such as past criminal activity, official 
acts, false rumors, etc.). 
 
554 Id. at 625-26. Judge Gibson stressed that in accepting the plea agreement, Eagle disclosed “his 
transgression in an intrinsically public forum” and “acknowledged before all his fellow citizens that he had 
committed a crime against the laws of Arkansas . . . . He cannot now claim that a subsequent disclosure of 
this same information constituted a constitutional violation.”
555 Id. at 626.
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That the court found the expunged plea agreement to still be a matter of public record 
also meant that the plaintiff had no privacy interest that was violated by the use of 
databases by public officials to locate records of the agreement.  Judge Gibson stressed 
that the material in these particular databases was already “public” and held, “Because 
[there is] no legitimate expectation of privacy in the contents of [a] criminal history file, 
we cannot agree that the officers violated [a] constitutional right when they engaged in an 
unwarranted search of this material.”556
Clearly Established Protections
The second stage of a qualified immunity case begins once a court has decided 
that a particular type of information warrants protection.  Following such a determination, 
a court will then evaluate how well established the privacy protection at issue was at the 
time of the alleged infringement. For instance, in James, the Eleventh Circuit held that 
protection for personal information obtained by a police officer under a promise of 
confidentiality had been firmly established.  The court relied on the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision in Fadjo. Noting that Fadjo had been decided seven years prior to James,557 the 
court held, “The opinion in Fadjo establishes the rule that a state official may not disclose 
intimate personal information obtained under a pledge of confidentiality unless the 
556 Id. at 628.
557 James v. City of Douglas, 941 F.2d 1539, 1544 (11th Cir. 1991). The court decided to apply the 
precedent set in the Fifth Circuit and noted that the “court in Fadjo, seven years before the conduct at issue 
in this case, held that if the allegations contained in Fadjo's complaint were true it would amount to a 
constitutional violation. Therefore, Fadjo clearly established the constitutional right James alleges was 
violated by officers Purvis and Thomas.”
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government demonstrates a legitimate state interest in disclosure which is found to 
outweigh the threat to the individual's privacy interest.”558
If a court holds that a particular privacy protection has been clearly established, 
then a duty to safeguard personal information attaches to the actions of the defendant(s). 
In making this determination, the courts embrace the privacy-as-confidentiality 
conceptualization. In James, the Eleventh Circuit framed the question before the court as 
“whether [the defendant’s] reasonably could have believed that allowing these other 
individuals to view the tape was lawful in light of existing law.”559 The James court 
found that the investigators had no legitimate interest in viewing or showing the tape and 
“viewed the tape for their own personal gratification.”560 The privacy protections were 
established to the extent that the police officers, absent a compelling interest, should have 
been aware that their actions were violating the plaintiff’s privacy interest in the tape.  
They were denied qualified immunity.
Similarly, in Sterling, the case involving the threatened disclosure of a person’s 
sexual orientation, the Third Circuit held, “[T]he law is clearly established that matters of 
personal intimacy are protected from threats of disclosure by the right to privacy.”561
Judge Mansmann noted that in the Third Circuit, “A right is clearly established if its 
outlines are sufficiently clear that a reasonable officer would understand that his actions 
violate the right.”562  She concluded that disclosing a person’s sexual orientation did 
558 Id. 
559 Id. at 1542.
560 Id. at 1544. 
561 Sterling v. Borough of Minersville, 232 F.3d. 190, 192 (3rd Cir. 2000).
562 Id. (citing Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 174 (3rd Cir. 1999).
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qualify as an invasion of privacy under the confidentiality branch of Whalen and that the 
area of the law was sufficiently established to prevent the officers from using their 
qualified immunity.563
In Greunke, the case about the pregnant high school swimmer, Judge Roth held: 
“[T]he District Court564 misconstrued the test for determining whether an allegedly 
violated right is clearly established . . . . [T]he test is not whether the current precedents 
protect the specific right alleged but whether the contours of current law put a reasonable 
defendant on notice that his conduct would infringe on the plaintiff's asserted right.”565
She held that information regarding procreation was the type of intimate information to 
which the Supreme Court had consistently extended privacy protections.
One court determined that the case before it dealt both with clearly established 
rights and vaguely defined rights. Denius v. Dunlap566 was discussed above in terms of 
the substantive due process analysis.  The case involved teachers in a government-run 
program for high school dropouts being forced to sign an “Authorization for Release of 
Personal Information” as a condition for continued employment.  Though the agreement 
requested access to a wide variety of information, Judge Joel Martin Flaum narrowed the 
scope of his analysis to financial and medical information.567
563 Contra. Sterling, 232 F.3d. at 200 (Stapleton, J., dissenting) (arguing that “the Court cites no case in 
which a threat to violate a right to privacy has been held to violate the Constitution” and that therefore the 
area of constitutional privacy is not well enough settled to prevent the officers from winning their motions 
for qualified immunity).
564
 Greunke v. Seip, 1998 U.S. Dist. WL 734700 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 21, 1998).
565
 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 639 (1987).
566
 209 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2000).
567 Id. at 955-56. Denius appealed claiming that the “Authorization also permits the release of other 
confidential information including all records pertaining to: 1) educational, 2) financial, 3) 
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Judge Flaum first noted that the Seventh Circuit had previously established a 
“substantial right in the confidentiality of medical information” in Anderson v. Romero568
and therefore officials should have been “on notice that [medical] information has 
constitutional protection . . . and that the state cannot require its disclosure without a 
sufficient countervailing interest.”569  Conversely, he found that the right to 
confidentiality in financial information was not yet clearly established.
When deciding that protection for a particular type of personal information is not 
clearly established, the circuit courts have often criticized the vagueness of Whalen and 
Nixon. For example, in Borucki, Judge Meletz held that a right of confidentiality in one’s 
psychiatric records was too vaguely conceived to constitute “clearly defined” law in 
1983.  He arrived at this conclusion following his review of Whalen, Nixon, and Paul.  
Judge Meletz decided that though such information was protected by the 
“confidentiality” branch of constitutional privacy, Whalen had not gone far enough to 
“clearly define” the constitutional right of confidentiality. He wrote, “[I]n Whalen, the 
Court reserved decision . . . on whether a duty to prevent public disclosure has roots in 
military/veterans, 4) criminal, or 5) employment matters,” but provides “no justification at this stage for 
requiring disclosure of this broad range of information.”  Judge Flaum wrote: “Denius argues that it is 
clearly established that the state could not require the release of confidential information without at least 
some interest to place in the balance and some measures limiting the use of the information and protecting 
it from further disclosure. Although Denius alludes in his brief to the Authorization's effect on his privacy 
rights in a broad range of confidential information, he only discusses with specificity his interest in medical 
and financial information. Therefore, we address his privacy argument with respect to these two types of 
information alone.”
568
 72 F.3d 518, 522 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “a number of cases in the lower federal courts, 
including our own, building on Whalen and Nixon, recognize a qualified constitutional right to the 
confidentiality of medical records and medical communications . . . .(footnotes omitted) [Though it] has 
been expressly rejected by the Sixth Circuit . . .[i]t is recognized by our court and was in 1992.”
569 Denius, 209 F.3d at 956-57.
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the constitution,”570 and “Whalen provides very little guidance regarding the nature of the 
confidentiality branch of the right to privacy.”571
Judge Meletz’s review highlighted the murkiness of constitutional privacy 
doctrine. In granting the defendant qualified immunity, he held: 
[W]e conclude that Supreme Court cases decided prior to June 17, 
1983 had not clearly established that a constitutional right of privacy 
would be implicated by state disclosure of the contents of a court-ordered 
psychiatric report. First, it was not clearly established, nor has it been 
argued here, that the area of psychiatric care, like ‘marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education,’ is 
within the areas protected by the autonomy branch of the right of privacy. 
Second, given the predominantly fourth amendment context of Nixon; the 
uncertain import of the Court's decision in Paul; and the paucity of 
concrete guidance in Whalen, it was not clearly established that personal 
psychiatric information is information protected under the confidentiality 
branch of the right of privacy.572
In Denius, Judge Flaum reviewed the constitutionality of an “Authorization for 
Release of Personal Information” that teachers in a government-run educational program 
had to sign as a condition for continued employment. In his qualified immunity analysis,
as noted above, Judge Flaum found the medical information was clearly protected.
However, he noted, “[I]t is not clear whether other confidential information, such as that 
contained in financial records, also receives similar protection under this right.”573
Judge Flaum reasoned, “Seven of our sister circuits have found that the 
constitutional right of privacy in confidential information covers some financial 
570 Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 848, n. 19 (1st Cir. 1987).
571 Id. at 841.
572 Id. at 844-45.
573 Denius, 209 F.3d at 956.
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disclosures,”574 but because the right to privacy in certain types of financial information 
was newly recognized, he ultimately concluded, “[W]e do not find that the law in this 
area was so clearly defined that a government official can be charged with its 
knowledge.”575  Thus, the defendant in Denius was entitled to qualified immunity in 
regard to medical information but not financial information.
Though Judge Flaum had found the interest in avoiding the disclosure of medical 
information in general to be clearly established in Denius, Judge Arthur L. Alarcon,
writing for the Tenth Circuit in Herring v. Keenan,576 held, “[T]here is a constitutional 
right to privacy that protects an individual from the disclosure of information concerning 
a person's health,” but “it was not clearly established, at the time [of the defendant’s] 
disclosure, that a probationer had a constitutionally protected right to privacy regarding 
information concerning his or her medical condition.”577 Herring involved a probation 
officer who disclosed to one probationer’s sister and employer that he was HIV positive.  
Judge Alarcon considered the specific privacy interest in one’s HIV status.  He held that 
the plaintiff “failed to demonstrate that the contours of that right were sufficiently clear in 
late 1993 so that a reasonable probation officer would understand that he or she could not 
disclose to [third parties] that the probationer had tested positive to HIV.”578
574 Id. at 957 (citing decisions from the second, fourth, fifth, eighth, tenth, and eleventh circuits) and (noting 
that “the only circuit to explicitly disavow such a right, and the right of confidentiality in general, is the 
Sixth Circuit . . . . However, we explicitly recognized our disagreement with the Sixth Circuit's approach in 
Anderson where we agreed with the majority of circuits that Whalen and Nixon delineate a federal right of 
confidentiality.”).
575 Id. at 958.
576 218 F.3d 1171, 1172 (10th Cir. 2000).
577 Id. at 1173.
578 Id. at 1179.
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In the recent Tenth Circuit case, Douglas v. Dobbs,579 Judge Lucero distinguished 
the case involving an investigation into an individual’s alleged prescription drug fraud 
from Whalen when he noted that warrants play a direct role in criminal investigations 
rather than serving a purely regulatory function as did the statute in Whalen.  He then 
concluded, “Whether a warrant is required to conduct an investigatory search of 
prescription records, in contrast to the regulatory disclosures at issue in Whalen, is an 
issue that has not been settled, and is an issue we need not decide in the present case.”580
Thus the privacy interest in prescription drug records had not been clearly established, the 
assistant district attorney could not be expected to know her actions were violating 
Douglas’ rights, and, thus, her claim for qualified immunity was allowed to stand.
Conclusion
Information privacy cases generally involve either a constitutional challenge to a 
statute, subpoena, or other government collection of personal data or to the action(s) of a 
public official or other state actor. Plaintiffs claim their right to avoid the disclosure of 
personal matters, their right to confidentiality, has been violated. In each case the 
government has compelled individuals to surrender control of their personal information
and thereby has assumed a duty to safeguard the information it collects. When the courts 
review government efforts to honor its concomitant duty to safeguard the surrendered 
information, the Supreme Court and the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal recognize a new 
conceptualization of privacy, privacy as confidentiality.  
579 419 F.3d 1097 (10th Cir. 2005).
580 Id. at 1103.
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This new conceptualization differs from the privacy-as-information-control 
conceptualization because instead of having the right to directly control access to 
personal information, individuals now have a right to compel government to control 
access to their personal information by third parties. When a statute is challenged, this 
duty is honored by the inclusion of statutory provisions that safeguard the personal 
information that has been surrendered.  In qualified immunity cases, this duty takes the 
form of an expectation that state actors will be familiar with clearly established 
information privacy interests and avoid violating individuals’ privacy through their 
actions.
Using the vague guideposts provided by the Supreme Court in Whalen, Nixon, 
and Paul, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal have slowly been shaping the information 
privacy doctrine. All have accepted that the right to avoid the disclosure of personal 
matters is either a protected liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment or an implied right 
with roots in the penumbras of specific protections in the Bill of Rights.  All the circuit 
courts except the Sixth have adopted intermediate scrutiny in the form of a balancing test 
as the appropriate level of substantive due process review for information privacy cases.
When utilizing a balancing test, courts determine the individual privacy interest at 
risk by considering the type of information in question, the type of plaintiff claiming 
infringement, how government is safeguarding the information it collects, and the 
government’s interest in collecting the information. A number of general trends have
emerged from the circuit courts regarding these evaluations.  
The more closely information is related to the fundamental interests traditionally 
protected in Fourteenth Amendment due process privacy cases – marriage, procreation, 
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contraception – the higher the level of constitutional protection is afforded.  Also, 
plaintiff categories are forming along a continuum with private citizens having the 
highest level of protection, government employees a moderate level, elected public 
officials a lower level, and convicts the lowest level.  The more protected an individual 
privacy interest in personal information is, the more compelling the government’s 
justification for infringement must be in order to withstand judicial scrutiny .
A balancing test is not utilized in qualified immunity cases. In these cases the 
courts will look to other circuits and the Supreme Court to determine if a particular type 
of information has been typically protected or if the right to confidentiality should be 
extended to include it.  If a court decides that the information in question is protected, 
then it must evaluate how well established the right of confidentiality in that type of 
information was at the time of the alleged infringement. State actors are not entitled to 
qualified immunity if their action(s) violated a clearly established information privacy 
right.
CHAPTER V
KDD AND PRIVACY
The previous three chapters have identified the primary conceptualizations of 
privacy as implicitly and explicitly expressed by the courts in First Amendment, Fourth 
Amendment, and information privacy cases.  This chapter discusses whether any of the 
four conceptualizations identified is sufficient to protect individual privacy interests in 
personal information against federal utilization of KDD technology for domestic 
surveillance purposes.  To answer this question, it is necessary to understand how KDD 
dataveillance is conducted.  
Once the KDD process is deconstructed and explained below, this chapter 
concludes that though the privacy-as-information control and privacy-as-confidentiality 
conceptualizations may offer some privacy protections during the pre-KDD processes 
stage, none of the four conceptualizations afford privacy protection against the KDD 
applications themselves.  Though the courts recognize that KDD technologies do provide 
a glimpse at an individual’s inviolate personality, the privacy-as-space conceptualization 
is not directly applicable since KDD involves electronic access to databases containing 
digital information about many individuals rather than an intrusion into the private realm 
of a single person.  Also, given the courts’ general acceptance of the notion of limited 
privacy in First and Fourth Amendment privacy cases as well as in information privacy 
cases, the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization is likely of little practical value to 
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plaintiffs. A new conceptualization of the constitutional right to privacy is necessary to 
protect individual information privacy interests against KDD applications.
In determining whether the use of KDD technology, which allows analysts to 
discover new knowledge about individuals by looking for data patterns in their digital 
dossiers, will infringe upon the general right to privacy or the right to information privacy 
in particular, it is important to understand that KDD applications are not monolithic.581
They comprise a number of sub-processes. Any single sub-process might be challenged 
on constitutional grounds, and a complete analysis of possible infringements throughout 
an entire KDD application is beyond the scope of this study. This dissertation is focused 
specifically on the threat posed by the application of KDD technology to data after all of 
the pre-KDD processes have been completed. 
The privacy-as-information-control and privacy-as-confidentiality 
conceptualizations, if strictly applied by the courts to the myriad methods that 
government utilizes to gather data and prepare searchable dossiers, provide avenues 
through which individuals might attempt to protect themselves against pre-KDD 
procedures. The actual KDD applications, however, represent a challenge to the existing 
privacy doctrines because they create new knowledge.  Neither one’s right to exert 
control over existing information or to compel the government to protect information it 
has forced individuals to surrender can protect knowledge about individuals that has been 
created by the government. KDD applications.  Therefore, like previous new surveillance 
581 See Clark, supra note 1 (defining dataveillance); SOLOVE, supra note 4 (defining digital dossiers); 
Tether, supra note 5 (defining data mining); Zarsky, supra note 5 (quoting U.M. Fayaad, the father of data 
mining, defining data mining); and Jensen, supra note 9 (explaining why the term Knowledge Discovery in 
Databases (KDD) is the preferred term for data mining conducted for the purpose of dataveillance).
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technologies, KDD technologies are now forcing the current privacy and information 
privacy doctrines to change once again.
Pre-KDD Data Processes
Unlike the national data center proposed in the 1960s, modern KDD technologies 
are decentralized.  This means that rather than “collecting” data from thousands of 
sources and “warehousing” the data in one massive digital storage facility, the United 
States Intelligence Community (USIC) has concentrated on developing software 
solutions that will apply KDD technologies to local databases that are held, maintained, 
and secured at their local point of origin.  This process has three stages: gathering,
formatting, and sharing. 
The first step in the pre-KDD process is to effectively link specific local databases
to form a temporary datascape to which the actual KDD analysis can be applied. 
Government software “gathers” data by accessing information previously surrendered by 
individuals that is stored in various local databases, private and public, and then 
determines which records will be included in the KDD analysis. The software then
“formats” the data.  Records that are saved locally exist in diverse program languages and 
operating platforms.  Formatting allows, in essence, the government software to “see” all 
the data as if they were written in the same language (code). Following the formatting, 
the data are “validated,” which means redundancies, incomplete entries, etc. are removed 
from the records.  The records are then copied in their formatted and validated form into 
a temporary database containing the newly gathered information that will be analyzed by 
the KDD applications.
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The local databases accessed during these pre-KDD processes contain
information that was either directly shared with private or public entities willingly by 
individuals in return for a specific benefit such as obtaining a driver’s license, registering 
for veterans’ benefits, or applying for a loan, or that was shared among public and private 
entities for secondary purposes after the information was initially gathered.  It is at 
different points during data collection, storage, sharing, and aggregation, the pre-KDD 
processes, that privacy as aright to information control or confidentiality could be useful, 
but the running of KDD applications, the second stage of KDD dataveillance, does not 
even begin until all of these processes have been completed.  It is during this second 
stage that existing privacy conceptualizations offer inadequate privacy protection.  
KDD Analysis Applications
The second stage involves the actual KDD analysis applications, which take a 
number of different forms that can be used alone or in combination.  Kim A. Taipale, 
founder and executive director of the Center for Advanced Studies in Science and 
Technology Policy, explained the three different types of knowledge discovery:
There are three distinct applications for [KDD] in the context of 
domestic security: first, subject-oriented link analysis, that is, automated 
analysis to learn more about a particular data subject, their relationships, 
associations and actions; second, pattern-analysis (or data mining in the 
narrow sense), that is, automated analysis to develop a descriptive or 
predictive model based on discovered patterns; and, third, pattern-
matching, that is, automated analysis using a descriptive or predictive 
model (whether the model itself is developed through automated analysis 
or not) against additional datasets to identify other related (or “like”) data 
subjects (people, places, things, relationships, etc.).582
Below are simplified but accurate examples of these applications.  
582 Taipale, supra note 63, at 175. 
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Subject-oriented link analysis is used to establish links between one individual 
and various other persons, organizations, and activities. It is the most basic form of KDD 
and produces the raw material for more advanced applications.  For example, if agents 
arrest a suspected terrorist, they might take his cell phone, credit card, and computer. 
Agents can then use information such as the phone numbers dialed from his phone, e-
mails sent and received, credit card purchases, or Websites visited to identify his 
associates.  KDD applications can then link to public records such as tax or criminal 
histories, financial records, phone records, and online accounts pertaining to these 
associates.
Such information can provide insight into relationships, lifestyle, and intentions. 
For instance, by tracking purchases made with the suspect’s credit card, law enforcement 
can get a clear idea of his lifestyle, where he travels, and his personal finances. The 
suspect’s records are distributed in many different databases containing information 
(financial, medical, commercial, educational, and criminal), but subject-oriented link 
analysis can “reach out” to scan the dossiers compiled during the pre-KDD stage.  This 
KDD application essentially builds a web of relationships and activities with the suspect 
at the center.583
Pattern analysis involves searching compiled data for correlations among  a pre-
defined class of subjects, such as known terrorists, that reveal a pattern.  For instance, 
running subject-oriented link analyses on a number of terrorists might reveal certain 
583 During this process, law enforcement analysts look for commonalities.  For instance, if the suspect calls 
one person in particular on a regular basis, law enforcement officers might run a data-matching application 
on the credit card histories of the suspect and this person.  Such an application will reveal if these two 
individuals travel to the same locations, buy the same things, or have the same source of funding.  Each 
phone number, credit card number, or e-mail address is another “link” from the subject to another 
individual, location, database, or account.  This is a valuable tool.  Such relationship-mapping could 
theoretically result in a terror cell being uncovered.   
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commonalities.  Examples might include traveling on student visas, receiving funds from 
overseas, frequent travel to symbolic sites such as the White House, taking flying lessons, 
or other variables that the USIC has deemed suspicious. The goal of pattern analysis is to 
use algorithms to assign a probability that the presence of a certain fact – perhaps 
traveling on an expired student visa -- indicates the likelihood of a future behavior, such 
as participation in a terror attack. Thus, new knowledge is revealed about an individual, 
which might be expressed as: There is an 80% likelihood that person X will be involved 
in a terror attack at some point in the future.
In federal counterterrorism efforts, this ability to predict the probability of future 
behavior is critical.  These KDD applications are iterative, which means that the output 
from one application can be used as the input data for the next analysis.  For instance, in 
the above example, a subject-oriented link analysis was run on a suspected terrorist to 
identify his associates, travel patterns, and purchasing behavior. By performing multiple 
subject-oriented link analyses on suspected or convicted terrorists, government analysts 
can recognize a pattern, and through analysis, assign probabilities to various predictors 
that might be present in dossiers.  They can then build a profile for individuals who have 
a high probability of being active terrorists.  These patterns can be used in the pattern-
matching applications described below.
Pattern Matching involves running a pattern, in the form of an algorithm, against 
extremely large databases to identify those individuals in the data set who share the same 
pattern.  This is the premier application for KDD technology in counterterrorism efforts. 
For instance, the intelligence agencies have most likely run subject-based link analysis on 
each of the nineteen 9-11 hijackers and built a pattern based upon commonalities in the 
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data of each.  These patterns, possibly called “potential-terrorist,” can then be run through 
massive international databases to see if any individuals “match” the data pattern.  As 
KDD is an iterative process, anyone thus identified might be investigated further using a 
subject-based link analysis or traditional law enforcement investigation techniques. This 
allows the USIC and law enforcement agencies to predict which individuals within a 
certain datascape are most likely to be potential terrorists.  Investigatory resources can 
then be focused on those individuals.  
The State Action Obstacle
Though this dissertation evaluates constitutional privacy protections in regard to 
KDD applications as opposed to pre-KDD processes, there is a significant obstacle to 
claiming privacy protections at either stage, the state action doctrine. It will be very 
difficult to challenge the government’s use of KDD technologies on constitutional 
grounds because so much of the process is conducted by private actors. 
The private-sector provides database access, KDD technology, and KDD services, 
which confuses the state action issue.  As Robert O’ Harrow, Jr. commented in his recent 
book: “It’s a simple fact that private companies can collect information about people in 
ways the government can’t. At the same time, they can’t be held accountable for their 
behavior or their mistakes the way government agencies can.”584  Neil Richards also 
warned of the government’s ability to avoid its constitutional responsibilities:
The government has also been contracting increasingly with 
private businesses, by acquiring databases of personal information and 
funding novel private-sector data collection projects. To the extent that 
such private collection is not state action, it allows the government, in 
584 O’ HARROW, supra note 3, at 8-9 (2005).
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effect, to outsource surveillance beyond the scope of otherwise applicable 
statutory and constitutional restrictions.585
Thus, it could be difficult for plaintiffs to claim an invasion of privacy because 
the entity actually accessing, compiling, and searching an individual’s personal data may 
not be a state actor even though the work is being done at the bequest of the government. 
Making that determination may be even more difficult in the current national security 
posture. Details regarding the relationship between USIC and private data aggregation 
companies are classified.  
If constitutional privacy protections are to protect personal information from pre-
KDD processes and KDD applications, the state action, which has been significantly 
narrowed during the past few decades, needs to be applied to the private data companies 
that are partnered with the government in KDD dataveillance programs. Currently, much 
of the data collection and most of the data sharing, aggregation, and mining programs are 
being conducted by private companies that provide such services to both private and 
public clientele.  Individuals have no constitutional protection against KDD activities
performed by private companies.  Traditionally there have been two exceptions to the 
state action doctrine whereby the courts have held that private entities were subject to 
constitutional standards regarding civil rights: the entanglement exception and the public 
function exception.  
Under the first, if the government has become sufficiently “entangled” with a 
private entity in performing a particular function, that private actor can be legally 
585
 Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1159 
(2005).
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considered a state actor.586  For instance, if a state hospital hired a private firm to handle 
the day-to-day operations of its facilities, then that private firm might be a state actor with 
regard to the policies and procedures it applies in its capacity of running a state facility. 
The private company could be sued under §1983 and be liable for infringement of 
constitutionally protected privacy rights.  Under the second exception, a private entity 
that performs a function that has traditionally been a function of the state can at times be
a state actor.587 For instance, if a community hires a private police force to patrol and act 
to preserve public safety, that private security firm may be considered a state actor if it is 
sued for violating the civil rights of its citizens.  
Currently, it would be very difficult to determine the exact extent of the 
involvement of private entities in federal dataveillance because such information is 
highly classified.  If the exact role of private companies remains difficult to ascertain, it 
will be hard to judge whether private companies are involved to the extent that they are 
“entangled” with the government regarding KDD.  Plaintiffs will struggle to establish 
state action.  Moreover, though national security is a traditional government function, 
dataveillance, with its roots firmly in private-sector marketing applications, is not. 
Depending how the courts define the function of dataveillance, as either a software 
586 See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455 (1973) (holding that a private school was entangled because it 
received free textbooks from the state), Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961)
(holding that a restaurant who discriminated against black customers was a state actor because its location 
in a public parking garage sufficiently entangled it with the city), and Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak 
343 U.S. 451, 462 (1952)  (holding that a transit authority was a state actor when it refused to stop playing 
loud radio programs on its cars because a Public Utilities Commission provided “regulatory supervision” to 
the authority, which was sufficient for the Court to decide that the authority was entangled with the 
commission ).
587 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (holding that a private company town had infringed upon a 
pamphleteer’s First Amendment rights when if forbid the individual to distribute the pamphlets and 
justifying this decision because the private town functioned like any other municipality – providing police 
protection, a fire department, garbage collection, etc. -- and thus for all intents and purposes was the local 
government); Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 
(1968), overruled by Hudgenson v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). 
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application or a national security procedure, it is unclear if these companies fall under the 
traditional public function exception.  This is the crux of the state action obstacle to 
constitutional privacy protections from KDD dataveillance at both the pre-KDD and 
KDD application stages. If one’s constitutional privacy rights are to protect privacy 
interests in personal information from KDD dataveillance, the Supreme Court needs to 
apply the state action doctrine to private entities used by the government for national 
security, intelligence, and law enforcement purposes.
Pre-KDD Processes and Constitutional Privacy Protections
The current privacy-as-information-control and privacy-as-confidentiality 
conceptualizations offer some protection for personal information regarding certain 
actions during the gathering, formatting, and sharing stages of the pre-KDD processes. 
The right to privacy as information control may be breached when information 
surrendered to the government for one purpose is used for a secondary purpose without 
an individual’s authorization. For instance, information surrendered for the purpose of 
obtaining a driver’s license might be sold by a state to a private data company without 
notification. This company, a private actor, might then combine the license information 
with financial and medical data it obtained from other sources and sell access to the 
compiled data to the USIC and law enforcement agencies.588  It is possible that the initial 
act of selling personal information to the private sector is sufficient state action to invoke 
one’s constitutional privacy protections. 
588 See SYKES, supra note 22 (describing how the government profits from the sale of public records to 
private entities).  It should be noted that no cases could be located in which an individual sued a state for 
selling information surrendered for a certain purpose, like a driver’s license, to marketing or data 
companies.
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The right to privacy as confidentiality could also be breached during the pre-KDD 
processes.  Events since the terror attacks on 9-11 such as the passage of the USA Patriot 
Act589 and the release of the 9-11 Commission Report590 have led to an increase in 
government-mandated information sharing among branches, agencies, and departments 
within the government for the purpose of improving intelligence and law enforcement 
capabilities. Each time the government accesses a private database for airline passenger 
records or student loan records, for example, for the purpose of finding threatening 
patterns, it is behaving in a manner similar to the New York statute at issue in Whalen.  
The government is compelling companies to disclose personal information about 
individuals for law enforcement purposes.  
The statute in Whalen was held to be constitutional in part because New York was 
able to demonstrate that it had honored its duty under Whalen to safeguard that 
information by keeping the data in a locked vault, limiting access to the data to specific 
personnel, and only running the data on “offline” computers. Assuming that the courts do 
broaden the state action doctrine and that existing privacy protections could then be 
brought to bear against federal KDD dataveillance, individuals could compel government 
to similarly safeguard information it obtains during pre-KDD processes.
KDD and Privacy as Knowledge Control
Once again the implementation of a new surveillance technology by the 
government has created a need for a new conceptualization of privacy, privacy as 
589 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
590 FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT (Authorized 1st Ed., 2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT].
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knowledge control. Privacy, when it has been conceptualized as space, secrecy, 
information control, or confidentiality, has always concerned preexisting information.  
The emergence of KDD technologies has forced the consideration of how individuals 
might exert constitutional privacy rights not over their personal information but rather 
over new knowledge created by the government that happens to pertain to them.
Whereas pre-KDD processes merely gather, format, and share personal 
information, KDD applications utilize that data for the purpose of discovering new 
knowledge.  For instance, as noted above, KDD technology allows analysts to assign a 
“probability of future behavior” to individuals based upon behavioral patterns found in 
their digital dossiers. The government, through the use of KDD, thus creates the fact591
that a particular individual has a certain percentage chance of engaging in a certain 
behavior. Though this new knowledge pertains to an individual, that individual did not 
willingly share it with the government (negating the privacy-as-information-control 
conceptualization), was not compelled by the government to surrender it (negating the 
privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization), and was not even aware that such 
knowledge existed.
Currently, the courts’ privacy conceptualizations protect information and one’s 
own knowledge, but not new knowledge that has been derived from one’s personal 
information.  An individual cannot file a privacy claim simply because the government 
came to “know” something about him or her by examining information available in 
privately held databases and public records. Dataveillance has thus created a need for a
591
 The word “fact” is used here to mean “bits of knowledge” that result when data is surveyed with KDD 
algorithms.  Such facts are not necessarily true but are rather like values in an equation, a variable.  This bit 
of information is attached to an individual’s record following a KDD application.
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new conceptualization of privacy that will allow the courts to extend constitutional 
privacy protections to protect knowledge created through dataveillance.  
Solove explained the difference between information and knowledge in 
information privacy law: “Information consists of raw facts.  Knowledge is information 
that has been sifted, sorted, and analyzed.”592 KDD technology is about discovering 
knowledge, not information.
A right to privacy, conceptualized as knowledge control, is justified by the ease 
with which the government can discover new knowledge about individuals.  Thus, this 
new privacy conceptualization can be predicated upon a notion already accepted by the 
Supreme Court, practical obscurity.593
In U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,594 the 
Court discussed practical obscurity in regard to criminal rap sheets that were compiled by 
FBI computers. The Court recognized that when personal information was widely
disbursed among different government agencies and private companies, it enjoyed a 
certain level of privacy protection because of how difficult it would be to manually 
compile the distributed data.  In Reporters Committee, the Supreme Court recognized that 
computer databases stripped away that protection by making it too easy to access the
592
 Solove, supra note 9, at 1456.
593
 Practical obscurity exists when bits of personal information have been made public at different times, in 
different places, to different people, but have not been compiled at one location and made available for 
anyone to access. Whereas the notion of limited privacy refers to one’s right to share personal information 
with some parties and not others, practical obscurity is about one’s ability to keep his or her information 
distributed among different entities.
594
 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
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previously distributed data.595  The same logic might be applied to today’s KDD 
technologies because they have made it too easy for the government to derive new 
knowledge and insights about individuals from previously unrelated data. 
The constitutional right to privacy, conceptualized as knowledge control, would
allow the courts to burden the government’s creation of new knowledge.  The courts must 
recognize that individuals are entitled to counteract the government’s KDD applications
by exerting a right to compel government to provide notice that the new knowledge
exists, to disclose how it is being used by the government, and to provide adequate 
safeguards – possibly the use of encryption, pseudonymity, or sunset provisions that 
guarantee that the new knowledge will be destroyed after a certain amount of time – that 
are designed to prevent the new knowledge from leaking. A strict application of privacy 
as knowledge control would also allow individuals to challenge any secondary uses of the 
created knowledge on information privacy grounds.596  Thus, this new conceptualization 
would be a hybrid of the privacy-as-information-control as originally conceived in the 
595 Id. at 762-64. In Reporters Committee, the Court considered whether rap sheets (complied criminal 
histories) that had been collected and stored in a central FBI database should be made available to the 
public under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). The Court recognized that Medico’s criminal history 
was “practically obscured” until the FBI compiled it all into one location. Justice Stevens wrote:
“Recognition of this attribute of a privacy interest supports the distinction, in terms of personal privacy, 
between scattered disclosure of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the rap 
sheet as a whole. The very fact that federal funds have been spent to prepare, index, and maintain these 
criminal-history files demonstrates that the individual items of information in the summaries would not 
otherwise be ‘freely available’ either to the officials who have access to the underlying files or to the 
general public.”
596
 Since KDD applications are iterative -- output from one operation is used as input for another --  newly 
created knowledge will likely be attached to an individual’s identity and then possibly used in additional 
KDD applications. At this stage, the privacy-as-knowledge-control conceptualization of privacy could offer 
a layer of protection by allowing individuals to challenge the government’s secondary usage of the 
discovered knowledge absent a showing of a substantial interest or particularized suspicion.  The new 
conceptualization would allow citizens to exercise privacy as information control or privacy as 
confidentiality or new knowledge rather than merely preexisting personal information. 
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privacy scholarship and the privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization that is now 
emerging from information privacy jurisprudence.
Implications for Law Enforcement’s Use of KDD Dataveillance
The new privacy-as-knowledge-control conceptualization of privacy would not 
prohibit KDD dataveillance, but it would protect individuals by burdening the
government’s use of the new technology. In order to fully adopt the new 
conceptualization, the courts must treat dataveillance the same way they treat traditional 
searches in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  They must treat dataveillance as a search 
conducted with technology with which the public is generally unfamiliar, and they must 
require the introduction of individualized suspicion into KDD applications.
Constitutionally, the courts currently treat dataveillance in much the same way 
they treat surveillance. The Supreme Court has held that the federal government and law 
enforcement personnel are free to observe what can be accessed from public vantage 
points.  For example, in Laird v. Tatum597 the Court held that the U.S. Army did not need 
to demonstrate probable cause prior to observing or recording demonstrators at a peace 
protest.  Anything that could be seen or heard in public space could not be considered 
private. In the same way, the courts have not required a demonstration of probable cause 
prior to the government’s accessing and using information freely given by a private 
entity. The instance mentioned in Chapter 1 involving JetBlue® is a good example. 
Conversely, the courts grant Fourth Amendment protection to individuals when 
the government conducts a search. When law enforcement is looking for specific 
information that is not in plain sight by, for example, accessing a suspect’s private papers
597
 408 U.S. 1(1972).
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or computer files, conducting DNA tests, opening locked file drawers, or looking through 
someone’s residence or car, the Fourth Amendment mandates that the government obtain 
a search warrant. The most significant implication of the courts’ recognition of a new 
privacy-as-knowledge-control conceptualization should be that the courts would begin to 
treat KDD dataveillance like a search rather than like traditional surveillance.  This would 
have major due process implications for law enforcement. 
Currently, dataveillance via KDD is treated more like surveillance than a search
because KDD computer software surveys information that has been previously 
surrendered by individuals to various public and private entities. KDD applications scan 
this information in the same manner a police officer might scan a crowd of protestors in 
an attempt to identify individuals who appear threatening in some way. The officer, 
conducting surveillance, would not need a warrant to observe the protesters, and if KDD 
applications merely scanned information, they too would not invoke constitutional 
protections either. 
However, KDD does more than just scan information.  Through the application of 
algorithms, KDD discovers new knowledge by searching for patterns in individual data 
records. This is knowledge that has not been voluntarily disclosed by individuals.  
Similarly, if the police officer in the example above moved beyond merely observing 
protestors and began searching the bags belonging to various protestors, he would need 
search warrants absent a compelling justification for the searches.
Moreover, under the privacy-as-knowledge-control conceptualization, the courts 
should recognize that KDD applications are not only similar to searches but also similar 
to searches conducted with new technology that is generally unfamiliar to the public. As 
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Justice Scalia reasoned in his majority opinion in Kyllo, when the public is unprepared to 
protect its privacy interests from a new surveillance technology, constitutional 
protections are necessary, and the use of new surveillance technologies should be 
burdened by a warrant requirement.598 This is an additional justification for the courts to 
burden the government’s use of KDD applications for dataveillance purposes should the 
privacy-as-knowledge-control conceptualization be adopted. 
In adopting the new conceptualization of privacy, the courts also should address 
the issue of individualized suspicion.  Scholars have suggested that the use of KDD 
technology amounts to government surveillance of millions of individuals not suspected 
of any crime.  For instance, Dempsey and Flint argued:
Pattern analysis raises the most serious privacy and civil liberties 
concerns because it involves the examination of the lawful, daily activities 
of millions of people.  Pattern analysis poses concerns under both the 
constitutional presumption of innocence and the Fourth Amendment 
principle that the government must have individualized suspicion before it 
can conduct a search.599
The courts could answer this concern – the lack of individualized suspicion – by holding 
that KDD analysis becomes the equivalent of a search when the government attaches an
identity to a bit of discovered knowledge.  That should be the moment when an individual 
becomes entitled to a right to privacy as knowledge control.
A number of technological solutions have been suggested by information 
technology policy experts as to how law enforcement might introduce individualized 
598
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia held, “Where . . . 
the Government uses a device that is not in general public use . . . the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is 
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”
599
 Dempsey & Flint, supra note 34, at 1466-67; see also Tien, supra note 30, at 405 (also arguing that an 
automated search of personal data is a “search” in violation of the Fourth Amendment absent particularized 
suspicion).
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suspicion into KDD applications. As noted above, during the pre-KDD process, software 
reaches out and gathers data from various remote databases. At that stage, the identifying 
information should be encrypted and left in the localized databases from which the
temporary KDD databases are initially assembled. Then the KDD applications can be run 
on anonymous data.
Patterns sought by the government through KDD analysis of financial, medical, 
educational, criminal, or other information accessed in the distributed databases are 
wholly recognizable without identifying information. Once analysts identify the 
anonymous data records that match their target pattern, the courts should then require the 
government to apply for a warrant prior to being permitted to reattach the identifying 
information to each record. Thus, the government would need to show individualized
suspicion prior to beginning an investigation targeted at any one individual.
This is what Charles Weiss called Deanonymization –selective revelation of the 
identity of individuals connected to these patterns.600  Weiss went on to propose a three-
tiered “standard of proof” that the government should be required to demonstrate prior to 
reattaching the identifying information.601 K. A. Taipale also saw Deanonymization
predicated upon a showing of particularized suspicion as the solution to constitutional 
600
 Weiss, supra note 12, at 262.
601 Id. at 275-76. Weiss wrote: “[T]his article would propose that the standard of proof for 
Deanonymization of patterns possibly indicative of terrorist activity have three tiers.  The first standard 
should be reasonable, articulatable suspicion—the Fourth Amendment standard for the Terry stop. It should 
apply to transaction patterns, thought to be associated with the most serious forms of terrorist activity, such 
as nuclear, biological, or large scale chemical attacks. The second standard should be reasonable indication, 
the criterion for initiating an FBI investigation.  It should apply to those transaction patterns which do not 
point to the most serious forms of terrorist activity and are not derived from the most sensitive data or 
databases.  The third standard should be probable cause, the Fourth Amendment standard for search, 
seizure, and arrest.  It would apply in cases of transaction patterns not associated with these most serious 
terrorist activities, but relying on the most sensitive data or databases—for example, those holding personal 
information on finances, medical conditions, and intellectual and political activities through an individual’s 
library books, video rentals, magazine subscriptions, Internet surfing and the like.”
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problems that arise from federal dataveillance. Taipale wrote, “[S]elective revelation can 
reduce the non-particularized suspicion problem, by requiring an articulated 
particularized suspicion and intervention of a judicial procedure before identity is 
revealed.”602 Should the courts adopt the privacy-as-knowledge-control 
conceptualization, the major implication for law enforcement agencies conducting 
dataveillance should be that prior to Deanonymization individualized suspicion will need 
to be demonstrated before beginning an investigation of any individual flagged by a KDD 
application.
Conclusion
KDD dataveillance occurs in two stages.  First, during the pre -KDD processes, 
data are gathered from remote databases, formatted, and shared to create a temporary 
database to which the KDD applications can be applied.  Second, KDD applications in 
the form of subject-oriented link analysis, pattern analysis, and pattern matching are 
applied to the prepared data. This second stage discovers new knowledge about 
individuals.   
One serious obstacle to claiming constitutional privacy protections from either 
stage of KDD dataveillance is the heavy involvement of the private sector.  Private 
companies involved in federal dataveillance supply data, technology, and services and 
cannot be held constitutionally liable for infringing upon privacy rights. The country’s 
602 Taipale, supra note 20, at ¶29; see also Taipale, supra note 63, at 129 (discussing his proposal that 
“technical development strategies premised on separating knowledge of behavior from knowledge of 
identity based on the anonymization of data (for data sharing, matching and analysis technologies) and the 
pseudonymization of identity or authorization (for identification and collection technologies) can help 
protect individual autonomy while still meeting security needs”); id.at 217 (asserting that disaggregating 
privacy into identity and behavior for analytic purposes, and designing technical systems to help manage 
the circumstances of attribution, can help achieve a practical resolution to the apparent conflict between 
privacy-security interests).
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current national security posture makes it even more difficult because information 
regarding the specific roles performed by private as opposed to public entities in 
dataveillance is classified.  The existence of any constitutional protection against federal 
dataveillance depends upon an application of the current state action doctrine.  Private 
data companies working with the USIC or law enforcement in dataveillance programs 
would need to be considered state actors under the entanglement or public function 
exceptions. 
Assuming the state action doctrine is applied, the current privacy and information 
privacy doctrines, based upon conceptualizations of privacy as information control and 
privacy as confidentiality, if strictly applied by the courts, offer constitutional privacy 
protection from various pre-KDD processes.  They are not, however, able to protect 
individual privacy interests against federal dataveillance programs using KDD 
applications because these applications discover new knowledge and plaintiffs are 
currently unable to claim a privacy interest in information that they did not actually 
surrender to the government.  
This is another circumstance in which the development of new surveillance 
technology is driving the creation of a new privacy conceptualization.  In order to protect 
individual privacy interests, the courts must recognize a new conceptualization of 
privacy, privacy as knowledge control.  This conceptualization will allow individuals to 
claim privacy protection for newly discovered knowledge. As a hybrid of the privacy-as-
information-control and privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualizations, the new 
conceptualization might allow individuals to limit the government’s use of the discovered 
knowledge to the purpose of the specific search in which it was created as well as 
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empower individuals to compel government to notify individuals when information about 
them is created, that it is being stored for future use, and of the safeguards the 
government has implemented to protect the new knowledge.
If the privacy-as-knowledge-control conceptualization were adopted, there would 
be due process implications for the USIC and law enforcement. Currently, the courts treat 
dataveillance more like surveillance than like a search.  Searches require due process in 
the form of particularized suspicion and a warrant. Surveillance is generally unburdened 
by such requirements.  Should the courts extend constitutional protection to KDD 
applications, dataveillance should be burdened by procedural due process too. 
Information technology policy scholars are suggesting that particularized 
suspicion and a warrant be required before the government can attach an identity to 
otherwise anonymous data. The easiest way to accomplish this is to prohibit access to 
identifying information in the distributed database(s) to be used in a KDD analysis.  Once 
a KDD application has been run on compiled but anonymous data, the USIC or law 
enforcement agency involved would need to apply for a warrant prior to deanonymizing 
the records of interest.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this dissertation has been to explore whether the current 
conceptualizations of the constitutional rights to privacy in general and information 
privacy in particular are adequate to protect citizens against the U.S. government’s use of 
KDD technologies in dataveillance programs. The preceding discussion of First 
Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and information privacy cases has revealed the courts’ 
current conceptualizations of privacy in those three doctrines. Chapter 5 detailed how 
KDD dataveillance operates and discussed why a new conceptualization of privacy is 
needed to protect knowledge discovered by KDD applications.  This chapter reviews all 
five conceptualizations, presents a summary of this project’s findings, and provides
suggestions for further studies related to this topic.
Privacy Conceptualizations
Altogether, this dissertation has discussed five conceptualizations of the 
constitutional right to privacy.  Three broad conceptualizations emerged from the review 
of scholarly literature in Chapter 1: privacy as space, privacy as secrecy, and privacy as 
information control. Evidence of the courts’ adoption of these conceptualizations, 
implicit and explicit, was sought in a review of First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, 
and information privacy cases.  A fourth privacy conceptualization, privacy as 
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confidentiality, was discovered in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal information privacy 
cases.  Lastly, a new conceptualization of privacy, privacy as knowledge control, was
suggested in Chapter 5 as a necessary answer to the particular challenge to constitutional 
privacy protections posed by KDD applications.
The privacy-as-space is the oldest conceptualization of privacy with its roots in 
the Framers’ desire to protect private property against intrusions by the federal 
government. Over time, this conceptualization evolved to include protections against 
government access to one’s inner space, self, or inviolate personality as well as to 
physical space. The courts continue to recognize both variants of the privacy-as-space 
conceptualization in privacy jurisprudence. 
In the mid-twentieth century America became a credentialed society, and during 
this period the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization emerged. Under this 
conceptualization, when individuals shared information for any reason, with any third
party, they surrendered their privacy interest in that information.  This third-party 
doctrine severely limited information privacy rights because it was very difficult for one 
to conceal personal information and still function in society. In mid-to-late Twentieth 
Century, the courts began to recognize the notion of limited privacy, which held that 
individuals had the right to share personal information with some entities and not others.  
Though the courts never explicitly rejected the privacy-as-secrecy 
conceptualization, it lost its practical value to plaintiffs because the courts understand that 
nobody can live and function in modern society without sharing personal information 
with various entities.  Nevertheless, often during the process of establishing the
appropriate level of protection to which specific information may be entitled, the courts 
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will still discuss the extent to which the information in question had been shared with 
others. 
When the courts recognized limited privacy, they simultaneously recognized the 
right of individuals to choose who could access their personal information and who could 
not.  This spawned the privacy-as-information-control conceptualization.   Under, this 
conceptualization or its variations, privacy-as-property or privacy-as-contract, the law 
functioned to empower individuals relative to the public entities that collected their 
personal information.  One important market failure critique of privacy as information 
control has been that it presupposes that individuals have both the desire and 
technological expertise to exercise control over their personal information. 
In circumstances in which the government is using surveillance technologies that 
are generally unknown to the public, individuals are no longer capable of protecting their 
individual privacy interests; thus the law must burden the government’s use of such 
technology by conditioning their use on due process. In Kyllo, Justice Scalia held that 
searches conducted with a “device . . . not in general public use” are unreasonable 
without a warrant.603  The warrant requirement is a legal limitation that compensates for 
new technology.  
A fourth conceptualization of privacy has emerged in the new information privacy 
doctrine, the privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization.  It has its roots in Justice 
Steven’s assertion in Whalen that “the right to collect and use [data] for public purposes 
is typically accompanied by a concomitant statutory or regulatory duty to avoid 
603
 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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unwarranted disclosures.”604 Under this conceptualization of privacy individuals have a 
constitutional right to expect the government to have statutory or procedural safeguards 
in place to protect the confidentiality of personal information they surrender to the 
government. This conceptualization also provides that state actors will be aware of 
clearly established privacy interests and make every effort not to infringe upon those 
privacy interests through their discretionary actions.
Privacy Conceptualizations in Privacy Jurisprudence
Four research questions were presented in Chapter 1. This section draws upon the 
case analyses in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, as well as the discussion of KDD dataveillance 
presented in Chapter 5 to answer each of the four questions.
RQ1: How has the U.S. Supreme Court conceptualized the constitutional right to privacy 
in general in First and Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence?  
First Amendment Privacy
The First Amendment privacy doctrine is primarily concerned with identity or 
one’s ability to speak or associate anonymously.  Anonymity is the state wherein one 
decides to keep one’s identifying information – name, address, telephone number, social 
security number, etc. – secret even if other aspects of his or her personality, such as 
political or religious affiliation, have already been disclosed.  This notion of sharing only 
some aspects of one’s identity and not others is referred to as limited privacy, and the 
Courts have supported this idea as central to the right to speak or associate anonymously.
604
 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605 (1977).
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In Chapter 2, Supreme Court cases dealing with anonymous speech, anonymous 
association, and surveillance of public assemblies were reviewed. In a series of 
anonymous pamphleteering cases, the Court recognized the privacy-as-access-to-self 
conceptualization in its discussion of the importance of protecting one’s most private 
thoughts and beliefs, his or her inviolate personality. It reasoned that when individuals 
choose to hand out leaflets or proceed door-to-door to collect signatures, they are 
associating themselves with a cause, movement, organization, or belief.  The Court 
reasoned that materials such as political pamphlets, petitions, and religious leaflets all 
express political or philosophical positions and are generally intended to be persuasive. 
The mere act of distributing these materials in person provides strangers a glimpse of
least one of the pamphleteer’s or canvasser’s deeply held faiths or beliefs. 
An anonymous pamphleteer is an indistinct representative of a larger, more 
abstract belief system, but once an identity is attached to those beliefs, a more intimate 
portrait of the individual emerges. Individuals may choose not to participate in this form 
of public discourse if the cost is revealing their innermost selves to random members of 
the public.  In this circumstance, First Amendment free expression rights have been 
chilled and the number of voices in the marketplace of ideas lessened. In limiting the 
government’s ability to compel disclosure of identifying information absent a compelling 
state interest, the Court has protected free expression rights by empowering individuals to 
control the dissemination of their identifying information in First Amendment contexts.
Aside from protecting intangible interests like one’s innermost thoughts and 
emotions, the right to control identifying information also has a more tangible benefit. 
Were government permitted to compel individuals to surrender their anonymity, it would
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make them vulnerable to retaliation.  Even if government did nothing to retaliate against 
those espousing unpopular beliefs, compelled disclosure of identity could indirectly 
enable private actors to retaliate socially, economically, or physically.  The risk of 
retaliation, as was shown in a number of the cases discussed in Chapter 2, has proved 
sufficient to chill expressive behavior.  The Court has recognized that privacy, conceived 
of as the control of identifying information, reduces the threat to intangible and tangible 
personal interests alike.  Thus, this right to control the flow of identifying information, to 
choose anonymity, has been treated as an implied right under the First Amendment, 
necessary to the exercise of the other enumerated rights under the Amendment.
The Court’s discussion regarding canvassers who go door-to-door included 
consideration of the right of homeowners to know the identity of the individuals who 
enter upon their property.  This created a need to reconcile the spatial privacy 
conceptualization with privacy as a right to control one’s own personal information. The 
Court concluded, generally, that property owners could not compel canvassers to disclose 
their identities, but they had the right “not to listen” or “not to respond” to canvassers’ 
calls.  Stated another way, property owners had a right to restrict the flow of information 
into their property.  Thus, the spatial conceptualization was reinterpreted as a right to 
control information.  Homeowners maintain the right to control which ideas and what 
information flow into their homes.  At the same time, canvassers and pamphleteers 
maintained control over the revelation of their identities.  Thus privacy as access to self 
was also reinterpreted as right to control information.
The First Amendment also protects the right to remain anonymous in regard to 
one’s associations. The Supreme Court has struck down laws designed to force groups to 
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turn over membership lists, and it has held that it is unconstitutional for the government
to directly compel – for instance in legislative hearing – individuals to disclose their own 
membership in particular groups or to reveal the identities of other group members. When 
one joins a group, in most cases the other members are aware of his or her identity.  Yet 
the Supreme Court has protected the right of individuals to withhold the fact of their 
membership in groups from government.  This is limited privacy, and as such, a direct 
refutation of the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization.
The Court has held that groups are entitled to maintain the anonymity of their 
members by controlling the identifying information of their members. Again the Court 
recognized limited privacy.  Individuals have a right to share their personal information 
with some entities and yet maintain a privacy interest in that same information with 
regard to other third parties. This is the same posture assumed by the Court in the 
anonymous speech cases involving pamphleteers and canvassers.  
The Supreme Court also sought to prevent any chill on association rights that 
might result from the forcible surrender of membership information.  As noted above, 
when individuals’ identities are known, they may perceive themselves to be at risk of 
suffering retaliatory harms. In situations in which an individual is being compelled to 
disclose the identities of other members of a group, he or she may fear that all the 
members in the group are being exposed to the risk of retaliatory harms. If individuals 
believe there is a possibility they will be forced to reveal information about their groups’
memberships, they may stop joining groups. This could effectively eliminate any political 
power certain groups might amass.  Implicit in these anonymous association decisions 
was the notion that individuals, or groups on their behalf, should have the right to
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determine their own level of exposure to risk; the government  should not have the power 
to do that for them.
Fourth Amendment Privacy
The Supreme Court’s conceptualization of privacy under the Fourth Amendment
has evolved through four separate stages: the Fourth Amendment as a procedural 
component of Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination, privacy as space, 
privacy as secrecy, and privacy as information control. The advent of new surveillance 
technologies has been responsible for the Court having to move through the later three 
stages.
During the first stage, Fourth Amendment protections were subsumed under the 
Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination.  The Framers had been wary of 
centralized government and sought to limit its power over individuals.  They were 
particularly concerned about government intrusions upon private property for the purpose 
of obtaining material evidence to be used against individuals in Court. Fourth and Fifth 
Amendment analysis was combined such that material evidence gathered without a 
warrant was ruled inadmissible in court as a violation of the defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment rights.  This tendency to combine Fourth and Fifth Amendment protections 
was exemplified in Boyd v. United States.605
The Court eventually established Fourth Amendment analysis as distinct from 
Fifth Amendment analysis.  It was the advent of a new surveillance technology, wire 
605
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taps, that reframed the Court’s discussion in Olmstead v. United States606 as one 
concerned with privacy as space. By tapping phone lines leading into a private space, law 
enforcement agents could learn what was transpiring behind closed doors without ever 
setting foot on private property. They could constitutionally collect personal information 
from within private space without a warrant.  
Thus the Court ex plicitly conceptualized privacy as the  right to protect private 
space.  No warrant was necessary to gather evidence by any means that did not require 
physical trespass. Court decisions during this period were generally limited to making a 
determination as to whether the government had procured a warrant prior to invading any 
private space absent consent or expedient evidentiary concerns. 
In 1967 the Court adopted the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization. It rejected 
the principle of limited privacy and instead embraced the third-party doctrine.  This 
period began with Katz v. United States,607  in which the Court recognized the role of 
personal agency in the creation of a subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy.  It is 
tempting to think that privacy protections were expanded under such a conceptualization 
since it effectively made privacy portable. Constitutionally protected privacy could exist 
anywhere as long as one protected the information and didn’t share it with third parties. 
For example, in Katz, the Court had reasoned that the plaintiff had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in a public phone booth because he closed the door and paid for 
the exclusive use of a telephone line.
The courts would be tasked with determining whether an individual had taken 
sufficient action to create a subjective expectation of privacy in certain information, 
606 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
607 Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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materials, or space that society in general would consider reasonable. However, in 
practice, this conceptualization severely limited privacy protections because the Supreme 
Court was very conservative regarding what constituted a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.  If the information in question was in any way shared with a third party, then it 
was no longer entitled to constitutional protection.  As a result, none of the information 
shared with banks, phone companies, or even information that might be discerned from 
the contents of one’s garbage has been covered by the constitutional right to privacy.    
The courts have now largely replaced the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization 
with a new conceptualization of privacy, privacy as information control. In Kyllo v. 
United States,608 the Court recognized that new surveillance technologies were eroding
the ability of individuals to create a subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy in 
spaces and information. In response, the Court explicitly recognized a heightened privacy 
interest in situations wherein the government uses surveillance technology that is 
generally unfamiliar to the public. In Kyllo the Court implicitly held that the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect space so much as it protects government knowledge of what 
transpires within a particular space.  Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence may 
become all about an individual’s right to control access to personal information.
Reconciling Conceptualizations
Currently, the primary conceptualization of the constitutionally protected right to 
privacy in both First Amendment and Fourth Amendment privacy jurisprudence is 
privacy as information control.  The Court never explicitly adopted nor rejected any one 
privacy conceptualization.  Instead, it gradually began to discuss privacy interests –
608 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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anonymity, protecting one’s papers in a home, protecting one’s innermost beliefs, 
protecting the solitude of a home – in terms of information flow.  Privacy as space, both 
physical and the self, is still discussed by the courts when evaluating privacy interests, 
and the privacy-as-secrecy conceptualization has been abandoned.  
RQ2: How have the U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal 
conceptualized the constitutional right to information privacy? 
Information Privacy
The Supreme Court has recognized in very board terms a constitutionally 
protected privacy interest in avoiding the “disclosure of personal matters.” 609  The source 
of this right has been only vaguely defined.  It is at once a personal liberty under the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and rooted in the penumbras and emanations 
of specific protections within the Bill of Rights.  The Supreme Court in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services610 reaffirmed the Court’s holding in Whalen and 
established intermediate scrutiny, in the form of a balancing test, as the appropriate level 
of judicial review in information privacy cases. The Court has also indicated that 
information that is more closely related to intimate choices such as marriage, procreation,
and contraception is entitled to more privacy protection.611
This has been the extent of the guidance provided by the Supreme Court.  Since 
Whalen and Nixon, the U.S. Courts of Appeal have been defining the scope of this right, 
609
 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). 
610
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 Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
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labeled by the circuit courts since the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Plant v. Gonzales612 the 
right of confidentiality.  In doing so, the circuit courts have collectively constructed a 
new conceptualization of constitutionally protected privacy, privacy as confidentiality. 
Under this conceptualization of privacy, individuals have the right to compel what the 
Supreme Court has termed a “concomitant duty” from government.613 To fulfill this duty 
the government must take measures designed to safeguard the personal information that it 
has compelled individuals to surrender.
The privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization differs from the privacy-as-
information-control conceptualization in terms of agency.  In the privacy-as-information-
control conceptualization, the courts applied privacy law to enable individuals to control 
access to and the use of their personal information.  For example, the constitutional right 
to privacy might prevent a city ordinance from forcing a pamphleteer to reveal his or her 
identity.  Under the newer privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualization, the responsibility 
for safeguarding that information has transferred to the government.  
When a statute is challenged on information privacy grounds, the court will 
consider whether the government has statutory or procedural safeguards in place that are 
appropriate to the circumstances of the challenge. In qualified immunity cases, this duty 
takes the form of an expectation that state actors will be familiar with clearly established 
information privacy law and avoid violating individuals’ privacy through their 
discretionary actions.  If a state actor violates this expectation, he or she can be sued in a 
§1983 civil suit.
612
 Plante v. Gonzales, 575 F.2d. 1119 (5th Cir. 1978).
613 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605.
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Using the vague guideposts provided by the Supreme Court in Whalen, Nixon, 
and Paul, the federal circuit courts of appeal have generally recognized that the right to 
avoid the disclosure of personal matters by the government, the right to confidentiality, is 
either a protected liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment or an implied right with roots 
in the penumbras of specific protections in the Bill of Rights.  All the circuit courts 
except the Sixth have adopted intermediate scrutiny, in the form of a balancing test, as 
the appropriate level of substantive due process review for information privacy cases.
The scope of the information privacy doctrine has been developing as the circuit 
courts balance individual privacy interests against the government’s interest in collecting 
personal information. Two general types of circuit court decisions were reviewed in 
Chapter Four, those involving a constitutional challenge to a statute, subpoena, or other 
government policy and those involving a challenge to the action(s) of a public official or 
other state actor. In statutory challenges the court must first define the individual privacy 
interest at risk by considering three factors: the type of information in question, the type 
of plaintiff claiming infringement, and how government is safeguarding the information it 
collects.  The privacy interest, once defined, is then weighed against the government’s 
interest in collecting the information. This process of determining the individual privacy 
interest in a particular case has resulted in the emergence of a number of general trends.  
Under the first factor, not all information is weighted equally in the eyes of the 
courts.  Information related to the fundamental interests traditionally protected in 
Fourteenth Amendment due process privacy cases -- marriage, procreation, 
contraception, etc. -- will receive a higher level of constitutional protection.  For instance, 
instead of treating “medical information” as a monolithic construct, the circuit courts 
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have afforded different levels of protection to different types of medical information.  For 
example, pregnancy and HIV status have received stronger constitutional protections than 
prescription drug records.  
Plaintiff categories have also formed along a continuum.  In a hierarchy that in 
some ways mirrors the plaintiff categories in defamation law, private citizens have the 
highest level of protection, government employees have a moderate level, elected public 
officials have an even lower level, and convicts have the least protection. For example, 
the courts have held that since candidates for political office and city employees are paid 
with tax dollars and function in the public interest, citizens have a right to know more 
about them in order to deter corruption, conflicts of interest, etc.  The courts have held 
that state and local statutes compelling political candidates, city employees, and federal 
employees to disclose personal financial records were constitutional. Likewise, public 
safety has been held to justify disclosure provisions in sex offender registry statutes in 
two states.  Conversely, in two circuit decisions, law enforcement officials conducting 
criminal investigations were denied qualified immunity for breaching a promise of 
confidentiality to one private citizen who had been asked to aid in a criminal 
investigation and to another who had been subpoenaed to cooperate.  
The last factor used in defining an individual privacy interest in information 
privacy cases is whether and how the government fulfilled its duty to safeguard the 
information it had compelled from individuals. Courts have considered both statutory and 
procedural measures.  The more substantial the government’s information safeguards, the 
weaker the individual privacy interest that can be claimed. A statute containing specific 
guidelines regarding how the government body will access, store, and protect personal 
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information is much more likely to be found constitutional.  For instance, the circuit 
courts have accepted coding systems, locked storage rooms, limited access by 
government employees, and processing sensitive data on “offline” computers as adequate 
safeguards. The level of specificity required by the courts will vary from jurisdiction to 
jurisdiction.  While some have required an accounting of precisely how the government 
would protect information, others simply verified that some form of safeguard was in 
place.
Consideration of the type of information at issue, the plaintiff category, and the 
government’s information safeguards provides the court with a “value” for the individual 
privacy interest at stake in a particular case.  The more fundamental the value is, then the 
more compelling the government’s purpose for the alleged infringement must be.  
Improving the electoral process; informing citizens to enable self-government; promoting 
the public’s general health, safety, and welfare; and national security have each been 
considered substantial or compelling government interests. Conversely, in the circuit 
cases reviewed in Chapter 4, no government interest was put forth to justify the 
disclosure of personal information obtained from an investigatory subpoena to an 
insurance investigator, for the release of sensitive commercial information disclosed 
during the discovery phase of a defamation trial but not used in the trial, for disclosing 
the pregnancy status of a high school swimmer, nor for forcing teachers in a government 
educational program to sign an information disclosure agreement.  In each case the 
government’s statute or action was held to be unconstitutional. 
Once both the individual privacy interest and the government interest in 
disclosure have been defined, courts determine which is greater. If the government’s 
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interest is greater, the legislation in question will likely be ruled constitutional.  If the 
individual privacy interest is found to be more substantial, the legislation will likely be 
struck down.  In Chapter 4 a two-part algebraic expression was proposed to express the 
relationships between factors considered by the courts in information privacy cases:
(Type of Information + Plaintiff Category)  – Government Safeguards = Individual Privacy Interest
Individual Privacy Interest (>,<) Government Interest in Information = Decision
Resolution of a qualified immunity case does not involve a balancing test.  The 
objective in these cases is to determine whether a particular type of information has been 
generally granted constitutional protection by the courts, and if not, to decide whether the 
right to confidentiality should be extended to include it.  Should a court decide that the 
information in question is protected, analysis then turns to an evaluation of how clearly 
established a right of confidentiality in that type of information was at the time of the 
alleged infringement. 
The test for what constitutes a clearly established doctrine varies from circuit to 
circuit as judicial review in the cases involves an in-depth analysis of cases from both 
within and without each jurisdiction that have dealt with the information in question.  If 
at the time of the infringement there has been a Supreme Court ruling regarding the 
privacy interest or a number of circuit court decisions on point, then the law is more 
likely to be considered clearly established. The government’s concomitant duty is 
honored in these cases if the defendant, a state actor of some kind, is aware of clearly 
established privacy laws and avoids infringing upon information privacy rights through
his or her discretionary actions. If the defendant infringes upon the privacy of information 
that is protected but the legal protection is not clearly established, then the defendant is 
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entitled to qualified immunity and cannot be found civilly liable for the alleged 
infringement.  State actors are not entitled to qualified immunity if their action(s) violate 
a clearly established information privacy right.
Privacy Conceptualizations and KDD
There are two factors that must be understood prior to a discussion of whether the 
courts’ current conceptualizations of privacy are sufficient to protect individual privacy 
interests in personal information.  First, KDD dataveillance is not a monolithic operation, 
but instead has two distinct stages, pre-KDD processes and KDD applications, and each
of these has a number of sub-processes. During the pre- KDD processes, data is gathered 
from remote databases, formatted, and shared to create a temporary database to which the 
KDD applications can be applied.  The KDD applications -- subject-oriented link 
analysis, pattern analysis, and pattern matching -- are applied to the prepared data for the 
purpose of discovering new knowledge. The first stage involves the manipulation of 
preexisting data while the second involves the creation of completely new knowledge 
about individuals.
Second, any constitutional protection against federal dataveillance at either the 
pre-KDD processes stage or the KDD applications stage will require the courts to apply 
the state action doctrine. Private entities are heavily involved in KDD  as suppliers of 
data, technology, and KDD services.  Individuals cannot claim an infringement upon a 
constitutional right against private entities.  Thus, the following discussion of the 
adequacy of constitutional privacy protections regarding KDD dataveillance must be 
predicated upon the understanding that the judiciary will need to find that private entities 
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partnering with the USIC and law enforcement in KDD dataveillance programs are state 
actors under either the entanglement or public function exceptions to the state action 
doctrine.  Absent such a holding, it is unlikely that the courts will recognize a 
constitutional privacy interest in personal information subjected to KDD analysis.
RQ3: What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current conceptualizations of the 
constitutional right of privacy in general or the constitutional right of information privacy 
in particular as protection against KDD? 
As discussed in Chapter 5, this dissertation is concerned with the KDD analysis 
stage and not with the pre-KDD processes stage.  If the state action obstacle was 
surmounted, the current conceptualizations of privacy and information privacy, if strictly 
applied by the courts, would offer constitutional protection from pre-KDD processes.  
However, the current conceptualizations of privacy are insufficient to protect individual 
privacy interests against federal dataveillance programs using KDD applications. 
The current privacy conceptualizations fail to provide protection against KDD 
analysis for two reasons.  First, KDD analysis applications generate new knowledge, and 
it is unlikely that plaintiffs would be able to claim constitutional privacy protections for 
information they have not actually surrendered to the government.  Second, dataveillance 
is currently treated by the courts more like surveillance than like a search.  As such, law 
enforcement is not burdened by a warrant requirement or even a need to show 
particularized suspicion.
RQ4: If a conceptualization more protective of information privacy is needed, what 
should it be? How might KDD applications and policies be designed to better comply 
with the individual constitutional right to avoid the disclosure of personal matters?
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The advent of KDD dataveillance is the most recent circumstance in which the 
development of a new surveillance technology is driving the creation of a new privacy 
conceptualization.  In order to protect individual privacy interests, the courts must think 
about privacy in a new way.  They must recognize privacy as the ability of individuals to 
exert control over knowledge rather than merely over information.  This privacy-as-
knowledge-control conceptualization, a hybrid of the privacy-as-information-control and 
privacy-as-confidentiality conceptualizations, would allow individuals to limit the 
government’s use of the knowledge discovered in the KDD applications to the specific 
purpose of the search in which it was created.  It would also empower individuals to 
compel government to notify individuals when knowledge about them is created, that it is 
being stored for future use, and of the safeguards the government has in place to protect 
the new knowledge.
If the privacy-as-knowledge-control conceptualization were adopted, there would 
be due process implications for the USIC and law enforcement. Currently, the courts treat 
dataveillance more like surveillance than like a search.  Searches require due process in 
the form of individualized suspicion and a warrant. Surveillance is generally unburdened 
by such requirements.  If the courts extend constitutional protection to knowledge 
discovered in KDD applications, then federal dataveillance will also be burdened by 
procedural due process. 
The exact nature of this due process requirement is yet to be determined, but 
information technology policy scholars are suggesting that individualized suspicion and a 
warrant be required before the government can attach an identity to otherwise anonymous 
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data. This can be accomplished by using encryption software to remove identifying 
information from the distributed database records being gathered for use in KDD 
analysis.  KDD applications can then be run on compiled but anonymous data.  Once
analysts identify the records that match the pattern being linked, analyzed, or matched, 
the government should be compelled to apply for a warrant prior to deanonymizing the 
records of interest.
Directions for Further Study
The constitutional information privacy doctrine is still taking shape in the circuit 
courts.  As noted above, different types of personal information receive differing levels of 
constitutional protection.  The strongest protection is being granted to information most 
closely related to fundamental, personal liberties traditionally protected in decisional 
privacy cases – marriage, procreation, contraception, intimate relationships, etc.  One 
interesting avenue of inquiry would be to explore whether the distinction made in Whalen
between the privacy interest in avoiding the disclosure of personal matters and the
interest in the ability to make important decisions without interference from the 
government is being blurred by this trend. As courts continue to grant greater protection 
to information related to those liberties commonly discussed in decisional privacy cases 
and lesser protection to unrelated information, the question will become whether
information privacy is being subsumed into decisional privacy?  A study looking at the 
language of the courts to identify evidence of such a merger would be valuable.
It would also be valuable to further define the plaintiff categories emerging in 
information privacy cases.  The fact that categories roughly mirroring those in 
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defamation law are emerging from the circuit courts was briefly touched upon in this 
dissertation.  However, a closer examination of the courts’ language in these cases would 
likely yield a philosophical underpinning for this emerging pattern. Having a clear 
understanding of the courts reasoning could make this nascent doctrine more predictable 
across jurisdictions.  
A thorough study of how KDD technology partnerships between private data 
companies and the USIC might justify the application of the state action doctrine by the 
courts would be a valuable contribution. In order to determine whether private entities 
involved with federal dataveillance should be included under the entanglement or public 
function exception, the exact nature of these national security partnerships will need to be 
defined.  Such a project would be challenging since many of the details of these 
partnerships are classified because of the nation’s current national defense posture.  
Nevertheless, a determination needs to be made as to whether the government is merely 
privatizing dataveillance or if it is avoiding its constitutional obligations to safeguard 
individual privacy interests by acting through private entities.   
Another area that needs to be explored from a constitutional perspective is the 
value-sensitive design of new data technologies. This is exemplified above in the 
discussion of a process through which identifying information can be removed from 
digital data records prior to the application of KDD processes and then reattached to 
specific files only upon a showing of particularized suspicion.  Technology policy experts 
are suggesting that privacy and national security interests can be balanced through 
technology implementation strategies designed to promote rather than erode 
constitutional values.  It would be a fruitful avenue of inquiry to analyze each proposed 
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information technology policy in terms of the five privacy conceptualizations discussed 
in this dissertation.  
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